Developments in central banking after the GFC: central banks, the state, globalisation and the GFC

Author(s):  
Louise Parsons
Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

The state of central banking is fragile and fraught with reasons to take a dim view of their stature. Low economic growth, an insufficiently unsubstantiated expansion of central bank responsibilities, and worries over future financial instability are sources of concern. Institutional and other objective measures point to a loss of confidence in the monetary authorities around the globe. Several central banks are unable to match words with deeds. The willingness of policymakers and central banks to take accountability seriously remains in doubt, at least in some of the most systematically important regions of the world. The financial crisis has awakened a desire to find a way to have central banks find a proper mix for conducting monetary policy and macroprudential policies. A decade after the crisis, no coherent new framework has emerged, and reforms have hardly dented an overall impression of disquiet about the state of central banking.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Chapter 1 first restates the present dominant view on the nature and origin of central banking, which can be summarized as follows: (1) Defining central banking is ‘by no means straightforward’; (2) the Riksens Ständers Bank and the Bank of England would have been the first sort-of central banks; (3) early central banks did not have a policy mandate and the orientation towards public objectives would go back only to the nineteenth century; (4) there has been no concept of central banking before 1800; (5) early central banking developed out of the largest commercial banks; (6) the lender of last resort (LOLR) would have developed only in the second half of the nineteenth century or even later. Second, the chapter reviews a recent literature which started again to question this view. It is explained how this book will take up the challenge to correct the myth about the origins of central banking.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

The Introduction describes the main themes and objectives of the book and provides an overview of its content. First, the current dominant view on the origins of central banking is recalled and challenged, and it is outlined what alternative view this book will propose, namely that central banking dates back to before 1800 and that a number of European continental institutions played a major role in its development. Then an overview of the chapters of the book is provided: Chapter 1 restating the currently dominant view on the origins of central banking; Chapter 2 on money issuance; Chapter 3 on the relation with the government; Chapter 4 on lending to the private sector; Chapter 5 on the lender-of-last resort; Chapter 6 on the overall balance sheet of early central banks; and Chapter 7 restating the rehabilitation of early central banking; The annex schematically reviews a total of 25 central banks operating before 1800.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

This chapter provides an overview of the macroeconomic environment since 2000. The era is broken down into three periods: 2000–2006, 2007–2010, and 2011–present. Warnings of an imminent crisis were present before 2007, but generally they were ignored by self-satisfied policymakers. Pre-crisis, inflation control was the once rising and, seemingly, preeminent monetary policy strategy. A review, both pre- and post-GFC, of a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators is included, with discussion of lesser known variables such as proxies for central bank communication and balance sheet indicators. These clearly enable us to identify interventions by central banks while also highlighting areas of continuing concern. In some respects (e.g. concerns about financial stability), everything has changed post-crisis, but in other respects (e.g. monetary policy strategy) fewer changes are apparent. The chapter concludes by arguing that there are reasons to be apprehensive about the current state of monetary policy and central banking.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun

Abstract The pre-crisis rise and post-crisis resilience of European repo and securitization markets represent political victories for the interests of large banks. To explain when and how finance wins, the literature emphasizes lobbying capacity (instrumental power) and the financial sector’s central position in the economy (structural power). Increasingly, however, finance also enjoys infrastructural power, which stems from entanglements between specific financial markets and public-sector actors, such as treasuries and central banks, which govern by transacting in those markets. To demonstrate the analytical value of this perspective, the article traces how the European Central Bank (ECB), motivated by monetary policy considerations, has shaped post-crisis financial policymaking in the EU. It shows that the ECB has played a key part in fending off a financial transaction tax on repos and in shoring up and rebuilding the securitization market. With market-based forms of state agency on the rise, infrastructural entanglement and power shed new light on the politics of finance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-78
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Szunke

The changes in the modern monetary policy, which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in response to the global financial crisis led to the transformation of the place and the role of central banks. The strategic aim of the central monetary institutions has become preventing financial instability. So far, central banks have defined financial stability as a public good, which took care independently of other monetary purposes (Pyka, 2010). Unconventional monetary policy resulted in changes the global central banking. The aim of the study is to identify a new paradigm of the role and place of the central bank in the financial system and its new responsibilities, aimed at countering financial instability.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document