said that there was no problem, the appellant said that he would give him one and punched him in the face. The victim suffered a broken nose and other injuries. The appellant desisted when a passer-by approached. The appellant was tried on, inter alia, a count of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The judge directed the jury that grievous bodily harm meant ‘serious injury’. The appellant was convicted. He appealed on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury failing to direct them that the injury had to be ‘really serious’. Held: The question had already been considered by the Court of Appeal in R v McMillan (1984) unreported, 8 October. The conclusion reached in that case was equally applicable to the present case, in which there was no need to use the phrase ‘really’ serious harm; the omission of the word ‘really’ was not significant. The victim had suffered a broken nose, which was clearly grievous bodily harm. ‘Infliction’ and ‘causing’: a distinction without a difference?

1996 ◽  
pp. 849-849
1996 ◽  
pp. 408-424

2021 ◽  
pp. 540-588
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

Manslaughter is defined by common law as any unlawful homicide that is not murder. The offence is limited by murder at one extreme and accidental killing at the other. Manslaughter can be either ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’. This chapter deals with voluntary manslaughter: this occurs when someone had the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm, but relies on a partial defence to murder. The two partial defences considered in this chapter are loss of self- control and diminished responsibility (suicide pact is dealt with in Ch 15). This chapter scrutinizes the defences available to the accused and in particular the developing case law under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 on loss of control and diminished responsibility, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Golds and the series of Court of Appeal cases since that decision.


1983 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

In an article published in this journal in 1973, Professor George P. Fletcher maintained that there ought to be no limitation of proportionality on the exercise of self-defense. The requirement of proportionality signifies that there is a limit to the price society is willing or agreeable to pay for the protection of a legitimate interest against an unlawful attack. The right to use self-defense therefore rests upon the condition that there be some kind of relationship, which is not one of equivalence, between the interest attacked and that sacrificed in order to save it. In the absence of such a relationship, self-defense may not be employed. Thus, for example, in the case of a petty theft, if the interest attacked (ownership or possession of the property) can be defended only by inflicting serious injury—death or grievous bodily harm—upon the aggressor, one must refrain from doing so, even if this means sacrificing the interest at stake. If self-defense is not circumscribed by the requirement of proportionality, then the owner of an apple orchard who shoots and kills a thief, lacking any other means of stopping him from running off with the fruit he has stolen, will bear no criminal responsibility for his act.


In practice it will be for the jury to determine whether the weapon used by the principal is sufficiently different from that contemplated by the accomplice for there to be a departure from the joint enterprise, but it can be imagined how difficulties might arise where, for example, the agreement is to hit the victim with bare fists and the principal kicks him whilst wearing steel-capped boots. Are the boots a fundamentally different type of weapon? 5 P may use the weapon contemplated by A, and with intent contemplated by A, but in a way that causes more life threatening injuries than those contemplated by A. For example A and P agree that P will attack V with a baseball bat and cause grievous bodily harm by breaking P’s arms. In the event P attacks V with the baseball bat, intending to cause V grievous bodily harm, by striking V on the head. V dies from his injuries. P may be convicted of murder, and A (in theory) could be convicted as an accomplice, given his mens rea. Can it not be argued, however, in the light of Gamble (see above) that by choosing to attack V and causing more life threatening GBH, P deliberately departed from the common design? See further R v Bamborough [1996] Crim LR 744, where the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that it would be sufficient, in order to substantiate A’s conviction for murder as an accomplice, that he had contemplated grievous bodily harm as a possible incident of the common design, the court not being overly concerned at how A might have foreseen the grievous bodily harm being caused by P. Residual liability for manslaughter where the principal is convicted of murder

1996 ◽  
pp. 407-407

2021 ◽  
Vol 71 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Piotr Tomasz Arkuszewski ◽  
Ewa Meissner ◽  
Małgorzata Zielińska ◽  
Piotr Hadrowicz

Aim: Comparison of injuries to the facial and cerebral parts of the skull causing death and grievous bodily harm, resulting solely from punches to the facial area of the skull. Assessment and confrontation of both groups in terms of the final criminal-legal classification of the perpetrator’s acts. Review of reasons for court judgements with a focus on the subjective elements of the prohibited act. Attempt to verify the hypothesis assuming that death or grievous bodily harm can be caused by a single punch to the facial part of the skull. Material and methods: Final judgements passed by criminal divisions of common courts of law in cases where death or grievous bodily harm was caused by injuries to the facial and cerebral parts of the skull resulting solely from punches to the facial area of the skull. Assessment of individual cases within each group to determine similarities and differences. Comparative analysis of both groups. Results: The cause of death in cases involving injuries to the facial part of the skull was rapid suffocation following blood aspiration into the respiratory tract. However, the criminal-legal classification of the perpetrators’ actions in these cases was varied. In one case, death resulted from injuries to the cerebral part of the skull, which are extremely rare as a result of a punch to the facial area within the skull. Grievous bodily harm was due to the loss of vision in the eye, typically due to eyeball rupture. Conclusions: Even though the circumstances of the injuries were similar, different mechanisms were responsible for causing death and grievous bodily harm in the victims. The most severe consequences (death and grievous bodily harm) were not caused by injuries of the same type in any of the cases studied. A single punch to the facial part of the skull may be enough to lead to either grievous bodily harm or death, but the criminal-legal assessment of punching to the face can vary greatly.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

Manslaughter is defined by common law as any unlawful homicide that is not murder. The offence is limited by murder at one extreme and accidental killing at the other. Manslaughter can be either ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’. This chapter deals with voluntary manslaughter: this occurs when someone had the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm, but relies on partial defence to murder. The two partial defences considered in this chapter are loss of self- control and diminished responsibility (suicide pact is dealt with in Ch 15). This chapter scrutinizes the defences available to the accused and in particular the developing case law under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 on loss of control and diminished responsibility, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Golds and the series of Court of Appeal cases since that decision.


YMER Digital ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (11) ◽  
pp. 382-387
Author(s):  
Mr. Kiran Ranganath Kale ◽  

cid attack is against the indivual but consequences are universal; hence I think it is one kind of deep rooted social evil. As a learner of law we all are well aware that crime is against world at large or against the society. Now this acid attacks demeans the society and humanity. It reflects crony of human beings which is always hidden and not apparent. Over the years the gravity of this heinous crime has centralized Research scholars, thinkers’ Social activist, Legislatures, law students’ judges as well to make out way to curb this paranoia. In A.K. Gopalan’s case Justice Patanjali shashtri said that “man is rational beings desires to do many things but in civil society his desires will have to be controlled with the exercise of sillier desires of other indivual.” And not pouring acid on him or her. Because the main reasons behind commission of this brutal act are unwarranted desires like rejection of love marriages not love but proposal of marriages, refusal of dowry, rejection of sexual demands, property dispute, family conflict, disputes of live-in relationships though desires of human beings cannot be legislated but behavior can be controlled by penalizing it. The acid attack is unpredicted and permeated violence against beauty and body of the person; this is the only attack which can be done against inherent things of the body rather than bodily harm to the person. Those beautiful things of the victims can be targeted which are impossible to digest to the acid throwers. Acid attack is not only crime but also brutal violence that shows the gravity of the act of the thrower. This leads several long term consequences like blindness, disfigurations of the face and body, having negative felling to live along with society. Hence this evil must be eradicated before it grows in civil society


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