scholarly journals ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE FRANCOIST SPAIN IN THE 1960-S

2017 ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Georgy Filatov

Relations between Spain and the Soviet Union in the XX century had periods of rapid development and quick decline. During the civil war in Spain the ties intensified unprecedentedly, but the rule of Francisco Franco was marked by the transformation of the two states into ideological and political opponents. The period of World War II can be considered as the lowest point in the relationship, when Spanish volunteers fought in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. The situation did not improve after the war, when the Soviet Union proposed the most stringent measures to influence the Franco regime. Nevertheless, since the second half of the 1950s, when both regimes experienced a period of relative liberalization, direct channels of communication, primarily economic, have begun to appear. Together with symbolic steps that the sides exchanged, the development of economic relations contributed significantly to the change. The Soviet Union supplied aluminum, cellu-lose and tractors, Spain exported agricultural products and copper. Since the middle of the 1960s, the range of goods has become more diverse: in Soviet deliveries, oil and oil products have played an increasing role, and Spain has provided more and more consumer goods. In the second half of the 1960s a new sphere has opened for the trade relations between Madrid and Moscow - fishing. Active development of the fishing industry in the USSR required new fishing areas, and the Spanish ports were convenient for basing Soviet fishing vessels. In the end of the decade, the sides signed a number of bilateral treaties regulating the mutual use of coastal infrastruc-ture. Economic ties between the USSR and the francoist Spain began to pave the way for establishing normal relations between the two countries.

1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Rubinstein

The last decade has witnessed a rapid development of economic relations between the Soviet Union and independent African countries. In examining certain economic and geographical aspects of this development, it should be borne in mind that Soviet–African economic relations are a quite new trend in world affairs. Before World War II the Soviet Union's foreign trade was conducted mainly with the advanced capitalist countries. Since the majority of the under-developed countries were very limited. Egypt was the only African country trading with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s. But Great Britain, then dominating Egypt, blocked any trade agreement between the two states. The volume of trade between them was very small, and at the beginning of World War II it ceased almost completely.


2021 ◽  

Assessments of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II and the nation’s thirty-fourth president have evolved across the more than seventy-five years from the conclusion of World War II in 1945 to the dedication in 2020 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. Historians have sought to explain Eisenhower’s unlikely rise from his modest upbringing in Abilene, Kansas, to his ascendance to command of western allies in the European theater. Selected over several senior officers in 1942 to command the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower initially experienced a series of setbacks and controversies resulting from inexperienced troops, incompetent subordinate leaders, a formidable enemy, and political deals with leaders of Vichy France. Although historians continue to debate his decisions regarding command and strategy in the European theater, they generally praise Eisenhower’s ability to maintain the western alliance amid national rivalries, professional jealousies, strong personalities, and competing political ambitions. Assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president have undergone a remarkable transformation. Initially ranked in 1961 near the bottom in assessments of presidential leadership, he currently appears within the top tier. Initial accounts in the 1960s portrayed Eisenhower as a bumbling, docile president who appeared to be out of touch with the basic policies and operations of his administration. He appeared unwilling to address the major issues confronting American society, and to defer to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on matters of foreign policy and national security. For his critics, Eisenhower perilously, inflexibly, and imprudently relied upon the superiority of the nation’s nuclear arsenal to contain communist expansion, then allowed the Soviet Union to beat the United States into space and create a missile gap. Scholars collectively labeled “Eisenhower Revisionists” assessing declassified documents beginning in the mid-1970s forged a revised consensus that Eisenhower was clearly thoughtful, informed, and firmly in command of his administration. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear arsenal retained and even strengthened its predominance of power. “Postrevisionist” analysts generally concur that Eisenhower was clearly the dominant decision-maker and developed an effective policy development process, but they question the efficacy of some of his decisions and policies, including his management of crises in this dangerous period of the Cold War, his increased use of covert operations and propaganda, his approach to decolonization, and his efforts to ease tensions and slow the nuclear arms race.


Author(s):  
Robert H. Bates

This article traces the trajectory of scholarship in the field of political development, beginning with the rise of what became known as “modernization theory” in the 1960s, which saw political development gain recognition as a subfield of political science. The article cites the works of prominent scholars within the modernization school and associates the birth of the subfield with historical developments spanning World War II and the war in Vietnam. It also discusses the transition from modernization theory to neoclassical political economy, made possible by the emergence of the newly industrialized countries and the fall of the Soviet Union. Finally, it considers the rise of democracy following the demise of communism, along with the study of political geography and the study of the historical determinants of contemporary politics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Klimiuk

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.


Author(s):  
James W. Peterson

Both America and Russia, for different reasons, decided to undertake a policy pivot towards Asia. For President Obama, such a pivot may have represented a needed change from preoccupation with tough issues in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan. President Putin may have looked East in an effort to get away from constant preoccupation with issues related to Crimea and the eastern edge of Europe. The Asian-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) offered a common forum of communication for both wth other Asian states. However, both powers had different historical reasons for pursuing the overture to Asian states. For the United States, a major defense agreement with South Korea was a result of the Korean War of the 1950s, while its long engagement in the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 70s provided it with additional historical experiences in the region. Russia concerned itself with intensified trade relations and also defined the region to include Central Asian states that had formerly been republics in the Soviet Union. U.S. troops had been a presence in the region for decades, and the multi-state controversy over Chinese actions in the South China Sea also bore in part a defensive component.


