Slovak Constitutional Court: Interpretation of the Constitution established a new gap in the constitutional system

ICL Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Mokrá
2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Attila Vincze

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
H Muhamad Rezky Pahlawan MP

Impeachment is an accusation or indictment of the President or another country's high officials from his position. Impeachment is not new in the history of Indonesian constitution, but the change in the Constitution has caused a change in the constitutional system as well as related to the mechanism of the dismissal of the President and / or Vice President. how is the Impeachment reviewed globally, the history of impeachment in Indonesia and the implementation of impeachment in other countries, the impeachment process of the president according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The process of impeachment in Indonesia after changing the constitution goes through three stages, namely impeachment in the House of Representatives, the Court The Constitution, and the People's Consultative Assembly. Keywords: Impeachment, Constitutional Court, Government


Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

By presenting the Court’s principal lines of case law regarding the allocation of powers in the Italian constitutional system, this chapter explores the constitutionally regulated relationships among the President, Executive, Parliament, and Judiciary. It reveals that rather than a “separation of powers” in the conventional sense of contemporary constitutional models, the Italian system is best described as instituting a set of reciprocal “relations of powers” with the Constitutional Court as the “judge of powers” that maintains and guarantees these interrelationships of constitutional actors. The chapter explores this role of the Constitutional Court in its relations with both Parliament and the President of the Republic, as well as the Court’s regulation of the relationship between the President and the Executive.


Author(s):  
María Isabel Álvarez Vélez

La STC 51/2017, de 10 de mayo, ha estimado el recurso de inconstitucionalidad presentado por el Presidente del Gobierno en relación con determinados preceptos de la Ley catalana 4/2010, de 17 de marzo, de consultas populares por vía de referéndum. Esta Sentencia nos sirve para realizar unas reflexiones acerca de la regulación de las vías de participación directa en nuestro sistema constitucional y de las consideraciones que ha realizado el Tribunal acerca del contenido de la mencionada norma.The STC 51/2017, of May 10, has estimated the appeal of unconstitutionality presented by the President of the Government in relation to certain precepts of the Catalan Law 4/2010, of March 17, of popular consultations by referendum. This Judgment serves to make some reflections about the regulation of direct participation in our constitutional system and the considerations that the constitutional Court has made about the content of the mentioned norm.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Becker

Even experienced scholars will have to think for quite a while when asked to remember whether a similar situation has ever occurred: A tiny constitutional provision in the organisational part of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law), not exactly neglected by learned writers but definitely never seen as a source of major problems, became the starting point of one of the most emotional outbursts German politics has ever experienced. The said provision, Article 51.3(2) of the Basic Law, dealing with the voting procedure in the Bundesrat innocently says that the votes of one Land's representatives “can” (“können”) be cast only unanimously. In order to understand the causes for the earthquake that struck the German political and constitutional system in the 774th session of the Bundesrat on 22 March 2002 it is essential to shed light on the structure and the constitutional role of the Bundesrat.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 169-174
Author(s):  
Болотин ◽  
Vladimir Bolotin ◽  
Паньков ◽  
Sergey Pankov

In the article the need of reasonable restriction of human rights and freedoms in modern conditions of increase of various threats for the constitutional system of Russia is shown; the results of modern research in this area, as well as the position of the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court of Russia, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation are revealed. Defined The system of restrictions, acting legal instrument for the protection of the constitutional order, the conditions and criteria for the limitation of rights and freedoms .


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Heru Nuswanto ◽  
Amri P. Sihotang,

