scholarly journals A construção da experiência perceptiva: o que isso quer dizer?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188
Author(s):  
Gary Hatfield
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Visual Space ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Stimulus Information ◽  
Spatial Properties

Classical constructivists such as Rock and Hoffman contend that the processes of perception are intelligent and construct perceptual experience by going beyond the stimulus information or by creating a percept that deviates from the physical properties of the object. On these terms, Gibson’s theory of perception is anti-constructivist. After reviewing classical constructivism, this article maintains, first, that the phenomenology of visual space shows a deviation from physical spatial properties, by being contracted in depth, even under fullcue conditions, a fact that makes trouble for Gibson’s version of direct realism. Second, independently of the first argument, it contends that perception is pervasively constructed in the sense that stimulus information must be transformed to yield perception. Accordingly, perception is radically constructed in its very bones.

Direct Realism and Illusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ambiguous Stimuli ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

Perception and Primary Knowledge

2019 ◽  
pp. 34-69
Author(s):  
Michael Ayers
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Decisive Reason ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge

A phenomenological analysis of perceptual experience, conducted with an eye on experimental psychology, addresses a series of questions. What is phenomenology? What makes perception of one’s environment as one’s environment? Does the phenomenal integration of the senses give decisive reason for ‘direct realism’? Do we perceive causal relations, or only infer them? Are we perceptually aware of acting? Are we perceptually aware of the causality of perception itself, and if so, in some cases or in all? It is argued that perceiving is not only direct cognitive contact with reality, but that the perceptual relation is itself an object of perceptual awareness. Accordingly, conscious perceptual knowledge comes with knowledge that and of how one has it. Other forms of knowledge (e.g. a priori knowledge) are analogous. A distinction is drawn between primary and secondary knowledge, such that that there could be no secondary knowledge without some primary knowledge.

A Historical Objection

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Indirect Realism ◽  
The Way

A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.

Phenomenal Presence

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
The Third ◽  
Spatial Properties ◽  
Perceptual Presence

Many different features figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features range from colours and shapes to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects to the relationality and wakefulness of our perceptual awareness of them. The topic of this collection of essays is the different ways in which features like these can be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. In particular, the focus is on features that are less often discussed, and the perceptual presence of which is less obvious because they are out of view or otherwise easily overlooked, features given in a non-sensory manner, and features that are categorical in the sense that they pertain to all perceptual experiences alike (such as their justificatory power, their wakefulness, or the externality of their objects). The book is divided into four parts, each dealing with a different kind of phenomenal presence. The first addresses the nature of the presence of perceptual constancies and variations, while the second investigates the determinacy and ubiquity of the presence of spatial properties in perception. The third part deals with the presence of hidden or occluded aspects of objects, while the last part of the volume discusses the presence of categorical aspects of perceptual experience. Together, the contributions provide a thorough examination of which features are phenomenally present in perception, and what it is for them to figure in experience in this way.

scholarly journals Role of Object Imagery in Comprehending Real World Phenomena Attributes

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 01074
Author(s):  
Elena Fedyaeva ◽  
Marina Ivleva
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Real World ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
English Language ◽  
Grammatical Structure ◽  
Evaluation Tool ◽  
Spatial Properties ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Feature

The paper analyzes the functioning of nouns as paragons of certain attributes characterizing various properties of the real world objects. Humans perceive the objects they see in space as possessing definite inherent attributes (shape or dimension). Perception results in the system of parametric adjectives. However, adjectives denote rather abstract meanings thus possessing a more sophisticated structure of categorial meaning in comparison with nouns. The dimensional nomination by adjectives is “vague”, while nouns can actualize several attributes and create a holistic image. The factual material analysis reveals that: 1) the use of nouns as an “evaluation tool” of the objects’ physical properties is due to the specific human feature to perceive the world primarily in essential, substantial or “objectified” images; 2) object images specify and simplify processing of the incoming data by cognitive structures; 3) object imagery is one of the tools to conceptualize spatial properties of the objects; 4) linguistic representation of object imagery is culture specific and depends on a grammatical structure of a given language conditioned by its historical development; 5) the English language is characterized by frequent direct nominal representation of an idea in contrast with the same idea being expressed by a simile in Russian.

Perception, Experience, and Direct Realism

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-72
Author(s):  
Alan Millar
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Demonstrative Thought

Direct Realism is the thesis that our perception of mind-independent things is routinely direct. It is true if and only if, routinely, our perception of mind-independent things is not by means of perceiving something that is distinct and separate from those things. This chapter defends Direct Realism. It begins with an examination of reasons that have been given in the past for rejecting it, focusing on Hume and G. E. Moore. There follows a discussion of relationalist versus non-relationalist conceptions of perceptual experience. Particular attention is given to reconciling a non-relationalist conception with Direct Realism. To this end discussion is focused on how perception facilitates perceptual–demonstrative thought. An important role is played by a view of how to understand non-committal descriptions of experiences. This view figures in a response to problems raised by Michael Martin for non-relationist conceptions of experience.

Direct Realism and Hallucination

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
The Past ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Physical Objects

Perception provides direct acquaintance with existent physical objects, if direct realism is true. However, hallucination involves perceptual experience of what does not exist. How should a direct realist rendition of perception confront hallucination? Fictivism proposes that the creation of objects of perception is secured by a person’s perception of them. Disjunctivism differentiates hallucination from perception while mistakenly insisting that hallucination is not in the brief of any genuinely coherent theory of perception. Direct realism rejects both fictivism and disjunctivism. Perception only detects and discovers—never creates nor concocts—when it represents its objects. Perception is cognition’s grip on the objectively real. If so, then accounts may be ready at hand to accommodate the likes of perception of the past, inverted and absent phenomenal character, as well as blindsight.

DOES SEEING RED REQUIRE THINKING ABOUT RED THINGS?

Think ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (22) ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josefa Toribio
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The World ◽  
Ripe Tomato

We continuously form perceptual beliefs about the world based on how things appear to us in our perceptual experiences. I see that the ripe tomato in front of me is red and I form the belief that this tomato is red based on my seeing it, i.e. based on my veridical perceptual experience of this red tomato. Perceptual experiences and beliefs are representational mental states. Both are defined not by what they are, i.e. their physical properties, but by what they are about, what they represent, by their content. The content of both perceptual experiences and beliefs is specified by how the world must be for them to represent things correctly; it is specified by stating the conditions under which they would be true.

The Photometric Properties of the Ap Stars

1976 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 365-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Hauck
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Ap Stars

The Ap stars are numerous - the photometric systems tool It would be very tedious to review in detail all that which is in the literature concerning the photometry of the Ap stars. In my opinion it is necessary to examine the problem of the photometric properties of the Ap stars by considering first of all the possibility of deriving some physical properties for the Ap stars, or of detecting new ones. My talk today is prepared in this spirit. The classification by means of photoelectric photometric systems is at the present time very well established for many systems, such as UBV, uvbyβ, Vilnius, Geneva and DDO systems. Details and methods of classification can be found in Golay (1974) or in the proceedings of the Albany Colloquium edited by Philip and Hayes (1975).

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