The transformative impact of the Great Recession on the political system

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-160
Author(s):  
Eva H. Önnudóttir ◽  
Agnar Freyr Helgason ◽  
Ólafur Th. Hardarson ◽  
Hulda Thórisdóttir
Author(s):  
Sebastián Royo

After over two decades of prolonged economic growth, Spain suffered its worst economic crisis in decades between 2008 and 2014. The political, social, and economic consequences of this crisis were very severe: unemployment increased sharply reaching over 27 per cent; inequalities deepened; and the two-party political system was transformed by the emergence of new parties. The implementation of structural reforms, which intensified as a result of the European Union financial sector bailout of 2012, led to economic recovery. As a result, credit was restored, strong economic growth resumed, and the political system did not implode. Yet, persistently high unemployment (particularly as regards youth and long-term) as well as inequality (and to a certain extent poverty) still persist a decade after the crisis. This chapter looks at the genesis of the crisis and examines the responses to the crisis, as well as its economic, social, and political consequences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Torcal ◽  
Pablo Christmann

We test the importance of responsiveness, performance and corruption to explain the evolution of political trust in Spain between 1997 and 2019. To this end, the study analyses two longitudinal datasets, namely, a repeated cross-sectional dataset from the Spanish samples of Eurobarometer and an individual-level panel survey conducted during a period of economic recovery in 2015. The study finds that perceptions about political corruption and responsiveness matter greatly in shaping political trust and to a lesser extent economic performance. Although the Great Recession is likely responsible for the sharp decline in trust towards political parties and the parliament between 2008 and 2012, the analysis suggests that trust in representative institutions remains low even after the Recession because of a series of devastating corruption incidents and a perceived lack of responsiveness of the political system. On the other hand, the study finds indications that trust in the judicial system might have been mainly affected by perceptions of corruption.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tobias Arnold ◽  
Sean Mueller ◽  
Adrian Vatter

Abstract Over the past decades, decentralization has become the new paradigm in how states should organize power territorially. Carefully planned institutional re-designs are the most visible expression thereof. Yet the Great Recession of 2007–2009 has pushed governments into the opposite direction, i.e., towards centralization, to better weather the fiscal drought. Given these contradictory developments, this article compares the effects of twenty-three separate state reforms with the impact of the Great Recession on fiscal centralization in twenty-nine countries over more than two decades. In the main, our analyses attribute a larger effect to design, i.e., pro-active policy making through reforms, than reactive crisis management after a great shock. However, this difference is only apparent once we consider a state’s institutional structure, that is whether a political system is unitary or federal. Our findings thus highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to better understand the drivers of fiscal de/centralization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110474
Author(s):  
Carlos Sanz ◽  
Albert Solé-Ollé ◽  
Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

We investigate whether corruption amplifies the political effects of economic crises. Using Spanish municipal-level data and a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that local unemployment shocks experienced during the Great Recession (2008–2015) increased political fragmentation. This effect was four times larger in municipalities exposed to malfeasance than in municipalities without a history of political corruption. We bolster this evidence by showing that, conditional on province and population strata fixed effects, there is no evidence of differential pre-trends. We also find that the interaction of unemployment and corruption harms the two traditional main parties and benefits especially the new party on the left ( Podemos).


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kostis Kornetis

This article engages the argument that the 2008–2009 Great Recession forced a revisiting of the period of transitions in Spain, Greece, and Portugal as “political masterpieces,” especially among a younger generation of activists. It argues that this radical reevaluation turned the conflicting generational recollections of the past into pivotal components of present political contestation. Moreover, it shows how the redeeming power of the transitions animates the political, cultural, and public discourse of young politicized people who, although (or precisely because) they have not experienced these events directly, keep returning to them to make sense of contemporary politics. The complex relations between past and present are analyzed using oral histories with the so-called Generation 2 of the transitions, namely people who have only “projective memories” of these events during the 1970. Especially relevant is the effects of their participation in the 2011 indignados movements.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith A. Richman ◽  
Robyn Lewis Brown ◽  
Kathleen M. Rospenda

Research derived from the stress paradigm suggests that certain types of coping (e.g., problem-focused coping instead of behavioral disengagement) are protective against problem-related drinking to deal with social stressors. Going beyond the typical focus in the coping literature, we hypothesize that stressors engendered by macrolevel social forces may require coping actions within the political realm in contrast to modes of coping focused outside of the political realm. A United States sample of 663 respondents completed a mail survey in 2010, including measures of stressful consequences of the Great Recession, drinking patterns and problems, modes of coping encompassed in the Brief COPE instrument, and politically oriented coping. Structural equation modeling examined whether modes of coping mediated the links between stressors and drinking outcomes. A substantial portion of the associations between stressors and drinking was explained by modes of coping. Politically oriented coping was protective against problem drinking for both genders. Future studies should further explore politically oriented coping in addition to modes of coping outside of the political realm when studying the relationships between macrolevel social stressors and deleterious drinking outcomes.


Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea LP Pirro ◽  
Paul Taggart

The European Union has been recently exposed to the multiple shocks of the Great Recession, the migrant crisis, and Brexit. Populist parties have been, either directly or indirectly, considered the principal beneficiaries of these crises in light of their Eurosceptic profiles. In this introductory article, we lay out the conceptual and analytical tools necessary to identify populist Eurosceptic actors, and systematically tackle the under-explored link between populist Eurosceptic framing and the unfolding of the different European crises. While we provide a framework to assess (alleged) changes in the framing of these parties, we also contend that these parties may have released effects in the political process by conditioning shifts in the positions on Europe of their mainstream competitors. In doing so, we define a set of possible interactive scenarios.


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