Unconscious mental states

Author(s):  
Georges Rey

Unconscious phenomena are those mental phenomena which their possessor cannot introspect, not only at the moment at which the phenomenon occurs, but even when prompted (‘Do you think/want/…?’). There are abundant allusions to many kinds of unconscious phenomena from classical times to Freud. Most notably, Plato in his Meno defended a doctrine of anamnesis according to which a priori knowledge of, for example, geometry is ‘recollected’ from a previous life. But the notion of a rich, unconscious mental life really takes hold in nineteenth-century writers, such as Herder, Hegel, Helmholtz and Schopenhauer. It is partly out of this latter tradition that Freud’s famous postulations of unconscious, ‘repressed’ desires and memories emerged. Partly in reaction to the excesses of introspection and partly because of the rise of computational models of mental processes, twentieth-century psychology has often been tempted by Lashley’s view that ‘no activity of mind is ever conscious’ (1956). A wide range of recent experiments do suggest that people can be unaware of a multitude of sensory cognitive factors (for example, pupillary dilation, cognitive dissonance, subliminal cues to problem-solving) that demonstrably affect their behaviour. And Weiskrantz has documented cases of ‘blindsight’ in which patients with damage to their visual cortex can be shown to be sensitive to visual material they sincerely claim they cannot see. The most controversial cases of unconscious phenomena are those which the agent could not possibly introspect, even in principle. Chomsky ascribes unconscious knowledge of quite abstract principles of grammar to adults and even newborn children that only a linguist could infer. Many philosophers have found these claims about the unconscious unconvincing, even incoherent. However, they need to show how the evidence cited above could be otherwise explained, and why appeals to the unconscious have seemed so perfectly intelligible throughout history.

Author(s):  
Peter R. Monge ◽  
Noshir Contractor

Computer simulations have long been used as an effective tool in engineering, economics, psychology, and a number of other social sciences. Engineers typically use simulations to predict performance of a system that has known dynamic characteristics. These characteristics are typically obtained from theory and are then articulated in the simulation as difference or differential equations. The goal of engineering simulation is then to assess the dynamic performance of a system based on a priori knowledge of the dynamic relationships among the various elements of the system. Forrester (1961, 1973) was one of the earliest and most influential advocates of simulation modeling of dynamic social systems. Forrester advocated this approach as a way to model and assess the dynamics of industrial and world phenomena. Sterman (2000) provides a recent review of research on dynamics simulation from this tradition. While this approach has produced a considerable number of studies, it too is based on the assumption that the researcher has a priori knowledge of the dynamic relationships among elements of the system. Indeed, many of the results of these models have been criticized for specifying relationships that were at best untested and at worst flawed. In response to these criticisms, more recent interest has focused on redefining the utility of simulations in the social sciences. Rather than using simulations to test the long-term dynamics of systems with known interrelationships, theorists (Carley & Prietula, 1994; Contractor, 1994; Hanneman, 1988) have suggested that social scientists should use simulations to help construct theory, to identify the heretofore-unknown interrelationships. This section describes the traditional use of computer simulations as well as the adaptation of this approach toward theory construction and testing in the social sciences. Later sections will apply these general approaches to the computational modeling of networks in particular. Carley and Prietula (1994) suggest that the emergence of the new field of computational organizational theory (COT) signals the growing interest in the construction of computational models to augment and assist theory building. Most social science theories are richly evocative but highly abbreviated (Poole, 1997), that is, they offer explanations that suggest complex interrelationships but do not provide precise, falsifiable mathematical formalizations of the theory.


Author(s):  
Frances Egan

The article gives an overview of several distinct theses demonstrating representationalism in cognitive science. Strong representationalism is the view that representational mental states have a specific form, in particular, that they are functionally characterizable relations to internal representations. The proponents of strong representationalism typically suggest that the system of internal representations constitutes a language with a combinatorial syntax and semantics. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson argued that mental representations might be more analogous to maps than to sentences. Waskan argued that mental representations are akin to scale models. Fodor and Fodor and Pylyshyn argued that certain pervasive features of thought can only be explained by the hypothesis that thought takes place in a linguistic medium. A physical symbol system (PSS) hypothesis is a version of strong representationalism, the idea that representational mental states are functionally characterizable relations to internal representations. The representational content has a significant role in computational models of cognitive capacities. The internal states and structures posited in computational theories of cognition are distally interpreted in such theories. The distal objects and properties that determine the representational content of the posited internal states and structures serve to type-individuate a computationally characterized mechanism. Strong Representationalism, as exemplified by the PSS hypothesis, construes mental processes as operations on internal representations.


Philosophy ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 44 (167) ◽  
pp. 12-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Locke

The problem of necessity is fundamentally a problem of knowledge: how can we know not just that something is so but that it must be so, not just that a statement is true but that it must be true? The problem arises the moment we make two fairly familiar assumptions: that all knowledge comes, in the end, from experience; and that experience can tell us only that something is so and not that it must be so. From these it follows immediately that there can be no knowledge of necessary truths. Yet obviously we do have such knowledge: we know that bachelors must be unmarried and that the angles of a Euclidean triangle must total 180°. It seems equally obvious that we do not learn such facts from experience, from observing bachelors and triangles, so it seems clear which of the assumptions is mistaken. Whatever may be the success of Locke's attack on innate knowledge, it seems undeniable that we do have knowledge which does not come from experience. We do possess some a priori knowledge, viz. knowledge of necessary truths.


