IMF and World Bank Roles in the Latin American Foreign Debt Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 169-206
Author(s):  
Patricio Meller
2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-416
Author(s):  
Tafadzwa Pasipanodya

In the 1960s, all Latin American member states of the World Bank rejected a resolution recommending an international agreement that would create a center for arbitration in which private foreign investors could settle their disputes with member states. Nevertheless, the resolution was approved and the icsid Convention was born. Ironically, Latin American states – which later became party to the icsid Convention – have had to defend themselves against more expropriation claims before icsid than any other region. This paper analyzes these expropriation claims with a twofold goal. First, to highlight the cases against Latin American states that have been most influential in defining expropriation. And, second, to draw attention to those cases that have revived apprehension about Latin American states’ consent to be adjudged by icsid tribunals.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Cavarozzi

Transitions into democracy: convergence and distinct pathsIn mid-1982 Mexico's Minister of Finance, Jesús Silva Herzog, arrived in the United States and announced that his country was not going to continue paying its foreign debt. Silva Herzog's declaration was soon followed by debt defaults in many other Latin American countries, marking the beginning of the region's most serious economic crisis in this century. This crisis involved the partial breakdown of Latin America's financial and trade linkages to the world economy; the cessation of new credit money paralleled an interruption in the flow of capital investments, amounting to a total reversal of the financial patterns of previous decades. (The level of foreign investment, especially in manufacturing and mining, had been relatively high since the mid-1950s, albeit with significant differences from country to country).The debt crisis coincided, not incidentally, with a convergence of the political trajectories of five of the region's more industrialised countries: Mexico, Brazil, and the three Southern Cone nations of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. All five governments – the South American military dictatorships and Mexico's stable authoritarian PRI regime – experienced periods of political turbulence closely related both to the severe economic disruptions and to other domestic and international influences.One of the remarkable aspects of this 1982 political convergence was that it came after the ‘long decade’ of the 1970s, during which the governmental routes of the five countries had been extremely divergent. In Argentina, for example, instability, militarism and political violence had intensified, starting in 1969; these phenomena then spread to its traditionally more democratic neighbours, Chile and Uruguay.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabella Alcañiz ◽  
Timothy Hellwig

International structures tie the hands of policy makers in the developing world. Dependency on the world economy is blamed for low growth, high volatility and less redistribution of income than average, but the effect of international constraints on mass politics is relatively unknown. This study examines how citizens of developing democracies assign responsibility for policy outcomes. A theory of the distribution of responsibility, combining insights from the political economy of development and the study of mass behaviour, is presented. Evidence from seventeen Latin American countries shows that citizens often blame policy outcomes on international and private-sector actors, to which they, as voters, have no direct recourse. Ties to world markets and the International Monetary Fund, especially foreign debt, shift responsibility towards international actors and tend to exonerate national politicians.


2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Herman

This essay characterizes the main actors and how they operate during a buildup of government foreign debt and after a default on payments. These actors are the borrowing governments, domestic and foreign commercial banks, purchasers of government bonds, other governments lending to the debtor, and multilateral institutions (the International Monetary Fund and development banks). As there is no international sovereign analog to national court-supervised bankruptcy in the case of countries, the workout from crises, mainly hitting poorer economies, occurs without legislated rules or an enforcement mechanism, although the IMF (sometimes with the World Bank) serves as an informal umpire for the global financial community.


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