Integrating Pedestrian Lighting into Transportation Design, Operations, and Maintenance

2021 ◽  
pp. 128-154
Author(s):  
Frank Markowitz
2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 441-447
Author(s):  
J. Davis ◽  
G. Cashin

This paper examines the similarities and differences between public and private ownership of water utilities, including variations such as corporatisation. In any utility where the asset owner and the asset operator are the same, there are pressures to reduce operations and maintenance costs and capital expenditure to maximise returns. The authors argue that this is the case irrespective of whether such returns are to private shareholders or dividends to government. On the other hand, where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate entities with a clearly defined contractual interface, it is not possible to increase returns by reducing operations and maintenance standards, presuming a properly constructed contract. This is because the performance standards are clearly stipulated in the contract with payment reductions applying for non-performance. Such a model can be put in place irrespective of whether the asset owner is a private company or a public utility. The paper examines the profit incentive applying to private and public sector organisations in models where:the asset owner and the asset operator are the same organisation;models where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate organisations, with the service delivery performance governed by a clearly defined contractual interface. The paper shows why the drivers governing the behaviour of public sector and private sector owners are similar, and how the separation of asset owner and asset operator can be used to ensure that service delivery standards are achieved at the lowest cost, whilst providing full transparency to shareholders, regulators and customers alike. The paper also reviews actual comparative data on service quality and performance under a number of ownership and contractual models, and draws conclusions on the effectiveness of the various asset owner/operator models in terms of service delivery performance and costs.


Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 1050
Author(s):  
Ruben Jimenez-Redal ◽  
Germán Arana-Landín ◽  
Beñat Landeta ◽  
Jaime Larumbe

Developing understanding of the economic value that communities ascribe to improved operations and maintenance (O&M) services has emerged as a key factor in achieving financial sustainability for rural water systems. The present study elicits household willingness to pay (WTP) for improved O&M services in eight gravity-fed water schemes in Idjwi Island (Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC). A contingent valuation survey was implemented through an open-ended format questionnaire to 1105 heads of household and a log-linear regression model was employed to assess the factors influencing higher values. Findings show an average willingness to pay of 327 Congolese Francs (CDF) per month and 36 CDF per bucket. Results also indicate a significant WTP differential among studied schemes. The analysis of the conditioning factors reveals that the level of excludability, the participation in management meetings and the time employed in fetching water from an improved source are contingent with their WTP. The findings of this study are important for development agents trying to establish acceptable, affordable and practicable tariffs that help finance reliable rural water systems in Idjwi.


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