which a social group or individual thinks is wrong. So the first port of call will be the courts, where we should be able to expect an independent judiciary. However, it is also true that sometimes actions and decisions are taken which, although in themselves not contentious, accumulate along with other legislation to create a highly questionable situation. Note here that the situation becomes questionable: an interpretation of the rules becomes possible which some would simply not agree with. For example, progressive attitudes towards free speech has resulted in the situation being taken advantage of by extreme groups for political ends. There are a number of very specific points which can be made about the use of DNA by society and more especially the construction and use of DNA databases. It is unlikely that anybody would really object to construction of anonymous databases so that we can produce a precise and reliable figure for the probability of finding a DNA profile in the general population by chance alone. What many people do have objections to is the construction of databases of named individuals. Strangely, it would seem that the country that has always been in the van of development of DNA technology is developing a rather poorer reputation for riding roughshod over the rights of its population, the UK. The problems and objections with databases of named individuals start with the practitioners and political will by successive governments. Luckily, there is an outspoken reaction to the UK government’s belief that all uses of DNA are good, but we should be aware that this is not so. Current thinking is that in the future it will be possible to determine facial shape, such as nose type and eye colour, with a simple test. This is put forward as a distinct possibility by the Forensic Science Service, with little regard to the extreme complexity of both the genetics and the environmental input into such things, not to mention plastic surgery. While it was always the belief that rapid turnaround of DNA results would be a good thing, this is only if the techniques are highly controlled. The idea that a hand held machine, as has been suggested, could be taken to a scene of crime and the DNA analysed in situ should fill any self-respecting scientist with horror. It has already been stated that there is a 40% chance of a stain found at a crime scene being linked to a name on the database of named individuals. As databases become larger as well as the number of individuals putting data on the database, so the likelihood of error increases; remember that error in this sense is quite likely to ruin a life. Names get onto databases for perfectly innocent reasons. Two of these are the husband or partner of a rape victim and, which is even more demeaning, the DNA profile of the victim herself. This was admitted in the House of Lords. So why is the British public so lacking in interest or apparently not in the least bit bothered by this staggering lack of feeling for the innocent? There is no mechanism for the removal of a DNA sample from the database after consent has been given. It is of interest here that both the police, forensic scientists and politicians are extremely reluctant to give a sample which can be held on the named database. Why is this? Fear? Fear of what may be done with such intimate information. This includes medical analysis and data which they have no right to access. It would be

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-299
Author(s):  
Meg Russell

Abstract The House of Lords is the world’s longest-established and probably best-known second chamber. Wholly unelected, with most members appointed for life, it appears a vestige of the ‘elite’ form of bicameralism once common throughout Europe. Hence calls for major reform are commonplace. However successful changes have been piecemeal and rare. Meanwhile the UK is not federal, but is nonetheless a ‘union state’, comprising the territories of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with its own distinct governing arrangements. These were most recently boosted by the 1997 Labour government’s devolution programme. Hence for decades, and particularly the last 20 years, devolution and Lords reform have both been on the UK’s political agenda. Throughout this time attempts to create a ‘second chamber of the nations and regions’ have repeatedly failed. This paper reviews the proposals made, and the obstacles they faced - drawing lessons for Britain, and territorial bicameralism more widely.


2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (11) ◽  
pp. 1394-1398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon W. J. Gould ◽  
Jess Rollason ◽  
Anthony C. Hilton ◽  
Paul Cuschieri ◽  
Laura McAuliffe ◽  
...  

Since 1999, the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS) has monitored the rise in infection due to a number of organisms, including meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The EARSS reported that MRSA infections within intensive care units account for 25–50 % of infections in many central and southern European countries, these included France, Spain, Great Britain, Malta, Greece and Italy. Each country has defined epidemic MRSA (EMRSA) strains; however, the method of spread of these strains from one country to another is unknown. In this current study, DNA profiles of 473 isolates of MRSA collected from the UK and Malta were determined by PFGE. Analysis of the data showed that two countries separated by a large geographical distance had a similar DNA profile pattern. Additionally it was demonstrated that strains of EMRSA normally found in the UK were also found in the Maltese cohort (EMRSA 15 and 16). A distinct DNA profile was found in the Maltese cohort, which may be a local EMRSA, and accounted for 14.4 % of all Maltese isolates. The appearance of the same MRSA and EMRSA profiles in two separate countries suggests that MRSA can be transferred out of their country of origin and potentially establish in a new locality or country.


