scholarly journals The Morality of Resisting Oppression

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Hannah Smith
Keyword(s):  
Academic Work ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Victim Blaming ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Women's Oppression ◽  
Resisting Oppression ◽  
Ethical Responsibilities

This paper reconsiders the contemporary moral reading of women’s oppression, and revises our understanding of the practical reasons for action a victim of mistreatment acquires through her unjust circumstances. The paper surveys various ways of theorising victims’ moral duties to resist their own oppression, and considers objections to prior academic work arguing for the existence of an imperfect Kantian duty of resistance to oppression grounded in self-respect. These objections suggest (1) that such a duty is victim blaming; (2) that it distorts the normative direction of self-regarding duties; and (3) that consequentialist reasons are inapt for justifying self-regarding ethical responsibilities. The paper then argues that the need for normative coherence in our very concept of a moral duty is of paramount importance, and especially so in the fight against patriarchal oppression. Accordingly, we should acknowledge the salient differences between pro tanto or defeasible moral reasons and fully fledged moral duties identifying agent-relative obligatory action. The paper concludes that we better respect and defend women’s rights when first we understand them as having, at best, defeasible moral reasons to oppose their oppression; and second, ensure that we make adequate allowance for a woman’s interpretative right to choose how to respond to her oppressive circumstances.

The Forest of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kwame Anthony Appiah
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Conventional Approach ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Business Decisions ◽  
Alternative Perspective

As business decisions and actions spill over into society in ways that arouse our concern, it is useful to explore how philosophy might offer an alternative perspective to consequentialism. This chapter reviews the conventional approach and the risks of “maximizing.” It submits that the narrowly consequential approach provides us with practical reasons for action but neglects normative or moral reasoning. Reasons for doing might be based on rational choice, but reasons for being (existential reasons) and feeling (sentimental reasons) are guided by moral choice. That these last two may not be “commensurable” does not make them less important. Treating everything as tradable with everything else may be bad for the soul and society. We have moral reasons to feel and to be certain ways, as well as to do certain things. It is time to pay greater heed to Jim March’s long-standing challenge to consequentialist decision theories.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

scholarly journals MORALITY, LAW AND CONFLICTING REASONS FOR ACTION

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cane
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Human Conduct ◽  
Morality Plays ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart suggested that four formal features of morality distinguish it from law: importance, immunity from deliberate change, the nature of moral offences and the form of moral pressure. On closer examination, none of these supposed features clearly distinguishes morality from law, at least in the broad sense of ‘morality’ that Hart adopted. However, a fifth feature of morality mentioned by Hart – namely the role that morality plays in practical reasoning as a source of ultimate standards for assessing human conduct – does illuminate the relationship between law as conceptualised by Hart and morality variously understood. Because morality has this feature, law is always subject to moral assessment, and moral reasons trump legal reasons. It does not follow, however, that law is irrelevant to moral reasoning.

scholarly journals Guns or Food: On Prioritizing National Security over Global Poverty Relief

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco García-Gibson
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Risk Of Death ◽  
Poverty Relief ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
International Anarchy

Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.

A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Barry ◽  
Emily McTernan
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties

Abstract When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.

scholarly journals Soft Law, Authoritative Advice and Non-binding Agreements

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-525
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
The Subject

Abstract One of the most fascinating developments in the domain of international law in the last few decades is the astonishing proliferation of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely, norms or directives explicitly avoiding the imposition of legal obligations on the relevant parties. From a philosophical perspective, this is rather puzzling: how can we explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding contract? In this article I aim to provide an account of the rationale of soft law from the perspective of the practical reasons in play. First, I analyse the idea of authoritative advice, suggesting that when authorities advise their putative subjects, they purport to give the subject presumptive reasons for action. I explain what presumptive reasons are. Secondly, I suggest the possibility that something very similar is at work in cases of non-binding agreements, coupled with special accountability relations that such agreements invariably constitute.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

scholarly journals Ethical responsibilities during undergraduate medical studies: A students’ perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 01-03
Author(s):  
Ayush Anand ◽  
Ashwini Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Health Professionals ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Biomedical Ethics ◽  
Medical Studies ◽  
Medical Field ◽  
Teaching Standards ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Ethical Responsibilities

Abstract All over the world, we see cases of violation of the code of ethical conduct by health professionals and students, leading to distrust between them and their patients. Institutions need to prioritise the training of students in biomedical ethics. Students face a variety of ethical issues throughout their course of study. Issues tend to vary from the pre-clinical years to the clinical years, depending upon the exposure to patients and teaching standards practised in institutions. There appears to be a gap between ethical issues discussed in classrooms and those faced by students in real life. Here we intend to provide a brief overview of the ethical responsibilities of a medical student in varied contexts. Knowing what their moral duties are will sensitise students to fundamental ethical principles in the medical field and lessen the gap between what is taught and what they will encounter in practice. Moreover, it will draw the attention of teachers towards the need to provide quality training in biomedical ethics.

Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law’s Claim to Authority

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Moral Duties

Political authorities claim to be able to impose moral duties on citizens by the mere expedient of legislating. This claim is problematic -- in fact, among theorists, it is widely denied that political authorities have such powers. I argue that the legitimacy of political authority is not contingent upon the truth of its claim to be able to impose moral duties by mere legislation. Such claims are better seen as exercises of semiotic techniques to alter social meanings. These alterations serve to facilitate desirable social change that may not have been antecedently obligatory because of the nonfulfillment of a compliance condition, which normally attaches to any "fair-play" duty. Where political authority uses the semiotic technique of announcing a legal -- and by implication moral -- duty, thereby altering social meaning as a means of bringing about the satisfaction of a compliance condition, it makes a claim whose literal falsehood (if false it be) does not derogate from the authority’s legitimacy.

E-Tutor

2009 ◽  
pp. 308-314
Author(s):  
Maria Ranieri
Keyword(s):  
Enterprise Resource Planning ◽  
Business Processes ◽  
Learning Experience ◽  
Resource Planning ◽  
Virtual Learning Environment ◽  
Information And Communications Technology ◽  
Drop Out ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Ict Industry

In recent years, there have been extensive discussions in the information system (IS) community on how to best respond to developments in the information and communications technology (ICT) industry. Some of these discussions have focused on the changing skills of IS graduates and have identified the need for graduates to have an integrated understanding of business processes and the ability to work effectively in teams to solve key business problems in the ICT industry. To better respond to the ICT changes, many firms have implemented companywide information systems called enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems to Many scholars believe that e-tutor support in a virtual learning environment is critical for the success of a student’s learning experience. Several reasons support this belief: “practical reasons such as reduction of drop-out rates, theoretical reasons such as mitigating student isolation, and moral reasons such as the obligation to help students succeed” (Denis, Watland, Pirotte, & Verday, 2004). Notwithstanding, the e-tutor profile is still uncertain and calls for deeper investigation and analysis. This paper aims to present a framework of competencies for specific e-tutor roles, through a literature review and personal experience.

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