2020 ◽  
pp. 431-449
Author(s):  
Oleg V. Shekatunov ◽  
Konstantin G. Malykhin

The article is devoted to the specifics of studying the industrial labour force of Russia in the 1920s - 1930s in Russian historiography. The various stages of study from the 1920s through the 1930s and up to the last years are concerned. The relevance of the study is due to several factors. These include contradictions in the assessments of Bolshevik modernization of the 1920s and 1930s; projected labour force shortages in modern Russia; as well as the existing labour force shortage in industry at the moment. This determines the relevance of studying the historical period, which was characterized by the most acute personnel problems in the country. The novelty of the study is due to the fact that in modern Russian historiography there is no holistic, integrated view of the problems of the labour force potential formation of Russian industry in the 1920s and 1930s. It is noted that there is no research aimed at analyzing the historiography of these problems. The main stages of the study of industrial labour force are highlighted. The analysis of scientific works correlated with each stage of the study of the topic is performed. The problems and methodology of each stage are considered. A review of a wide range of scientific papers both articles and thesis is presented.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (23) ◽  
pp. 4403-4434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susimaire Pedersoli Mantoani ◽  
Peterson de Andrade ◽  
Talita Perez Cantuaria Chierrito ◽  
Andreza Silva Figueredo ◽  
Ivone Carvalho

Neglected Diseases (NDs) affect million of people, especially the poorest population around the world. Several efforts to an effective treatment have proved insufficient at the moment. In this context, triazole derivatives have shown great relevance in medicinal chemistry due to a wide range of biological activities. This review aims to describe some of the most relevant and recent research focused on 1,2,3- and 1,2,4-triazolebased molecules targeting four expressive NDs: Chagas disease, Malaria, Tuberculosis and Leishmaniasis.


Author(s):  
Robert Audi

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.


Author(s):  
Donald C. Williams

This chapter begins with a systematic presentation of the doctrine of actualism. According to actualism, all that exists is actual, determinate, and of one way of being. There are no possible objects, nor is there any indeterminacy in the world. In addition, there are no ways of being. It is proposed that actual entities stand in three fundamental relations: mereological, spatiotemporal, and resemblance relations. These relations govern the fundamental entities. Each fundamental entity stands in parthood relations, spatiotemporal relations, and resemblance relations to other entities. The resulting picture is one that represents the world as a four-dimensional manifold of actual ‘qualitied contents’—upon which all else supervenes. It is then explained how actualism accounts for classes, quantity, number, causation, laws, a priori knowledge, necessity, and induction.


Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyridoula Vazou ◽  
Collin A. Webster ◽  
Gregory Stewart ◽  
Priscila Candal ◽  
Cate A. Egan ◽  
...  

Abstract Background/Objective Movement integration (MI) involves infusing physical activity into normal classroom time. A wide range of MI interventions have succeeded in increasing children’s participation in physical activity. However, no previous research has attempted to unpack the various MI intervention approaches. Therefore, this study aimed to systematically review, qualitatively analyze, and develop a typology of MI interventions conducted in primary/elementary school settings. Subjects/Methods Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines were followed to identify published MI interventions. Irrelevant records were removed first by title, then by abstract, and finally by full texts of articles, resulting in 72 studies being retained for qualitative analysis. A deductive approach, using previous MI research as an a priori analytic framework, alongside inductive techniques were used to analyze the data. Results Four types of MI interventions were identified and labeled based on their design: student-driven, teacher-driven, researcher-teacher collaboration, and researcher-driven. Each type was further refined based on the MI strategies (movement breaks, active lessons, other: opening activity, transitions, reward, awareness), the level of intrapersonal and institutional support (training, resources), and the delivery (dose, intensity, type, fidelity). Nearly half of the interventions were researcher-driven, which may undermine the sustainability of MI as a routine practice by teachers in schools. An imbalance is evident on the MI strategies, with transitions, opening and awareness activities, and rewards being limitedly studied. Delivery should be further examined with a strong focus on reporting fidelity. Conclusions There are distinct approaches that are most often employed to promote the use of MI and these approaches may often lack a minimum standard for reporting MI intervention details. This typology may be useful to effectively translate the evidence into practice in real-life settings to better understand and study MI interventions.


Author(s):  
Gaojian Huang ◽  
Christine Petersen ◽  
Brandon J. Pitts

Semi-autonomous vehicles still require drivers to occasionally resume manual control. However, drivers of these vehicles may have different mental states. For example, drivers may be engaged in non-driving related tasks or may exhibit mind wandering behavior. Also, monitoring monotonous driving environments can result in passive fatigue. Given the potential for different types of mental states to negatively affect takeover performance, it will be critical to highlight how mental states affect semi-autonomous takeover. A systematic review was conducted to synthesize the literature on mental states (such as distraction, fatigue, emotion) and takeover performance. This review focuses specifically on five fatigue studies. Overall, studies were too few to observe consistent findings, but some suggest that response times to takeover alerts and post-takeover performance may be affected by fatigue. Ultimately, this review may help researchers improve and develop real-time mental states monitoring systems for a wide range of application domains.


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