Shaping Presidential Powers in Hungary: Convention, Tradition and Informal Constitutional Amendments

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Attila Vincze

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 211
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yoppy Adhihernawan ◽  
Annisa Nur Fadhila

Impeachment is a part of the control mechanism in the constitutional system to allege the President's violation of the constitution. Impeachment characterizes presidential systems as implemented in various countries, such as the United States, South Korea, and Indonesia. This study aimed to examine the rule and practice on the impeachment of the President and/or Vice President in Indonesia, with reference to the United States and South Korea. Then, it analyzed how this mechanism is effective to be implemented in Indonesia. This study used a juridical research method with a comparative law approach. This study indicated differences in impeachment in the United States, South Korea, and Indonesia. The impeachment mechanism in the United States only involved representative institutions, but that in Indonesia and South Korea required judicial intervention. In particular, Indonesia's impeachment dealt with the decision that remained in the hands of the political institution, the People's Consultative Assembly. In South Korea, the final decision ended in the judicial institution. Through this comparison, Indonesia should reformulate the impeachment mechanism of the President and/or Vice President in Indonesia with the following suggestions. First, regarding allegations of serious violations, the final impeachment decision must be in the Constitutional Court. Second, concerning allegations of misconduct, the decision on impeachment must rest with the People's Consultative Assembly. KEYWORDS: Impeachment, Indonesia, South Korea, United States.


Author(s):  
Espinosa Manuel José Cepeda ◽  
Landau David

The 1991 Constitution sets up a relatively flexible system of constitutional change, which can be activated through several different routes. The Constitution has thus been frequently amended since its enactment. The Colombian Constitutional Court has been aggressive in policing the tools of constitutional change. It has been meticulous in ensuring that amendments follow the proper congressional procedures, and in the case of amendments via referendum it has ensured that questions are sufficiently clear and do not bias voters toward certain answers. Most significantly, the Court had developed a substitution of the constitution doctrine, where it has struck down some constitutional amendments on the ground that they replaced core provisions of the existing constitution, rather than merely changing them. This doctrine was most famously used in a case striking down a constitutional amendment that would have allowed the popular president Alvaro Uribe to run for a third straight term.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald F. King ◽  
Susan Ellis

A constitution is a set of rules written by current political actors designed to bind future political actors. As fundamental law, it stipulates basic rights and duties, defines collective goals, establishes institutions and procedures, and makes claims regarding both identity and allegiance. In their effort to control the future, constitutional founders usually include special provisions regarding change. Alterations to the fundamental law are more difficult to accomplish than alterations to more ordinary laws. Founders often require super-majorities, even special, repetitive, or con-current super-majorities, as a condition for amendment. In this sense, even democratic constitutions impose conscious constraints on the exercise of democratic will. The intention is to limit the pace of adaptation and also to bias the pattern of outcomes.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-692
Author(s):  
Gábor Spuller

The new Constitution and the new Act are changing the status of the Hungarian Constitutional Court by developing the Hungarian constitutional tradition, creating better collaboration between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary, and establishing an effective instrument for the protection of individual human rights. But the pattern of the Parliament reacting to the rulings of the Constitutional Court with constitutional amendments reduces the competences of the Constitutional Court. It is to be hoped that this process is coming to an end, because otherwise the achievement of the “paradoxical revolution of law” is endangered.Due to the former extensive competences in terms of law review and its limited influence on ordinary jurisdiction, the status of the Constitutional Court caused problems. Because of the abstract nature of the procedures, the distance from the ordinary judiciary, and the power dilemma between the Constitutional Court and the Parliament respectively, the Government decided the main stream of its ruling up to 2012.Now there are some important changes, especially the introduction of a widespread constitutional complaint. The abolition of the actio popularis is justified. The relationships between the state organs seem to be better clarified and adjusted. The European clause of the 1949/1989 Constitution, which was largely retained in the Fundamental Law, contains a fundamental concept, which is that the European Union is founded on strong sovereign Member States. On the other hand, the Fundamental Law strengthens Hungary's ties to Europe by making these an integral part of that law. As the Constitutional Court had not yet really applied the European Clause, it now has the opportunity to put these two concepts into practice and make them mutually compatible by enforcing them at a high level.The discussions concerning the newest constitutional developments in Hungary mainly have their origin in the power struggle between the constituent majority of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. It is not clear, however, how long this conflict will continue to be a matter falling solely within the national sovereignty of Hungary. Due to the parliamentary super-majority of the governing parties, the Constitutional Court is losing its power. Hungary is a unitary state; it is an open question whether there is any substitution needed to balance the power of the governing parties. Nevertheless, in spite of the substantial restrictions on reviewing the constitutionality of financial laws and the several amendments of the new Constitution, the Constitutional Court still plays a role in safeguarding democratic checks and balances. Indeed, it can have a positive impact on the European integration of Hungary. It has been granted new competences to guarantee constitutional unity within the Hungarian legal system and to complete the enforcement of individual rights. The Constitutional Court should make better use of its new granted competence to remedy any possible grievance entirely.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
H Muhamad Rezky Pahlawan MP

Impeachment is an accusation or indictment of the President or another country's high officials from his position. Impeachment is not new in the history of Indonesian constitution, but the change in the Constitution has caused a change in the constitutional system as well as related to the mechanism of the dismissal of the President and / or Vice President. how is the Impeachment reviewed globally, the history of impeachment in Indonesia and the implementation of impeachment in other countries, the impeachment process of the president according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The process of impeachment in Indonesia after changing the constitution goes through three stages, namely impeachment in the House of Representatives, the Court The Constitution, and the People's Consultative Assembly. Keywords: Impeachment, Constitutional Court, Government


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Rebessi ◽  
Francesco Zucchini

AbstractIf we examine the current literature, no study on policy agenda has so far addressed the agenda of a Constitutional Court in a country that has recently experienced crucial changes in its political system. The present contribution on the Italian Constitutional Court seeks to bridge this gap. We aim at assessing the role the Italian Court plays in the policy process in both the First and the Second Republic by answering two research questions: (1) in its decisions does the Court accommodate themes that are neglected in the parliamentary legislative process? (2) Does the Court (and if so, how often) represent interests and values in opposition to the interests and values supporting the current legislative majorities? By employing an original data set that puts together all decisions of constitutional illegitimacy under incidental review between the years 1983 and 2013, we found that in both Republics Court’s agenda is significantly more concentrated than Parliament’s agenda, and it does not broadly offer an alternative access point to the policy-making for new or neglected issues. However, at the same time, the alternational system of the Second Republic seems to trigger more immediate and ‘salient’ reactions from the Constitutional Court, which in that period becomes more prone to sanction recent legislation.


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