The contract-delict interface and harm-causing omissions

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 203-242
Author(s):  
A Fagan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Pure Economic Loss ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Specific Duty

Dale Hutchison co-authored two excellent articles on the contract– delict interface. Their focus was primarily on breaches of contract causing pure economic loss. This article extends the investigation to omissions which are in breach of contract and which cause physical harm to person or property. At the centre of the investigation is the Supreme Court of Appeal’s (majority) judgment in the case of Chartaprops 16 v Silberman 2009 (1) SA 265 (SCA). A harm-causing omission will be wrongful, for the purpose of delictual liability, only if it was in breach of a specific duty. To date, our law has recognised only a small number of such specific duties. The Chartaprops judgment seems to recognise another, arising – in a way which is not clearly explained in the judgment – from the contractual duties by which the harm-causer and certain third parties are bound. In a series of steps, this article develops an account of that duty, culminating in the following formulation, which is meant to capture both the duty’s ground and its content: ‘If a person has contracted with another person to perform a task and knows (or ought to know) that the other person has contracted with him to perform that task in order to discharge a delictual duty owed by the other person to one or more further persons, then he owes those further persons a specific duty, the breach of which constitutes a wrong for the purposes of Aquilian liability, not to cause harm to them by negligently having contracted with the other person to perform that task and then failing to perform it.’

Revisiting pure economic loss: lessons to be learnt from the Supreme Court of Canada?

Legal Studies ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Pure Economic Loss ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Common ◽  
Difficult Area

This article examines the treatment of pure economic loss claims in England and Canada. The two jurisdictions have much in common. Starting from the same case sources, the common law of each system has struggled to deal with claims for negligently-incurred pure economic loss. Yet, the systems diverged in the 1990s when the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of Murphy v Brentwood DC and reiterated its adherence to the Anns two-stage test. It is submitted that, in view of recent developments which suggest the gradual convergence of the two systems, English law should carefully examine the categorisation approach adopted by the Canadian courts. The current English position is far from clear, and the Canadian model is capable of bringing transparency and greater clarity to this difficult area of law.

scholarly journals Some Recent Developments in the Law of Limitation of Actions, Concurrent Liability and Pure Economic Loss

1969 ◽  
pp. 388
Author(s):  
W. S. Schlosser
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Pure Economic Loss ◽  
Practical Matter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Limitation Of Actions ◽  
Future Path

Two recent decisions the Supreme Court of Canada have affirmed three important principles: 1. The running of a limitation period may be postponed until the injury is discoverable by reasonable diligence; 2. Solicitors (at least) may be concurrently liable in contract and tort, and; 3. Damage for pure economic loss is recoverable for negligent acts. While the Supreme Court of Canada has made the law's future path clear, much remains for discussion and definition. In the short term, the practical matter of applying these decisions and predicting their effects shows there is much uncertainty yet to be resolved.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

O ENSINO RELIGIOSO EM QUESTÃO

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Mauro Rocha Baptista
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Education ◽  
Common Core ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
National Curriculum ◽  
The Other ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common

Neste artigo analisamos a relação do Ensino Religioso com a sua evolução ao longo do contexto recente do Brasil para compreender a posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal ao considerar a possibilidade do Ensino Religioso confessional. Inicialmente apresentaremos a perspectiva legislativa criada com a constituição de 1988 e seus desdobramentos nas indicações curriculares. Neste contexto é frisado a intenção de incluir o Ensino Religioso na Base Nacional Curricular Comum, o que acabou não acontecendo. A tendência manifesta nas duas primeiras versões da BNCC era de um Ensino Religioso não-confessional. Uma tendência que demarcava a função do Ensino Religioso em debater a religião, mas que não permitia o direcionamento por uma vertente religioso qualquer. Esta posição se mostrava uma evolução da primeira perspectiva histórica mais associada à catequese confessional. Assim como também ultrapassava a interpretação posterior de um ecumenismo interconfessional, que mantinha a superioridade do cristianismo ante as demais religiões. Sendo assim, neste artigo, adotaremos o argumento de que a decisão do STF, de seis votos contra cinco, acaba retrocedendo ante o que nos parecia um caminho muito mais frutífero.Palavras-chave: Ensino Religioso. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Confessional. Interconfessional. Não-confessional.Abstract: On this article, we analyze the relation between Religious education and its evolution along the currently Brazilian context in order to understand the position of the Supreme Court in considering the possibility of a confessional Religious education. Firstly, we are going to present the legislative perspective created with the 1988 Federal Constitution and its impacts in the curricular lines. On this context it was highlighted the intention to include the Religious Education on the Common Core National Curriculum (CCNC), which did not really happened. The tendency manifested in the first two versions of the CCNC was of a non-confessional Religious Education. A tendency that delineated the function of the Religious Education as debating religion, but not giving direction on any religious side. This position was an evolution of the first historical perspective more associated to the confessional catechesis. It also went beyond the former interpretation of an inter-confessional ecumenism, which kept the superiority of the Christianity over the other religions. As such, in this paper we adopt the argument that the decision of the Supreme Court, of six votes against five, is a reversal of what seemed to be a much more productive path on the Religious Education.Keywords: Religious Education. Brazilian Supreme Court. Confessional. Inter-confessional. Non- confessional.Enviado: 23-01-2018 - Aprovado e publicado: 12-2018

scholarly journals The Limits of Arbitration Law in Addressing Cultural Diversity: The Example of Ismaili Arbitration in the United Kingdom

