Objectivity

Author(s):  
Alexander Miller

Objectivity is one of the central concepts of metaphysics. Philosophers distinguish between objectivity and agreement: ‘Ice-cream tastes nice’ is not objective merely because there is widespread agreement that ice-cream tastes nice. But if objectivity is not mere agreement, what is it? We often think that some sorts of claim are less objective than others, so that a different metaphysical account is required of each. For example, ethical claims are often held to be less objective than claims about the shapes of middle-sized physical objects: ‘Murder is wrong’ is held to be less objective than ‘The table is square’. Philosophers disagree about how to capture intuitive differences in objectivity. Those known as expressivists say that ethical claims are not, strictly speaking, even apt to be true or false; they do not aim to record facts but, rather, express some desire or inclination on the part of the speaker. Others, dubbed subjectivists, say that ethical statements are in some sense about human desires or inclinations. Unlike the expressivist, the subjectivist views ethical claims as truth-apt, but as being true (when they are true) in virtue of facts about human desires or inclinations. Error-theorists and fictionalists argue that (atomic, positive) ethical claims are systematically and uniformly false, but that they may be regarded as trading in ‘useful fictions’. Some philosophers, referred to as antirealists, disagree with expressivism, subjectivism, error-theories and fictionalism, and attempt to find different ways of denying objectivity. Quietists, on the other hand, think that there are no interesting ways of distinguishing discourses in point of objective status and that philosophical debate about differences in objective status is in some sense misguided.

Author(s):  
Alexander Miller

Objectivity is one of the central concepts of metaphysics. Philosophers distinguish between objectivity and agreement: ‘Ice-cream tastes nice’ is not objective merely because there is widespread agreement that it is true. But if objectivity is not mere agreement, what is it? We often think that some sorts of claim are less objective than others, so that a different metaphysical account is required of each. For example, ethical claims are often held to be less objective than claims about the shapes of middle-sized physical objects: ‘Murder is wrong’ is held to be less objective than ‘The table is square’. Philosophers disagree about how to capture intuitive differences in objectivity. Those known as non-cognitivists say that ethical claims are not, strictly speaking, even apt to be true or false; they do not record facts but, rather, express some desire or inclination on the part of the speaker. Others, dubbed subjectivists, say that ethical statements are in some sense about human desires or inclinations. Unlike the non-cognitivist, the subjectivist views ethical claims as truth-apt, but as being true in virtue of facts about human desires or inclinations. Some philosophers, referred to as anti-realists, disagree with both non-cognitivism and subjectivism, and attempt to find different ways of denying objectivity. Quietists, on the other hand, think that there are no interesting ways of distinguishing discourses in point of objective status.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.


Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.


1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen D. Hudson

Everyone knows what it is to feel a conflict between a ‘non-rational’ desire and reason, as e.g., when we want a second dish of ice cream but think it would be unwise to take it. In such cases we commonly think of our desires as unreasonable: they prompt us to perform some action contrary to our deliberations. Nevertheless, most of us assume that reason can move us: that simply recognizing an act as the most reasonable thing to do gives us a motive to do it — even if in fact we do not perform that action. If we do not eat the second dish of ice cream we are disposed to think that we did not because we judged it unwise. If, on the other hand, we do eat the second dish, we are disposed to think we did because we were more strongly inclined toward eating than not eating, even though we were inclined toward refraining because we judged eating unwise. This is the position of the man on the street. It is the commonsensical notion of reason, motivation, and their relationship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5340
Author(s):  
Bilal Deveci ◽  
Serkan Türkmen ◽  
Cevdet Avcıkurt

Many countries are of rare plants growing thanks to geographial conditions. Spices which are rare and precious not only primarily provide different flavour and aroma to food and beverages but also commercially contribute to the economy of the country. The transformation of these plants into the spice is made throught traditional or contemporary methods. As a term association, spice generally evokes bitter, salty and refreshing feelings on people.  On the other hand, vanilla is also a spice that can be used in ice-cream, chocolate, dessert, pastry, and confectionery. Also, vanilla is utilized in sector such as medicine, cosmetic and parfume. The purpose of this study is to discuss the general characteristics of vanilla, the orchid plant family it belongs to, its tranformation process to be a spice, the contribution of vanilla type that can be produced in to the industry, the types of vanilla, its areas of usage, how vanilla is produced and differences between vanilla and vanilin. ÖzetBirçok ülke, coğrafi şartların uygunluğu sayesinde nadir olarak yetişen bitkilere sahiptir. Az bulunan ve kıymetli olan baharatlar; öncelikle yiyeceklere ve içeceklere farklı tat ve koku sağlamakta, diğer bir yandan da ticari olarak ülke ekonomilerine katkı sağlamaktadır. Bu bitkilerin baharat haline dönüştürme süreçleri geleneksel veya modern şekilde yapılmaktadır. İnsanlar tarafından genel olarak baharat, kelime çağrışımı itibariyle; acı, tuzlu, ferahlatıcı vb. his uyandırmaktadır. Fakat vanilya dondurma, çikolata, tatlı, pasta ve şekerlemelerde kullanılan bir baharat olma özelliği taşımaktadır. Ayrıca vanilya ilaç, kozmetik, parfüm gibi endüstrilerde de kullanılmaktadır.  Bu çalışmada vanilya bitkisinin genel özelliklerine, ait olduğu orkide ailesine, kullanılabilir bir baharat olması için geçirdiği sürece, üretilebilen türün endüstriye olan katkısına, vanilyanın çeşitlerine, kullanım alanlarına ve vanilinin nasıl üretildiğine, vanilya ve vanilin arasındaki farklılığa yer verilecektir.