2012 ◽  
pp. 136-136

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first describes the UK legislature. The legislature of the UK is the Queen in Parliament. Parliament is bicameral, meaning that, apart from the Queen, there are two legislative chambers called the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The House of Lords—composed of life peers, senior bishops, and some hereditary peers—is guardian of the constitution through the work of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and protects the constitution and initiates and revises legislation. The House of Commons—composed of constituency representatives organized on party lines under the whip system—is the principal legislative chamber and plays a significant role in scrutinizing the executive. The discussion then turns to the legislative process, covering electoral law, alternative voting systems, and the devolution of the legislative function including the Wales Act 2017.


did not intend to legislate contrary to the ECHR. Therefore, if during the course of statutory interpretation there were two possible interpretations, one in conformity with the Convention and one not in conformity with the Convention, the interpretation in conformity with the Convention should be preferred. The House of Lords, however, was careful to stress that it should not be assumed that such an interpretation must be applied. Judicial discretion remained. 5.4.3.2 Human Rights Act 1998 The relationship between the UK and the ECHR was changed in 1998 with the incorporation of the majority of the rights in the ECHR into English law. The enforcement procedures and processes in the Convention were not incorporatedonly the majority of rights and this is potentially a problem. For example, Article 13 of the ECHR places a duty on every Member State to provide an effective remedy in national courts for infringement of the Convention. This has not been incorporated. The HRA 1998 was enacted with an ‘in force’ date for the majority of its sections of October 2000. UK citizens can now bring actions under the ECHR in English courts under domestic law. The Act sets out the Convention rights incorporated into the English legal system in Schedule 1. Consider the text of s 1, set out in Figure 5.8, below, and note the process used to lay out what is and what is not included in the Act. The long title of the Act gives an indication of the purpose of the Act. The two rights not referred to relate to Article 2: Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law… and to Article 13 which requires every State to ensure that there are appropriate and effective remedies in the national courts. At the level of the ECtHR, the procedure for bringing an action is generally as follows.

2012 ◽  
pp. 137-137

Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 443-482
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter looks at the circumstances surrounding two events. The first is the 2005 decision of the UK Parliament to set up a committee to examine whether the constitutional conventions governing the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons should be codified. The second is the decision of the Commons (and the Labour government) to press ahead and present the Hunting Bill 2004 for royal assent despite the opposition of the Lords to the policy of a total ban on hunting wild animals with dogs; the Lords preferred a policy of licensed hunting.


Author(s):  
Ben Worthy

This chapter considers the impact of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000 on the UK Parliament. Since 2005, FOI 2000 has helped make both the House of Commons and the House of Lords more open and accountable. The most high-profile effect of the law came in 2009, when it played a part in exposing the abuse of the expense allowance system. Despite the scandal, it is not clear whether FOI has transformed the culture of the two Houses. Nevertheless, the law has indirectly sparked a series of other reforms, so that FOI now sits alongside a whole range of instruments intended to make Parliament more open and accessible. The chapter first provides an overview of what FOIs consist of, their application to legislatures and Westminster specifically, before analysing the extent of the impact of FOI 2000 on the UK Parliament.


Author(s):  
Ed Beale ◽  
Libby Kurien ◽  
Eve Samson

This chapter examines the ways in which the UK Parliament formally constrains the government and engages with European Union (EU) institutions. The House of Lords and the House of Commons both have processes to ensure that legislation proposed at the EU level has been properly reviewed before it takes effect in UK law. The ‘scrutiny reserve’, which stipulates that ministers should not agree to proposals under scrutiny, is used to elicit information about the government's negotiating position. Parliament also has a role in examining EU legislation and providing direct access to European institutions. The chapter first provides an overview of the EU legislative process, focusing on three principal EU institutions: member states, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Commission. It also considers the formal role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process, the UK Parliament's scrutiny of the EU legislation and its effectiveness, and parliamentary scrutiny after Brexit.


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