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Sandrine Brachotte
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Cultural Studies ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
The Other ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Arbitration Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Employment Equality

This article studies religious arbitration from the perspective of global legal pluralism, which embraces both normative plurality and cultural diversity. In this context, the article considers that UK arbitration law regulates both commercial and religious arbitration while relying on a monist conception of arbitration. It further identifies two intertwined issues regarding cultural diversity, which find their source in this monist conception. Firstly, through the study of Jivraj v. Hashwani ([2011] UKSC 40), this article shows that the governance of religious arbitration may generate a conflict between arbitration law and equality law, the avoidance of which can require sacrificing the objectives of one or the other branch of law. The Jivraj case concerned an Ismaili arbitration clause, requiring that all arbitrators be Ismaili—a clause valid under arbitration law but potentially not under employment-equality law. To avoid such conflict, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of employment-equality law, thereby excluding self-employed persons. Secondly, based on cultural studies of law, this article shows that the conception of arbitration underlying UK arbitration law is ill-suited to make sense of Ismaili arbitration. In view of these two issues, this article argues that UK arbitration law acknowledges normative multiplicity but fails to embrace the cultural diversity entangled therewith.

scholarly journals Insurance related problems in bareboat charter agreements

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.

The Supreme Court, Ideology, and the Decision to Cite or Borrow from Amicus Curiae Briefs

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110321
Author(s):  
Kayla S. Canelo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Extreme Groups ◽  
Insight Into

Scholars have sought to understand the dual characterization of Supreme Court justices as both legal and political actors. One way to further uncover this complexity is to assess how the justices engage with the interest groups that file amicus curiae or “friend-of-the-Court” briefs. Scholars have revealed that the justices often “borrow language” from these briefs in their opinions. However, much less often, they cite the amici. These two uses are distinct in that one is revealed to the reader while the other is not. So which interest groups do the justices decide to cite and which do they borrow language from? I find the justices borrow more language from ideologically similar interests, but that ideology plays a less central role in the decision to cite. Specifically, I find that the justices are less likely to cite briefs filed by ideologically overt interests, but this only extends to the most ideologically “extreme” groups. Further, the justices are not more likely to cite briefs filed by interests that are ideologically similar to their own preferences. These findings provide insight into how the justices balance policy and legitimacy goals.

Regspraak: Novasie en delegasie van skuld – hoe raak dit die versekering van die tersake skuld?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-378
Author(s):  
JC Sonnekus ◽  
EC Schlemmer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Secured Debt ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Preferential Position ◽  
The Creation ◽  
D 20 ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Secured Creditors

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place. This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).

scholarly journals LAWSUIT IN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT AFTER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS BASED ON PERMA NO. 6 OF 2018

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 458
Author(s):  
Muhammad Adiguna Bimasakti
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Government Administration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Administrative Proceedings

The enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration very much changes the paradigm of the proceedings in the State Administrative Court. One of the fundamental things is about administrative proceedings as pre-litigation proceedings. Under Article 75 of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration, citizens who feel disadvantaged by a Government’s Decision or Action can file an administrative proceedings, and then file a lawsuit in the Administrative Court. Regarding this regulation, two interpretations arise regarding the obligation of administrative proceedings as pre-litigation proceedings. One party argues that the administrative proceedings as pre-litigation proceedings must be carried out before filing a lawsuit in the Court, and the other argues this is not mandatory. For a period of four years, the interpretation of the obligation of administrative proceedings as a pre-litigation proceedings in Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration is floating in the realm of discourse. It was only on December 4th, 2018 that the Supreme Court issued a Supreme Court Regulation (PERMA) No. 6 of 2018 concerning Guidelines for Resolving Disputes Regarding Government Administration After Administrative Proceedings, finally the Supreme Court dictates that administrative proceedings as a pre-litigation proceedings is a must. However, the PERMA does not regulate fundamental things regarding lawsuit after administrative proceedings, namely, who will be seated as the defendant, and what is the object of the lawsuit. In addition, there are also a number of things that needed to be reviewed regarding the arrangements in the PERMA, such as regarding the deadline for a lawsuit in the Court.

scholarly journals The Contractual Interpretation of Tipping J

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
The Future ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Way

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.

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