scholarly journals Altruistic Preferences in the Dictator Game: Replication of Andreoni and Miller (2002) in Japan

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-21
Author(s):  
Jiayi Xue ◽  
Yohsuke Ohtsubo
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Fixed Number ◽  
Replication Studies ◽  
Dictator Games

We conducted two replication studies of Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) modified dictator game study, which revealed that participants’ altruistic decisions were consistent with the notion of utility maximization. The two studies (Study 1 with small stake sizes and Study 2 with large stake sizes) included 11 modified dictator games, in which participants allocated a fixed number of tokens between themselves and their recipient. In eight of the 11 games, each token’s value was different for each player. In Study 1 (N = 78), 85% of participants did not violate the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) throughout the 11 games. In Study 2 (N = 58), 81% of participants did not violate GARP. These results suggest that participants’ decisions were largely consistent with utility maximization. Following Andreoni and Miller’s analysis, we classified all participants (except one anomalous case) into the Selfish, Leontief (egalitarian), and Perfect Substitutes (utilitarian) groups. The majority of participants were classified into either the Leontief or Prefect Substitutes groups (i.e., non-selfish groups).

scholarly journals Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Oberholzer-Gee ◽  
Reiner Eichenberger
Keyword(s):  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Weak Axiom

Abstract We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).

scholarly journals Individual Preferences for Giving

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1858-1876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Fisman ◽  
Shachar Kariv ◽  
Daniel Markovits
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Graphical Representations ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Budget Sets ◽  
Baseline Experiment

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

scholarly journals Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Analysis ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Mechanical Turk ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Social Setting ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Dictator Games

We investigate whether experience playing the Dictator Game (DG) affects prosociality by aggregating data from 37 experiments run on Amazon Mechanical Turk over a six-year period. While prior evidence has shown a correlation between experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk and selfishness, it is unclear to what extent this is the result of selection versus learning. Examining a total of 27,266 decisions made by 17,791 unique individuals, our data shows evidence of significant negative effects of both selection and learning. First, people who participated in a greater total number of our experiments were more selfish, even in their first game – indicating that people who are more likely to select into our experiments are more selfish. Second, a given individual tends to transfer less money over successive experiments – indicating that experience with the DG leads to greater selfishness. These results provide clear evidence of learning even in this non-strategic social setting.

scholarly journals The Effect of Sense of Community Responsibility on Residents’ Altruistic Behavior: Evidence from the Dictator Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 460
Author(s):  
Chao Yang ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yuhui Wang ◽  
Xuemeng Zhang ◽  
Yong Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Community ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Community Responsibility ◽  
The Rich ◽  
High Level

Understanding the new mechanism of altruistic behavior is pivotal to people’s health and social development. Despite the rich literature on altruism, this is the first study exploring the association between the sense of community responsibility (SOC-R) and altruistic behavior by repeated dictator games. Data were gathered from 95 residents (30% male; M age = 33.20 years). Demographic variables, money motivation, and SOC-R were measured. The results revealed that there was a significant positive correlation between SOC-R and altruistic behavior, and SOC-R had a positive predictive effect on residents’ altruistic behavior. With the increasing of the number of tasks assigned, the level of residents’ altruistic behavior gradually decreased. There was a significant difference in money allocation between the groups with high and low levels of SOC-R. The level of altruistic behavior in the group with a high level of SOC-R was significantly higher than that in the the group with a low level of SOC-R. Findings from the present study highlighted the potential value of strengthening residents’ SOC-R in the improvement of altruism. Implications and directions for future research were also discussed.

scholarly journals Controlling for presentation effects in choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yves Breitmoser
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
User Interfaces ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Model Testing ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Economic Experiments ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Stochastic Errors ◽  
Out Of Sample

Experimenters make theoretically irrelevant decisions concerning user interfaces and ordering or labeling of options. Reanalyzing dictator games, I first show that such decisions may drastically affect comparative statics and cause results to appear contradictory across experiments. This obstructs model testing, preference analyses, and policy predictions. I then propose a simple model of choice incorporating both presentation effects and stochastic errors, and test the model by reanalyzing the dictator game experiments. Controlling for presentation effects, preference estimates become consistent across experiments and predictive out‐of‐sample. This highlights both the necessity and the possibility to control for presentation in economic experiments.

scholarly journals Emotional Intelligence and Bargaining Behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sazhin
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Emotional Regulation ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trait Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Bargaining Behavior

In this experiment, we examined how trait Emotional Intelligence (EI) related tobehavior in social bargaining tasks. EI is theoretically related to both higher trait levels of empathy and better emotional regulation. More empathetic people may act more generously toward a bargaining partner. Subjects with better emotional regulation may be better at controlling their emotions in bargaining situations, which may help them make more self-interested choices. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to measure whether higher EI individuals behaved more generously or selfishly. These games are played between two people, where one person receives an endowment from the experimenter and decides how much to share with a recipient. The Ultimatum Game allows the recipient to reject offers, which forces the proposer to give his money back to the experimenter. In the Dictator Game, the recipient is unable to reject the proposer's offer. To maximize earnings, the most strategic thing to do in the Ultimatum Game is to make offers closer to even splits to avoid getting rejected by one's partner and to keep the whole endowment in the Dictator Game where there is no threat of retribution. Conversely, if a subject is motivated by fairness, they would make fair offers in both games. We found that subjects with higher EI acted strategically by being fair in the Ultimatum Game and selfish in the Dictator Game. These findings suggest that EI predicts more self interested behavior in bargaining situations.

Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Jakiela
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
The Status ◽  
Rural Kenya ◽  
Fairness Norms

We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

A COMPARISON OF TWO METHODS FOR TESTING THE UTILITY MAXIMIZATION HYPOTHESIS WHEN QUANTITY DATA ARE MEASURED WITH ERROR

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 612-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRY E. JONES ◽  
PHILIPPE DE PERETTI
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Errors ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
Empirical Application ◽  
Stochastic Framework ◽  
Multiple Sample ◽  
Monetary Assets ◽  
Compare And Contrast

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) can be violated because of random measurement errors in the observed quantity data. We study two tests proposed by Varian (1985) and de Peretti (2004), which test GARP within an explicit stochastic framework. Both tests compute adjusted quantity data that are compliant with GARP. We compare and contrast the two tests in theoretical terms and in an empirical application. The empirical application is based on testing a large group of monetary assets for the United States over multiple sample periods spanning 1960–1992. We found that both tests provided reasonable results and were largely consistent with each other.

scholarly journals Asset Demand Based Tests of Expected Utility Maximization

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (11) ◽  
pp. 3459-3480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Kubler ◽  
Larry Selden ◽  
Xiao Wei
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Functional Form ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Contingent Claim ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Asset Demand

We provide conditions under which contingent claim and asset demands are consistent with state independent Expected Utility maximization. The paper focuses on the case of a single commodity and demands are allowed to be functions of probabilities and not just prices and income. We extend prior analyses by deriving three distinct tests for demands to be rationalized by Expected Utility: (i) a contingent claim analogue to the certainty strong axiom of revealed preference, (ii) a characterization of the functional form for demand, and (iii) necessary and sufficient conditions based on the Slutsky matrix. (JEL D01, D11, D81)

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