Central Banks and Banking Supervision Reform

Author(s):  
Pierre C. Boyer ◽  
Jorge Ponce
2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Carretta ◽  
Vincenzo Farina ◽  
Paola Schwizer

Purpose This paper aims to analyzing the main risk culture traits of a sample of Central Banks and Supervisory Authorities in Europe as well as of the European Central Bank (ECB). Design/methodology/approach Risk culture is measured through text data processing of the official discourses made by the head Supervisory Authorities, during the years from 1999 to 2012. Findings Results highlight heterogeneous but converging risk cultures for European Union (EU) supervisors and the presence of a “distance” between these cultures and the risk culture of the ECB. Originality/value The paper points out that cultural differences, especially in presence of credit markets still characterized by poor integration, could create unwanted distortion effects during the initial stages of the Banking Union.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 340-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Maria Lastra

The name “lender of last resort” owes its origins to Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 referred to the Bank of England as the “dernier resort” from which all banks could obtain liquidity in times of crisis.1 The lender of last resort (“LOLR”) role of the central bank remains a major rationale for most central banks around the world, in both developed and developing countries.2 While other central bank functions have recently come under fire (e.g. banking supervision), the importance of having the LOLR under the umbrella of the central bank is seldom contested.3 It is the immediacy of the availability of central bank credit (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.


Author(s):  
Alexis Frédéric Drach

From the 1970s on, banking supervision grew in size and importance. Which were the characteristics of the regulatory elite leading this activity? Based on archival material from central banks and supervisory institutions and on a collective biography analysis, this chapter explores the profile of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision members, their role in the construction of an international regulatory institution, and some of their first achievements. It shows that some Basel Committee members were deeply involved in transnational networks of governance, others used their experience as banking supervisor in the private sector, while still others had a more national-centred career and stayed in the central banking or banking supervision sector. The Basel Committee members were the elite of banking supervisors. Over time, their committee evolved from a club to a standard-setter institution, illustrating the newly acquired influence both of banking supervision and experts and expertise in international financial governance.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatyana Filipova ◽  
Erika Csongrádi ◽  
Mārcis Apinis ◽  
Zdeněk Foit ◽  
Järvi Kotkas ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Mugarura ◽  
Patience Namanya

Purpose This paper aims to examine how central Banks (in the narrow purview of Bank of Uganda) exercise their supervisory mandate to foster an efficient sound business environment for banks to operate efficiently. The authors were motivated to write on the subject of bank supervision because of the closure of Crane Bank and putting it under administration in 2016. The closure of this bank generated a lot of controversies on both sides of the political divide and in the press. Initially, the popular view was that Crane bank was poorly supervised, and as a result, it was exploited by insiders to commit money laundering, fraud, insider dealing, just to mention but a few. This put Bank of Uganda (the Central Bank) in a negative spotlight for failure to provide the required oversight of this bank. In Uganda, the supervision of banks and other financial institutions is the responsibility of Bank of Uganda. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopted a qualitative research approach using secondary data sources, including books, journal papers and websites, and evaluating primary legislation but also empirical evidence both in Uganda and other jurisdictions. The secondary data was evaluated to draw comparative analyses of causes of banks failures in countries both in Africa, Europe, USA and others jurisdictions across the globe. Findings It would be onerous to charge central banks with the responsibility of preventing bank failures, even though they would are required to institute measures to prevent banks from collapsing and its ripple effects on the economy. Effective banking supervision is a core factor for the success of every bank, but it cannot single-handedly prevent a bank from collapsing. A well-supervised bank can also fail not necessarily because of inherent weaknesses within its banking supervision, but it could fail because of extraneous factors beyond the control of individual banks. For example, Lehman Brothers Ltd (a highly leveraged of broker dealers) collapsed due to factors beyond its control, the Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK were nationalised by the British Government. Research limitations/implications The limitation of the paper was that data on central banks and failed banks both in Uganda and other jurisdictions (the scope of the paper) was overwhelming, and it was daunting to sift through and analyse it in depth. Practical implications Banks play a fundamental role in the social-economic development of countries, and how they are regulated is significantly important for the stability of economies. They provide loans, guarantees and other financial products to businesses, and they are engines for economic growth and development. Social implications Banks affect, people, societies, businesses, markets and governments. Therefore, this paper has wider implications for the foregoing constituencies. Originality/value The originality of the paper is that this paper is unique, draws experiences across jurisdictions and evaluates in the narrow purview of banking regulation in Uganda.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Schwarz ◽  
Polychronis Karakitsos ◽  
Niall Merriman ◽  
Werner Studener

AbstractThis paper analyses how accounting frameworks can affect three important areas of responsibility of many central banks, namely monetary policy, financial stability and banking supervision. The identified effects of accounting rules and accounting information on the activities of a central bank are manifold. First, the effectiveness of monetary policy crucially hinges on the financial independence of a central bank, which can be evidenced, inter alia, by its financial strength. Using a new simulation of the financial results of the European Central Bank (ECB), this paper shows that the reported annual profit and financial buffers of a central bank can be significantly affected by accounting, profit distribution and loss coverage rules. Second, in respect of financial stability, the accounting frameworks applied by commercial banks can not only affect their behaviour, but also that of financial markets. Indeed, there is evidence that accounting frameworks amplified pro-cyclicality during the recent crisis, and thus posed risks to the stability of the financial system. This being so, the accounting frameworks of credit institutions have obvious implications for central banks’ analyses with regard to promoting financial stability. Finally, as regards banking supervision, regulatory reporting and key supervisory ratios are based on accounting data. Under the new regulatory framework for banks in the European Union (EU), bank supervisors are highly reliant on accounting data. This means that central banks, in their role as bank supervisors, need to understand the underlying accounting rules and should directly support the development and application of harmonised accounting frameworks.


Author(s):  
Walker George ◽  
Purves Robert ◽  
Blair Michael

This chapter examines the statutory regime for the regulation of banks and banking in the UK. It first considers the development of UK banking supervision before discussing the traditional nature of bank supervision and the role and function of the Bank of England. It then reviews earlier and more recent crises in UK banking markets, including with regard to Northern Rock, and the circumstances surrounding the transfer of responsibility for bank supervision initially from the Bank of England to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and then from the FSA to the Prudential Regulation Authority. It also analyses the main provisions contained in the Bank of England Act 1998, later amendments under the the Banking Act 2009 and the Financial Services Act 2012, and relevant sections of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Finally, it explores the most recent changes announced with regard to ring-fencing, recovery planning, and resolution.


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