Joshua Glasgow argues in this chapter that ‘race’ in the ordinary sense is defined such that races are supposed to be large groups of humans organized according to certain visible traits, like skin color. Biology cannot validate the existence of such groups, even if it can identify other human populations. So Glasgow argues that race is not biologically real. And because the relevant traits do not change when social facts change, race is not a social construction. This suggests that race is not socially real, either. Consequently, it seems that race is not real. However, Glasgow also considers another possibility: that race is real, neither biologically nor socially, but in a more basic sense. According to this view, races are real by virtue of facts that find no home in any of the sciences, biological or social. Their only significance is that which people choose to give them. In the course of making his arguments, Glasgow explores how we should identify the meanings of our terms and how to proceed when scientific and ordinary meanings diverge. He concludes by leaving it open whether race is simply not real, or whether it is real in that basic sense.
Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts
