Properties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Daly
Keyword(s):  
Quality Attribute ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Categorical Properties ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Rival View

Asked to describe a given tomato, you might cite its redness, its size, and its age. In doing so, some philosophers would claim, you have cited some of the tomato’s properties. A property is what is variously called a feature, quality, attribute, or (as some philosophers put it) a way that something is. A property is supposed to be an entity that things (including particulars, such as tomatoes or people) have. The topic of properties is part of ontology (the study of what there is). The topic involves two key issues. The first issue concerns the nature of properties. That is, it concerns what sorts of entities properties are. One important question here is whether properties are located in space and time. Some philosophers follow Plato in thinking that properties are located in neither space nor time. Others follow Aristotle in thinking that properties are located in space and time. Another question is whether distinct individuals can literally have one and the same property. The view that they can takes properties to be repeatable entities, or universals. A rival view takes properties to be non-repeatable entities, or particulars. The second issue concerns the existence of properties. Given a view about the nature of properties – a view about what properties are supposed to be – there is then an issue about whether there are any such entities. The traditional debate typically took properties to be universals. Realists about universals argued that universals exist, whereas Nominalists argued that they do not. With greater recognition emerging during the last century of other ways of thinking of properties, the debate about the existence of properties has become many-sided. Philosophers who agree both about what properties are, and that properties so understood exist, may find other grounds for disagreement. This raises a subsidiary class of issues. For instance, do particulars exist in addition to properties? A given apple is edible, sweet to taste, and so on. Some philosophers argue that the apple is only a ‘bundle’ of these and other properties. Other philosophers disagree, and take the apple to be a ‘bare particular’ which has various properties, but is distinct from them. Other disagreements concern which properties exist, and how to classify them. For instance, is there a genuine distinction between so-called primary and secondary qualities? Again, is there a genuine distinction between so-called dispositional and non-dispositional (or categorical) properties?

Properties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Daly
Keyword(s):  
Quality Attribute ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Categorical Properties ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Rival View

Asked to describe a given tomato, you might cite its redness, its size and its age. In doing so, some philosophers would claim, you have cited some of the tomato’s properties. A property is what is variously called a feature, quality, attribute or (as some philosophers put it) a way that something is. A property is supposed to be an entity that things (including particulars, such as tomatoes or people) have. The topic of properties is part of ontology (the study of what there is). The topic involves two key issues. The first issue concerns the nature of properties. That is, it concerns what sorts of entities properties are. One important question here is whether properties are located in space and time. Some philosophers follow Plato in thinking that properties are located in neither space nor time. Others follow Aristotle in thinking that properties are located in space and time. Another question is whether distinct individuals can literally have one and the same property. The view that they can takes properties to be repeatable entities, or universals. A rival view takes properties to be nonrepeatable entities, or particulars. The second issue concerns the existence of properties. Given a view about the nature of properties – a view about what properties are supposed to be – there is then an issue about whether there are any such entities. The traditional debate typically took properties to be universals. Realists about universals argued that universals exist, whereas nominalists argued that they do not. With greater recognition emerging during the last century of other ways of thinking of properties, the debate about the existence of properties has become many-sided. Philosophers who agree both about what properties are, and that properties so understood exist, may find other grounds for disagreement. This raises a subsidiary class of issues. For instance, do particulars exist in addition to properties? A given apple is edible, sweet to taste, and so on. Some philosophers argue that the apple is only a ‘bundle’ of these and other properties. Other philosophers disagree, and take the apple to be a ‘bare particular’ which has various properties, but is distinct from them. Other disagreements concern which properties exist, and how to classify them. For instance, is there a genuine distinction between so-called primary and secondary qualities? Again, is there a genuine distinction between so-called dispositional and nondispositional (or categorical) properties?

scholarly journals Skilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Erik Rietveld
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Over Time

There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environmentand by taking into account the skills people have to engage with these affordances. For this reason we coin the term ‘skilled we-intentionality’ to characterize the intentionality characteristic of group ways of acting, feeling and thinking.

scholarly journals Georeferenced Open Data and Augmented Interactive Geo-Visualizations as Catalysts for Citizen Engagement

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thore Fechner ◽  
Christian Kray
Keyword(s):  
Digital Divide ◽  
Open Data ◽  
Open Government ◽  
Citizen Engagement ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Online Tools ◽  
The World ◽  
Ict Tools ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Large Groups

Citizen engagement figures prominently on political agendas around the world. In this context, high hopes are pinned to open government, open data and ICT tools. At the same time, there are fears of a widening digital divide, where large groups of society are in danger of being excluded from societal processes, for example due to having difficulties in using the online tools provided. In this paper, we propose an approach that has the potential to address many key issues in this context (e.g. accessibility, complexity, engagement). It relies on space and time as common integrators, and uses interactive augmented geo-visualizations to facilitate citizen engagement. We report on key challenges that need to be overcome to realize this approach and on initial progress towards this goal. We describe a set of prototypical tools aimed at supporting citizen engagement in the envisioned way, and discuss the approach as well as its potentials, issues and challenges in detail. Initial experiences and results indicate that our approach is not only technically feasible but it can also empower citizens to more effectively engage with societal and governmental processes.

