Normative power and military means

2014 ◽  
pp. 145-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trineke Palm
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran

This chapter discusses the idea of a “second-personal stance” as developed by Darwall and others, and notes some differences with the notion of “addressing” developed here, particularly with respect to the difference between theoretical and practical reasons. Austin’s distinction between the “illocutionary” and the “perlocutionary” is discussed in connection with Joseph Raz’s idea of the exercise of a normative power. The particular sense of “act” that applies to the perlocutionary status of utterances is illuminated by Jennifer Hornsby’s development of the idea of “reciprocity” as the distinguishing mark of the illocutionary (and hence of acts like telling). The chapter ends with further comparison and contrast between acts of telling and promising.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Benjamin LAWRENCE

Abstract Cambodia's Constitution, promulgated in September 1993, was to be the foundation of a transition to liberal, multiparty democracy. Yet, despite the document's seeming commitment to those very principles, constitutional provisions are frequently used to undermine liberal rule of law and to impose restrictions on political processes, freedoms, and rights. Focusing on the events of 2016–2017, including the jailing of opposition politicians, controversial legal reforms, and the dissolution of the country's foremost opposition party, this article demonstrates how authoritarian practices in Cambodia are framed in terms of adherence – even fidelity – to the Constitution. Further, it explores how ideas of ‘stability’ and ‘law and order’ often elide with those of rule of law in discourses and practices that simultaneously exalt and hollow out the normative power of the Constitution. This article posits that a socio-legal approach that pays particular attention to discourse can shed new light on the empirical fact of authoritarian constitutionalism, but also the processes of meaning-making that accompany, facilitate, and legitimize its practice. Far from merely a sham, then, Cambodia's Constitution – like many others – is imbricated in a complex web of contestation and legitimation that extends far beyond the walls of any courtroom.


2021 ◽  
pp. 72-77
Author(s):  
K. Tabarintseva-Romanova

In connection with the ongoing geopolitical transformations and the increase in the importance of information technologies in world politics, there is an increase in the terminological apparatus of international and scientifi c discourse. The article analyzes such “new” concepts as: smart power, normative power, sharp power, which are a kind of hybrid of traditional concepts of “soft” and “hard” power.


Author(s):  
T. Romanova ◽  
E. Pavlova

The article examines how the normative power, which the EU puts forward as an ideological basis of its actions in the world, manifests itself in the national partnerships for modernization between Russia and EU member states. The authors demonstrate the influence of the EU’s normativity on its approach to modernization as well as the difference in the positions of its member countries. It is concluded that there is no unity in the EU’s approach to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the new classification of EU member states, which is based on their readiness to act in accordance with the Union’s concept of normative power, is offered.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-422
Author(s):  
William Lucy

Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s new book provides an ambitious and thorough account of the role of consent in the law and, also, as a possible basis for law’s authority. Given only a slight familiarity with the previous work of its authors, the volume’s thoroughness and ambition will come as no surprise. The volume does, however, contain some surprises, two of which are particularly worth noting. One surprise, at least to those of us with our noses to the grindstone of a narrow area of legal doctrine, is the near ubiquity of consent in various areas of legal doctrine. The book serves a useful role just by reminding us of this. A second surprise is the complexity of the notion of consent itself, for Beyleveld and Brownsword are intent on determining the normative power of the notion, including the conditions under which that power can be realised, who can realise it and why it should be thought normatively significant. This, too, is a valuable contribution to our thinking about a fundamental feature of the juristic landscape.


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