Religious Equality in the Spanish Constitutional System

2016 ◽  
pp. 321-332
2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Eliot Olivier

Political controversies in New South Wales and Canada recently have focused public attention on the constitutional practice of proroguing parliament. They have also shone a light on two lingering areas of uncertainty that surround its operation under the Commonwealth Constitution. This article seeks to clarify these two muddy areas of the law concerning prorogation. The first is the effect of prorogation on the Senate and its committees. Since Federation, the Senate has purported to authorise its committees to continue to function notwithstanding a prorogation of the Parliament. However, it is argued that this practice is unsupported by the provisions of the Constitution and the Senate has no such power. Second, the article examines the operation of the conventions that constrain the Governor-General's power to prorogue. Prorogation generally is exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, this article contends that where a Prime Minister seeks to prorogue Parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence, the Governor-General will have a discretion to reject the advice. It may also be open to the Governor-General to reject an advice to prorogue where the purpose is to avoid scrutiny of a fundamental constitutional illegality. In Australia, the uncertainties that surround prorogation, coupled with the now precarious political landscape in Canberra, create the very real possibility of a prorogation crisis at the Commonwealth level. This article provides a response to these uncertainties. In doing so it offers a solution to how a prorogation crisis can be resolved, whilst maintaining the fine balance of power in our constitutional system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Breno Valadares (CIHJur)

Neste ensaio, defende-se que o contraste entre o sistema constitucional de 1988 e os pretéritos, sobretudo o imediatamente anterior (Ditadura Militar), permite constatar a instauração de um regime político democrático. Diz-se que esse regime apresenta-se como condição para que os direitos fundamentais possam evoluir no sentido de sua concretização constitucional. Mas, à implementação de liberdade de expressão, não se seguiu a concretização dos direitos relacionados com a segurança, a liberdade de locomoção e o devido processo legal nem uma revolução educacional. Por outro lado, o sistema constitucional não se manteve estático. Uma elite política que precisa prestar contas a um eleitorado periodicamente é pressionada a dar respostas aos anseios desse eleitorado. Algumas ações governamentais revestem-se desse sentido. Entretanto, uma evolução nesse sentido não poderia limitar-se à simples dinâmica eleitoral, até porque existem aí diversas distor-ções, decorrentes da relativa fraqueza da opinião pública.


1905 ◽  
Vol 18 (8) ◽  
pp. 635
Author(s):  
Westel W. Willoughby

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (01) ◽  
pp. 17-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Fisher

From World War II to the present, prominent scholars placed their hopes in the presidency to protect the nation from outside threats and deal effectively with domestic crises. Their theories weakened the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances by reviving an outsized trust in executive power (especially over external affairs) that William Blackstone and others promoted in eighteenth-century England. The American framers of the Constitution studied those models with great care and fully rejected those precedents when they declared their independence from England.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 1017-1038 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurens van Puyenbroeck ◽  
Gert Vermeulen

A critical observer would not deny that the practice of European Union (‘EU’) policy making in the field of criminal law in the past decade since the implementation of the Tampere Programme has been mainly repressive and prosecution-oriented.1 The idea of introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, guaranteeing the rights of defence at a EU-wide level, has not been accorded the same attention as the introduction of instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-fighting. What does this mean for the future of EU criminal policy? Will the EU succeed in the coming years in developing an area where freedom, security and justice are truly balanced? According to several authors, to date the EU has evolved in the opposite direction. As one observer put it:[I]f Procedural Criminal Law arises from the application of Constitutional Law, or indeed if it may be described as “a seismograph of the constitutional system of a State”, then as a consequence the Procedural Criminal Law of the European Union shows the extent of the Democratic Rule of Law, of the existence of a true “Rechtsstaat”, within an integrated Europe. This situation may be qualified as lamentable, as the main plank of the EU's criminal justice policy relates to the simplification and the speeding up of police and judicial cooperation—articles 30 and 31 of the Treaty of the EU—but without at the same time setting an acceptable standard for fundamental rights throughout a united Europe.2


2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Attila Vincze

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1(162) ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Piotr Uziębło

The problems raised in the doctrine of constitutional law related to the implementation of a decision taken in a referendum in matters of particular importance to the state, as well as the generally marginal use of the institution of popular vote in the constitutional prac-tice, give rise to reflection on the introduction of the institution of a referendum law into the Polish constitutional system. In this article the author considers the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution, analyzing at the same time contemporary normative regulations concerning such acts in other countries. The research leads to the conclusion that despite the risks involved, the refer-endum law should appear in the Polish constitutional system in the future, as it would not only give a chance for a more complete reflection of the will of the collective subject of sovereignty without the necessity of its decoding by the parliament, but it could also be an impulse for the development of the referendum practice in the Republic of Poland. However, it is important to introduce proce-dural barriers that will prevent depreciation of this institution.


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