Hume, Hegel, and Abstract General Ideas

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 28-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Considerable Extent ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Copy Theory ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Modern Context ◽  
Abstract Ideas

Abstract:Hegel's phenomenological method allows and requires him to justify his own positive views only by thorough internal critique of the views he opposes; Hegel calls this ‘determinate negation’ (§1). Hegel's transcendental-pragmatic epistemology is sharply opposed to empiricism. One key tenet of Modern empiricism is aconceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ of particulars. This view is deeply embedded in Hume's official ‘copy theory’ of sensory impressions and ideas. Both of these views are required by Hume's account of abstract general ideas. Both of these views saw widespread revival in twentieth-century empiricism. Can these views be criticised on strictly internal grounds, as Hegel requires? This paper answers in the affirmative. More thoroughly than any other philosopher, Hume attempted to analyse our conceptual, propositionally-structured thought solely in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, whether they be sensory impressions or their copies, ‘ideas’. In this context, Hume's account of our ideas of space and time have long been regarded as anomalies in, if not exceptions to, his account of the generality of thought. I argue that these ideas are not anomalous, but rather are typical of Hume's account of the generality of thought, an account that ultimately undermines Hume's official empiricist account of the generality of thought, based on his copy theory. I reexamine Hume's ‘idea of existence’ to identify some key equivocations between ‘ideas’ as objects and ‘ideas’ as concepts that are crucial to Hume's attempt to account for the generality of thought. The main issue is clarified by placing it within its Modern context (§2). The key issues are then specified by considering Hume's idea of existence (§3). The fundamental role played in Hume's account by his equivocations are then developed in detail by examining Hume's accounts of abstract ideas (§4), of distinctions of reason (§5), of the idea of equality (§6), and of the ideas of space and time (§7). On this basis I contend that Hume's account of the generality of thought is fundamentally linguistic, and is rooted in judgmental discriminations of kinds that cannot be accounted for by appeal to impressions of sensation or reflection, nor their corresponding idea-objects. These conclusions are reinforced and extended by critical evaluation of Garrett's analysis and defence of Hume's account of abstract ideas (§8). Hume is thus not only the great Modern exponent of the copy theory of impressions and ideas, he is also its first and still one of its most profound critics (§9). To this considerable extent, not only are the most basic principles of Hume's empiricism subject to internal critique, as Hegel requires, but Hume himself provides all the essentials of such a critique. These results serve to substantiate and highlight the philosophical significance of Hegel's critique of ‘Sense Certainty’ (§10).

scholarly journals Skilled we-intentionality:  Situating joint action in the living environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Erik Rietveld
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Over Time

There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environment.

scholarly journals The Unbearable Disembodiedness of Cognitive Machines

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-210
Author(s):  
Enrico Nardelli
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
Digital Systems ◽  
Social Infrastructure ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Key Issues

AbstractDigital systems make up nowadays the communication and social infrastructure and fill every parcel of space and time, affecting our lives both professionally and personally. However, these “cognitive machines” are completely detached from the human nature, whose comprehension is beyond their capabilities. It is therefore our duty to ensure their actions respect human rights and values of a democratic society. Education is one of the main tools to attain this goal, and a generalized preparation in the scientific basis of the digital technologies is a required element. Moreover, it is fundamental to understand why the digital automation has a nature completely different from the traditional industrial one and to develop an appreciation for human and social viewpoints in the development and deployment of digital systems. These are the key issues considered in this chapter.

Space for Lurking

2013 ◽  
pp. 149-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Warburton
Keyword(s):  
Design Pattern ◽  
Participatory Design ◽  
Social Space ◽  
Design Consideration ◽  
Social Spaces ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Pattern Approach ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Important Design

Despite its negative connotations, lurking is a valid activity for individuals entering an unfamiliar online social space, especially when deciding how to present themselves and their identity online. Providing the space and time for individuals to acclimatise to extant social rules and behaviours is an important design consideration. This chapter outlines key issues surrounding non-participative behaviour in online social spaces and describes the participatory design pattern approach that was used to develop a transferable solution to this recurring problem in the form of a design pattern.

Probing vacancies and structural distortions at individual defects in ceramics using EELS

1996 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 678-679
Author(s):  
D. J. Wallis ◽  
N. D. Browning
Keyword(s):  
Structural Information ◽  
Core Loss ◽  
Nearest Neighbors ◽  
Ceramic Materials ◽  
Scanning Transmission Electron Microscope ◽  
Real Space ◽  
Atomic Scale ◽  
Structure Property ◽  
Scanning Transmission ◽  
Key Issues

In electron energy loss spectroscopy (EELS), the near-edge region of a core-loss edge contains information on high-order atomic correlations. These correlations give details of the 3-D atomic structure which can be elucidated using multiple-scattering (MS) theory. MS calculations use real space clusters making them ideal for use in low-symmetry systems such as defects and interfaces. When coupled with the atomic spatial resolution capabilities of the scanning transmission electron microscope (STEM), there therefore exists the ability to obtain 3-D structural information from individual atomic scale structures. For ceramic materials where the structure-property relationships are dominated by defects and interfaces, this methodology can provide unique information on key issues such as like-ion repulsion and the presence of vacancies, impurities and structural distortion.An example of the use of MS-theory is shown in fig 1, where an experimental oxygen K-edge from SrTiO3 is compared to full MS-calculations for successive shells (a shell consists of neighboring atoms, so that 1 shell includes only nearest neighbors, 2 shells includes first and second-nearest neighbors, and so on).

Languages in Space and Time

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Patriarca ◽  
Els Heinsalu ◽  
Jean Leó Leonard
Keyword(s):  
Space And Time
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