<p>Kedudukan komisi yudisial sebagai pengawas system peradilan di Indonesia di rasa sangat penting untuk menjadikan system peradilan di Indonesia professional dan berintegritas. Persoalan kemudian hadir pasca putusan <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky">MK No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> dimana dalam putusan menjadikan Komisi Yudisial tidak lagi sebagai pihak yang ikut serta mengawasi perekrutan hakim tingkat pertama. Padahal dalam system ketatanegaraan jika lembaga komisi yudisial peran dan fungsinya dibatasi akan menjadikan mahkamah agung sebagai lembaga absolute dalam kekuasaan yudikatif.</p><p>.</p><p>Pasca putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky"> No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> tidaklah menjadi penghambat Komisi Yudisial dalam melakukan penegakan kode etik. Bahkan pada sisi lain Komisi Yudisial harus mampu melakukan penerobosan penafsiran bahwa putusan tersebut semata-mata memberikan ruang dan kedudukan Komisi Yudisial untuk merespon upaya kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman yang secara mandiri dan merdeka akan tetapi harus sesuai real nilai-nilai pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dengan menempatkan Komisi Yudisial yang nantinya akan menguji idependensi hakim-hakim yang merupakan hasil seleksi dari Mahkamah Agung secara ketat dalam menjalankan tugas dan fungsinya sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip dasar kode etik yang telah telah dicanangkan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku.</p><p>Status of the Judicial Commission as the regulatory system in the sense of justice in Indonesia Sangat system makes for a review of integrity and professional judiciary in Indonesia. Present Problems then after the Constitutional Court ruling No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 Where hearts Judicial Commission Decision making is NOT Again as parties Yang Participate oversee the recruitment of judges of first instance. Whereas hearts constitutional system if Institution Role and functions of the Judicial Commission shall be limited to make the Supreme Court as the Institute for Judicial power absolute hearts.</p><p>Post a Constitutional Court decision No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 does not become an obstacle to the Judicial Commission in enforcing the code of conduct. Even on the other side of the Judicial Commission should be able to make a breakthrough interpretation that the decision merely provides the space and the position of the Judicial Commission to respond to the efforts of the independence of judiciary is independent and free but must be corresponding real values of Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic Indonesia by placing the Judicial Commission which will examine idependensi judges were selected from the Supreme Court strictly in performing their duties and functions in accordance with the basic principles of the code of conduct that has been implemented in accordance with the legislation in force.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-760
Author(s):  
Jernej Letnar Černič

After the democratization and independence of Slovenia, the Constitutional Court has generated the paradigm reform in the Slovenian constitutional system by protecting individual rights against the heritage of the former system. The constitutional judges are not blank slates, but individuals embedded in their private and professional environments. In the past three decades, the Court has delivered several seminal decisions concerning the protection of the rule of law, human rights, and constitutional democracy. What motivates constitutional judges to protect individual rights in some cases and show preference for the preservation of authority and stability of the existing legal system in others? The article is based on the empirical research measuring the presence of judicial ideology at the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in three mandates (1993–1997, 2002–2006, 2011–2016). The methodological and theoretical model aims to measure economic, social, and authoritarian dimensions of judicial ideology (three-fold judicial ideology model). The research group has analysed the decisions and separate opinions of the Constitutional Court from selected periods based on hypotheses provided by the model. This article intends to present and analyse the research results concerning the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology. More specifically, it examines the level of authoritarianism of the Slovenian Constitutional Court in its judicial decision-making during the three mentioned mandates. Through the obtained empirical results, the paper seeks to strengthen fair, impartial, and independent functioning of the Slovenian Constitutional Court and its respective judges.


Rechtsidee ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bukhori Bukhori ◽  
Nizla Rohaya

The purpose of this study was to determine the position, role and function of the DPD-RI in the Indonesian constitutional system before and after the Constitutional Court Decision No. 92 / PUU-X / 2012. The research method used is juridical normative and type of research is statutory approach, comparative approach, and conceptual approach. The results showed that a number of laws and regulations governing the DPD-RI were still less than the initial purpose of the formation of the DPD-RI. Certain articles relating to the position, function and role of the DPD-RI actually limit the authority of the DPD-RI so that it cannot function as a state institution that should have the same position as the DPR-RI. The decision of the Constitutional Court No. 92 / PUU-X / 2012 brings a new chapter in the implementation of democracy in Indonesia. The ruling of the Constitutional Court firmly provides a strategic role for the Regional Representative Council in Indonesian constitution.


FIAT JUSTISIA ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 307
Author(s):  
Yusdiyanto Yusdiyanto

The research aims to enlight the overview about the urgent of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) as the product of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) by using the dogmatic approach. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution has changed the Indonesian constitutional system. According to the article 2 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, highest authority remains in the hands of the people and is carried out according to the Constitution. The constitutional design of the Indonesian government system is presidential. However, the implementation often reaps many obstacles and problems, the consequences of amendments, eliminating the authority of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in terms of electing the President and Vice President, and determining the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN). MPR is no longer placed as the highest institution of the country and the perpetrators of popular sovereignity. The Constitution which is the holder of popular sovereignty in the practice adheres to a clear and strict understanding of the separation of powers. Like in the legislative field there are People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional Representative Board (DPD); in the executive field there are Presidents and Vice Presidents elected by the people; in the judicial sector there are the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission; in the field of financial supervision there is a Indonesian Supreme Audit Institution (BPK). Changes in the position, function and authority of the MPR have implications for the emergence of the National Development Planning System and the National Long-Term Development Plan which became the authority of the elected President. The President that won the election as a basic guidelines for implementing development as the replacement of the GBHN.  


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