The Social Reuse of Confiscated Assets in EU Member States: From Current Experiences to an EU Policy for a ‘Powered-by-Citizens’ Fight Against Crime

1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-66
Author(s):  
Jim Murray

Focusing on the social and psychological aspects of introduction of the euro, the author describes its likely impact on consumers on a day-to-day basis during the run-up to and aftermath of 1 January 2002 when the new notes and coins will begin to be distributed in 11 out of 15 EU member states. While admitting that introduction of the euro is likely to be of ultimate direct (easier transactions) and indirect (lower inflation) benefit to consumers, he points out that the period of changeover will be experienced as traumatic by many who have no experience of any comparable change and who will be made to feel like strangers in their own countries. The Phase B - "optional" - period should thus be used to ease the transition by encouraging consumers to become familiar with the new currency pending its "compulsory" introduction in Phase C. A series of policy measures devised by the BEUC to foster consumer acceptance of the euro is described: it is recommended that legislation should be introduced to a) guarantee continuity of contract b) ensure that all conversion transactions are free of charge to the consumer, and c) make dual pricing compulsory for a given initial period.


2017 ◽  
pp. 53-70
Author(s):  
Bazyli Czyżewski ◽  
Agnieszka Poczta-Wajda

Average incomes in the agricultural sector are still much lower than average wages in non-agricultural sectors in the most of the EU Member States, which is contrary to one of the CAP’s initial objectives of “ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community”. The main aim of this paper is to verify whether EU membership and the use of CAP funds helped reduce relative income gap of farmers. The second aim is to analyse which factors influence this income gap and how. Our study is based on EAA data for EU-27 for the period 1995–2015 and makes use of three panel data regression models estimated for all EU Member States, the “old” ones (EU-15) and the “new” ones (EU-12). Our results show that the social goals of the CAP support have not been achieved in the EU-15; however, they have been achieved under the SAPS in the EU-12.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-58
Author(s):  
Ulrich Krotz ◽  
Lucas Schramm

What are the implications of Brexit for the nature, role, and potential of Franco-German leadership in the EU? Brexit, we contend, is both an expression and a further cause of two broader underlying developments in the contemporary EU: First, a stronger and more prominent German part and position, and second, disintegrative tendencies in several EU policy fields and the EU polity as a whole. This, in turn, has major implications for Franco-German bilateralism and for Franco-German leadership in the EU. In light of a stronger Germany, a relatively weaker France, and significant centrifugal forces, the two largest EU member states must not only realign their bilateral relationship but must also act as a stabilizer in and for the EU. We show that during the EU’s recent crises, not least during the Brexit negotiations and the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, France and Germany did exercise joint leadership. We also show, however, that major discrepancies persist between the two countries in particular policy fields and with regard to longer-term European objectives. Brexit, with its numerous calamities and implications, thus once again moves Franco-German leadership—and its shortcomings—to center stage in Europe. When it comes to leadership in the EU, there remains no viable alternative to the Franco-German duo. Yet, in order to provide constructive leadership and successfully shape the EU, the two countries must bridge substantial differences and be ready to carry disproportionately high burdens.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-144
Author(s):  
Mariya G. Bistrina ◽  
Thomas Thomov

While news of successful vaccine trials is encouraging, the prospect of long-term restrictions underscores the magnitude of a number of problems and challenges faced by all EU member states during the first wave of coronavirus infection. European leaders have come together in a series of measures and policies to support the European economy and society at the time of the declaration of the emergency. This situation underlines the particular importance of respecting the social rights of citizens. Social rights offer protection in many of the areas that most define our daily lives, including legally binding standards in education, employment and health care. This gives EU citizens the right to education, fair working conditions and access to preventive health care. The article traces the practice of how European countries apply the lessons learned from the first wave in order to minimize the negative impact on human rights. Several European governments have decided to expand income support schemes. To date, the authorities have expanded access to testing for COVID-19 in nursing homes, migration camps and other institutions. The authors highlight how the pandemic has affected fundamental rights, especially the social rights of society as a whole. The article describes some of the measures that EU member states have taken to protect the most vulnerable segment of society as Europe faces the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 58-67
Author(s):  
Melissa Erhiun

The relevance of the topic has been summed up by the migratory crisis, the emergence of recent conflicts and the occasional instability near the cordons of the EU, as a result, he is forced to strengthen supranational governance in various fields. One of such areas is foreign policy, which in the context of changing the nature of security interactions plays an important role in the process of European integration. The object of the study is the EU as an international actor in the process of its formation and development. The subject is the foreign policy dimension of the EU's functioning, its conceptual, institutional and instrumental aspects.The aim of the article was to consider a number of approaches with different emphases in the interpretation of the European Union's foreign policy, definitions of "sovereignty" and "supranationality", the difference between normative and implementing supranationalism, the historical attitude of member states to the full preservation or delegation of sovereignty. in the formation of EU policy, the creation of new authorities and positions in the process of EU formation in the context and the factors influencing member states on the formation of common EU policy and determine the attitude of member states to the supranational level of governance, advantages and disadvantages for them.Conclusions. Member states are ambivalent about deeper integration in foreign policy. On the one hand, foreign policy cooperation can serve as a tool that allows Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively. However, in the absence of leadership in the EU, the supranational level can become an instrument of regulatory justification for projecting the priorities of individual member states on other members of the union. At the same time, the possibilities of its use remain limited due to serious differences in the strategic culture of the EU member states.


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-236
Author(s):  
Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski

Josep Borrell’s visit to Moscow was a substantial political failure of the EU’s diplomacy still it was not an accident neither a surprise. The EU’ policy towards Russia has been based on illusions and the European wishful thinking since the very beginning of the mutual relations that started in 1991-1993. The Borrell’s visit to Moscow rather showed the nature of the Russian attitude towards the EU than produced it. Russia prefers to act within the “great powers concerto” i.e. to deal with both - the leading EU member states (Germany, France) and the non-EU great powers (UK, USA) and not with the EU institutions and representatives who are not respected neither treated seriously in Moscow. There is a deep division within the EU between the Eastern flank member states whose perception of Russian threat is strong and well founded and the western and southern countries the political interests and priorities are focused on other problems. Russian capacity to corrupt the numerous prominent members of the European political class makes the EU policy vis a vis Russia even less coherent and realistic. The article shows the history of the EU-Russia relations in the last 30 years and proves the fiasco of the Borrell’s visit to Moscow was not just an accident still a logical consequence of the ill based EU policy towards Russia.


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