scholarly journals Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48
Author(s):  
Raphael van Riel

AbstractIn this paper, I argue for two claims, (i) that on a common conception of the second order property of being a mental disorder, some facts about mental disorders are the result of social constructions, and (ii) that the way facts about mental disorders are constructed differs from the received view on social construction. The difference is examined, a novel type of social construction is identified, and it is suggested that there are numerous other types of social facts that are constructed in a similar way.

Author(s):  
George Graham

The basic claims of the chapter are, first, that mental disorders are not best understood as types of brain disorder, even though mental disorders are based in the brain. And, second, that the difference between the two sorts of disorders can be illuminated by the sorts of treatment or therapy that may work for the one type (a mental disorder) but not for the other type (a brain disorder). In the discussion some of the diagnostic implications and difficulties associated with these two basic claims are outlined.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleanor Townsley

This article describes an exercise that explores how race categories and classifications are socially constructed scientifically. In an introductory sociology setting, students compare their perceptions of the size of minority populations with counts from the U.S. Census. In a series of debriefing sessions, students analyze both their perceptions and Census counts as social constructions of the moral phenomena we call race. In the process, students are introduced to Census data and the Census web site as well as to historical and theoretical literature on the social construction of race. Students are then asked to reflect critically about the scientific practices in which race is constructed as a social fact, and in particular, to consider their own roles in these practices as users and subjects of race categories. The larger goal is to help students to develop a critical sociological imagination that productively engages the analysis of race in contemporary society.


1988 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 627-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ann Jimenez

The author traces the historical evolution of the concept of chronicity of mental disorders. She suggests that belief in chronicity is a social construction that developed as psychiatry moved toward a scientific model of mental disorder in the early twentieth century.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-361
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Grau-Pérez ◽  
J. Guillermo Milán

In Uruguay, Lacanian ideas arrived in the 1960s, into a context of Kleinian hegemony. Adopting a discursive approach, this study researched the initial reception of these ideas and its effects on clinical practices. We gathered a corpus of discursive data from clinical cases and theoretical-doctrinal articles (from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s). In order to examine the effects of Lacanian ideas, we analysed the difference in the way of interpreting the clinical material before and after Lacan's reception. The results of this research illuminate some epistemological problems of psychoanalysis, especially the relationship between theory and clinical practice.


Author(s):  
Gabriela Soto Laveaga

In my brief response to Terence Keel’s essay “Race on Both Sides of the Razor,” I focus on something as pertinent as alleles and social construction: how we write history and how we memorialize the past. Current DNA analysis promises to remap our past and interrogate certainties that we have taken for granted. For the purposes of this commentary I call this displacing of known histories the epigenetics of memory. Just as environmental stimuli rouse epigenetic mechanisms to produce lasting change in behavior and neural function, the unearthing of forgotten bodies, forgotten lives, has a measurable effect on how we act and think and what we believe. The act of writing history, memorializing the lives of others, is a stimulus that reshapes who and what we are. We cannot disentangle the discussion about the social construction of race and biological determinism from the ways in which we have written—and must write going forward—about race. To the debate about social construction and biological variation we must add the heft of historical context, which allows us to place these two ideas in dialogue with each other. Consequently, before addressing the themes in Keel’s provocative opening essay and John Hartigan’s response, I speak about dead bodies—specifically, cemeteries for Black bodies. Three examples—one each from Atlanta, Georgia; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Mexico—illustrate how dead bodies must enter our current debates about race, science, and social constructions. 


SUHUF ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-72
Author(s):  
Ahmad Fathoni
Keyword(s):  

The object of the study of the knowledge of the variety of the Quranic reading  is the  Qur'an itself. The focus is on the difference of the reading and its articulation. The method is based on the riwayat or narration which is originated from the Prophet (Rasulullah saw) and its use is to be one of the instruments to keep the originality of the Qur’an. The validity of the reading the Qur’an is to be judged based on the valid chain  (sanad ¡a¥ī¥)  in accord with the Rasm U£mānÄ« as well as with the  Arabic grammar. Whereas the qualification of its originality is divided into six stages as follow: the first is mutawātir, the second is masyhÅ«r, the third is āhād, the fourth is syaz, the fifth is maudū‘, and the six is mudraj. Of this six catagories, the readings which can be included in the catagory of mutawātir are Qiraat Sab‘ah (the seven readings) and Qiraat ‘Asyrah  (the ten readings). To study this knowledge of reading the Qur’an (ilmu qiraat), one is advised to know about special terms being used such as  qiraat  (readings), riwayat (narration), tarÄ«q (the way), wajh (aspect), mÄ«m jama‘, sukÅ«n mÄ«m jama‘ and many others.


SUHUF ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-214
Author(s):  
Afifur Rochman Sya'rani

Most of traditional Muslim exegetes interpret Q. 4:34 in terms of maintaining the superiority of men over women. Some progressive Muslim scholars then insist a contextual approach to the verse to criticize gender inequality. Among some progressive Muslim scholars, this article comparatively examines the interpretations of Amina Wadud and Mohammed Talbi of Q. 4:34. Although both of them propose a contextual reading of the verse, they have different intellectual background, approach and method in interpreting the Qur’ān. The questions are to what extent the similarities and differences of both Wadud’s and Talbi’s interpretation of Q. 4:34 and how far their interpretations reflect their respective intention and perspective? Applying Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach, the article concludes that [1] Both Wadud and Talbi argue that the verse does not establish the superiority of men over women, but acknowledges duties division among married couple; [2] the difference among their interpretations is on the status of relationship among married couple; [3] Wadud’s and Talbi’s interpretations represent their respective hermeneutical situations and the way they define ontologically the nature of  interpretation and Qur’anic hermeneutics affect on producing the meanings of the verse.


Author(s):  
Abraham A. Singer

This chapter reviews the development of transaction cost economics and unpacks its theory of the firm. The chapter begins with the marginal revolution in economics and how it altered the way economists understood the corporation. It then reviews the work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, explaining how they provided a novel account of firms. Transaction cost economics emphasizes how firms use hierarchy and bureaucracy to overcome problems of opportunism and asset-specific investment to coordinate some types of economic activity more efficiently than markets can. The transaction cost account of the corporation’s productivity component is shown in tabular form in comparison with its historical forerunners reviewed in the previous chapter.


Author(s):  
Uriah Kriegel

Brentano’s theory of judgment serves as a springboard for his conception of reality, indeed for his ontology. It does so, indirectly, by inspiring a very specific metaontology. To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents’ distinctive properties. Brentano offers a fourth and completely different approach to existence talk, however, one which falls naturally out of his theory of judgment. The purpose of this chapter is to present and motivate Brentano’s approach.


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