scholarly journals Humans or Machines? Scientific Determinism within the Context of Yoruba Human Ontology

Author(s):  
Oluwatoyin Adebola GBADAMOSI

Freewill has been a subject of intense study in the history of philosophy, this revolves around the debate that are humans free or are their actions determined? While there has been a lot of questions on the nature of human will, the search for answers remains relevant in contemporary studies as seen in the entrance of neuroscience to this quest. Neuroscience, in the study of the human will arrived at a conclusion based on empirical studies that freewill is an illusion because the human will is determined by cerebral activities. The discovery in the field of neuroscience therefore challenges the traditional belief about freewill and our beliefs that humans are in full control of their will. This submission indicated that human decisions for actions were initiated before humans became aware of them, that is, likening humans to machines, thereby creating a lacuna especially within the Yoruba religious and cultural contexts. This study therefore, interrogated the position of neuroscience on the human will by focusing on how scientific determinism can be viewed from the Yoruba worldview. Scientific determinism evident in the field of neuroscience was examined with a view to situating the findings of neuroscience on human will within the context of Yoruba human ontology.

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-442
Author(s):  
Alan W. Richardson

Mary Jo Nye is one of our great historians of chemistry, especially of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her work has been consistent and diligent in connecting the scientific research of the figures she studies to its larger intellectual and cultural contexts. Given the significance and the breadth of the historical figures she studies, this broad focus brings into her histories of chemistry and physics an expansive array of concerns, influences, cultural and political contexts. Of special interest to those of us whose research focuses on the history of philosophy of science, several of the figures substantially illuminated by Nye’s work are scientists who played important roles in the development of (history and) philosophy of science. Among these figures, J. D. Bernal and Michael Polanyi are only the most significant. This essay is part of a special issue entitled THE BONDS OF HISTORY edited by Anita Guerrini.


Author(s):  
Christoph Klimmt

This comment briefly examines the history of entertainment research in media psychology and welcomes the conceptual innovations in the contribution by Oliver and Bartsch (this issue). Theoretical perspectives for improving and expanding the “appreciation” concept in entertainment psychology are outlined. These refer to more systematic links of appreciation to the psychology of mixed emotions, to positive psychology, and to the psychology of death and dying – in particular, to terror management theory. In addition, methodological challenges are discussed that entertainment research faces when appreciation and the experience of “meaning for life” need to be addressed in empirical studies of media enjoyment.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Davide Sparti

Obwohl jede menschliche Handlung mit einem gewissen Grad an Improvisation erfolgt, gibt es kulturelle Praktiken, bei denen Improvisation eine überwiegende Rolle spielt. Um das Risiko zu vermeiden, einen zu breiten Begriff von Improvisation zu übernehmen, konzentriere ich mich im vorliegenden Beitrag auf den Jazz. Meine zentrale Frage lautet, wie Improvisation verstanden werden muss. Mein Vorgehen ist folgendes: Ich beginne mit einem Vergleich von Improvisation und Komposition, damit die Spezifizität der Improvisation erklärt werden kann. Danach wende ich mich dem Thema der Originalität als Merkmal der Improvisation zu. Zum Schluss führe ich den Begriff affordance ein, um die kollektive und zirkuläre Logik eines Solos zu analysieren. Paradigmatisch wird der Jazzmusiker mit dem Engel der Geschichte verglichen, der nur auf das Vergangene blickt, während er der Zukunft den Rücken zugekehrt hat, und lediglich ihr zugetrieben wird. Weder kann der Improvisierende das Material der Vergangenheit vernachlässigen noch seine genuine Tätigkeit, das Improvisieren in der Gegenwart und für die Zukunft, aufgeben: Er visiert die Zukunft trotz ihrer Unvorhersehbarkeit über die Vermittlung der Vergangenheit an.<br><br>While improvised behavior is so much a part of human existence as to be one of its fundamental realities, in order to avoid the risk of defining the act of improvising too broadly, my focus here will be upon one of the activities most explicitly centered around improvisation – that is, upon jazz. My contribution, as Wittgenstein would say, has a »grammatical« design to it: it proposes to clarify the significance of the term »improvisation.« The task of clarifying the cases in which one may legitimately speak of improvisation consists first of all in reflecting upon the conditions that make the practice possible. This does not consist of calling forth mysterious, esoteric processes that take place in the unconscious, or in the minds of musicians, but rather in paying attention to the criteria that are satisfied when one ascribes to an act the concept of improvisation. In the second part of my contribution, I reflect upon the logic that governs the construction of an improvised performance. As I argue, in playing upon that which has already emerged in the music, in discovering the future as they go on (as a consequence of what they do), jazz players call to mind the angel in the famous painting by Klee that Walter Benjamin analyzed in his Theses on the History of Philosophy: while pulled towards the future, its eyes are turned back towards the past.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document