1991 ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Tapani Valkonen ◽  
Zvidrins Krumins ◽  
Zvidrins Peteris

This article compares the development of mortality in Finland and Latvia from the pre-World War II time to the 1980s. This comparison is particularly interesting, because both the socioeconomic conditions and the levels of mortality were relatively similar in these countries in the 1920s and 1930s. Since the Second World War the economic and social development of Finland has differed from that of Latvia, which was incorporated into the Soviet Union. The differences in mortality trends between Finland and Latvia may thus shed light on the effects of the Soviet regime on mortality. The detailed analysis of the post-war mortality in Latvia has been virtually impossible until recently. Up to the end of the 1950s there were practically no open publications on mortality. From the beginning of the 1960s to the mid-1970s the statistical yearbook of Latvia published only a few selected indicators of mortality and life expectancy. From the mid-1970s till the mid-1980s the publication of these data stopped altogether. Limited information was included in bulletins and statistical collections that were meant for restricted circulation. The situation changed radically in 1988— 1989 when institutions of statistics essentially broadened the scope and content of published data on mortality, including age-specific death rates and mortality by cause of death.


2013 ◽  
Vol 68 (02) ◽  
pp. 259-288
Author(s):  
Elena Zubkova

To what extent was the Soviet state able to control (and oppose) the process of social exclusion and to what extent was Soviet society ready to integrate social outcasts? This article attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the phenomenon of begging in the Soviet Union between the 1940s and the 1960s. The article begins by studying the phenomenon of begging as a reaction to poverty, serving as a survival strategy for the lower social classes who were excluded from society due to poor standards of living. A brief historical overview of the campaign to combat begging in the the USSR from the Revolution of 1917 until the mid-1950s shows both the continuity and shifting perspectives of state reaction to this social problem. This article also analyzes begging, which was an important social phenomenon in the USSR after World War II, through the specific biographies of actual beggars. The article concludes with an examination of the public discourse on poverty in the 1950s and early 1960s, which reveals how both society and the state viewed the issue.


2018 ◽  
Vol XIV ◽  
pp. 309-332
Author(s):  
Marian Tadeusz Mencel

Cuba, due to the geographical location, is geostrategically important in the region, which was understood by the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and in recent years also by the People's Republic of China. The history of the Cuban-Chinese contacts dates back to the days of creating of cultural and civilization governance by European invaders in Latin America, but it was not established by the political and economic relations, which began just after World War II, the creation of Communist Cuba and China. In the article, the author took an attempt to present the cultural, political and economic changes in relations of the two countries over more than 500 years in a variety of conditions arising from changes in the international environment and the position of China and Cuba in the context of the international relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Klimiuk

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.


2020 ◽  
Vol 210 ◽  
pp. 16022
Author(s):  
Vladimir Bruz ◽  
Sergey Vitinev ◽  
Anatoly Solodilov

The paper considers trending matters of the history of World War II based on views of contemporary Russian and foreign representatives of neoliberalism. The present topic is relevant since neoliberalism supporters attempt to reconsider the key events of World War II, which is especially noticeable just before the 75th anniversary of its end. Instead of serious historical research, numerous works of neoliberal authors contain highly ideologically charged representation of the events considered, which usually has anti-Russian trends. The present paper investigates neoliberal judgments and views of Russian and foreign authors on the reasons of World War II, its beginning, the Eastern Front (which in Russia is called the Great Patriotic War) and on the image of the Soviet army. These particular aspects are usually payed special attention and considered from the perspective of the new neoliberal reading. The aim of this paper is to perform the analysis of neoliberal views on some key aspects of World War II. The authors consider the rationale proposed by neoliberals and try to identify the grounds for reconsideration of a number of events of World War II. The key method of analysis performed was the dialectical method. Such specific methods as those of analysis, synthesis, comparative-historical and problematic-chronological methods, methods of actualization, of specific and logical analysis and some other ones were applied as well. As the result of the research conducted, the authors ascertained that in both Russia and foreign countries neoliberal views on important matters of World War II stem from ideology and political interests. In fact, there is the aim pursued to substantiate the responsibility and blame of the Soviet Union for starting the war, inhumanity of soviet regime and barbarity of the Soviet army. To attain this, in the context of informational war that is currently taking place all means are used from distortion of facts to fabrications and outright lies. Such methods are obviously unscientific and have nothing to do with historical research. The political objective of the ideological campaign run is to show Russia, which is the legal successor state of the Soviet Union, as the aggressive country that treats the free liberal world. The proceedings of the present paper may be relevant for historians, political analysts and theorists as well as for those who are engaged in World War II and particularly its Eastern Front.


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