Author(s):  
Dylan Murray

On the one hand, judgments about taste and aesthetics seem somehow more subjective than other judgments—those about matters of descriptive fact, for instance. On the other hand, it seems we sometimes genuinely disagree in virtue of making different taste and aesthetic judgments. And many theorists think that in order to ground genuine disagreement, judgments must have contradictory contents—contents that cannot both be true. Most semantic theories of taste and aesthetic predicates, including contextualism and truth relativism, attempt to account for the comparative subjectivity of taste and aesthetic judgments while preserving this supposed contradiction datum. This chapter presents results from three studies suggesting that while most people think they can disagree about taste and aesthetics, this is not because they think their judgments in this domain preclude one another’s truth. Indeed, the results suggest that many people do not regard judgments of taste and aesthetics as truth-apt at all.


Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip J. Nickel

AbstractAccording to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a falsehood but unintended hearers do not, and the phenomenon that the addressee may deflect challenges to his testimonial belief to the speaker but unintended hearers may not. Here I argue that we can do a better job explaining the normative statuses associated with testimony by reference to epistemic norms of assertion and privacy norms. Following Sanford Goldberg, I argue that epistemic norms of assertion, according to which sincere assertion is appropriate only when the asserter possesses certain epistemic goods, can be ‘put to work’ to explain the normative statuses associated with testimony. When these norms are violated, they give hearers the right to blame the speaker, and they also explain why the speaker takes responsibility for the justification of the statement asserted. Norms of privacy, on the other hand, directly exclude eavesdroppers and bystanders from an informational exchange, implying that they have no standing to do many of the things, such as issue challenges or questions to the speaker, that would be normal for conversational participants. This explains asymmetries of normative status associated with testimony in a way logically independent of speaker assurance.


Foods ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 1433
Author(s):  
M Kamal Hossain ◽  
Miroslav Petrov ◽  
Oliver Hensel ◽  
Mamadou Diakité

This study aimed to understand the influence of extruded microparticulated whey proteins (eMWPs) and process design in light ice cream processing by evaluating the microstructure and physicochemical properties. The inulin (T1), a commercial microparticulated whey protein (MWP) called simplesse (T2), a combination (T3), as well as eMWPs (as 50% volume of total particles): d50 < 3 µm (T4), and d50 > 5 µm (T5) were used as fat replacers. The first process design was pasteurization with subsequent homogenization (PH). The second process was homogenization with subsequent pasteurization (HP) for the production of ice cream (control, 12% fat, w/w; T1 to T5, 6% fat, w/w). The overrun of light ice cream treatments of PH was around 50%, except for T4 (61.82%), which was significantly higher (p < 0.01). On the other hand, the overrun of HP was around 40% for all treatments except T1. In both the PH and HP groups, the color intensities of treatments were statistically significant (p < 0.001). The melting behavior of light ice cream was also significantly different. The viscosity of all treatments was significant (p < 0.05) at a shear rate of 64.54 (1/s) for both cases of process design. A similar firmness in both the PH and HP groups was observed; however, the products with eMWPs were firmer compared to other light ice creams.


Author(s):  
Andre Gallois

A philosophical theory of perception must accommodate this obvious fact: when someone perceives, or seems to perceive something, how things appear may differ from how they are. A circular coin tilted will look elliptical. A stick partially immersed in water will look bent. Noting that appearance and reality do not always coincide, some philosophers have given the following account of the contrast between the two. Suppose someone seems to see a book with a red cover. Whether or not there is any book to be seen, the individual seeming to see the red book will be aware of something red. What they are aware of is called a sense-datum. According to a sense-datum theory, any perceptual experience involves awareness of a sense-datum whether or not it is an experience of a physical object. Some philosophers link a sense-datum theory with certain views about knowledge. According to foundationalists all knowledge of the external world must rest on a foundation of beliefs that are beyond doubt. We can always be mistaken about what physical objects are like. On the other hand, we cannot be mistaken about what sense-data are like. So, all knowledge about the external world rests on beliefs about sense-data. In this way a sense-datum theory is supposed to do double duty in contributing towards an account of perception, and an account of knowledge based on perception.


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