A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Barry ◽  
Emily McTernan
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties

Abstract When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

scholarly journals Guns or Food: On Prioritizing National Security over Global Poverty Relief

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco García-Gibson
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Risk Of Death ◽  
Poverty Relief ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
International Anarchy

Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.

The Hospital and Its Patients1

2018 ◽  
pp. 76-86
Author(s):  
Richard M. Titmuss
Keyword(s):  
National Health Service ◽  
Health Service ◽  
National Health ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Social Institution ◽  
Structure Functions ◽  
Technological Advance ◽  
Social Costs ◽  
The Third ◽  
Hospital Work

This chapter discusses the significance of the hospital as a social institution. It is one of the most complex of social institutions — an institution which in recent years has grown immensely in its complexities, and to which scholars have added newer complications as a result of the development of the National Health Service. Now, in this situation, the chapter suggests three main dangers. The first danger is that increasing complexity in structure, functions, and administration can lead to increasing economic and social costs without a proportional rise in value rendered to the community. The second danger is that the ends or aims of hospital work may be obscured by excessive preoccupation with means. The third danger is represented by scientific and technological advance.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law’s Claim to Authority

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Moral Duties

Political authorities claim to be able to impose moral duties on citizens by the mere expedient of legislating. This claim is problematic -- in fact, among theorists, it is widely denied that political authorities have such powers. I argue that the legitimacy of political authority is not contingent upon the truth of its claim to be able to impose moral duties by mere legislation. Such claims are better seen as exercises of semiotic techniques to alter social meanings. These alterations serve to facilitate desirable social change that may not have been antecedently obligatory because of the nonfulfillment of a compliance condition, which normally attaches to any "fair-play" duty. Where political authority uses the semiotic technique of announcing a legal -- and by implication moral -- duty, thereby altering social meaning as a means of bringing about the satisfaction of a compliance condition, it makes a claim whose literal falsehood (if false it be) does not derogate from the authority’s legitimacy.

The General Nature of a Moral Duty

Philosophy ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol 28 (104) ◽  
pp. 41-57
Author(s):  
W. J. Rees
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
The One

I propose in this article to reconsider, in the light of some recent developments in the theory of knowledge, certain general questions about the nature of duty. In particular, I propose to consider the question of the relation between our moral duties on the one hand, and our knowledge or ignorance of facts and of moral principles on the other.

Can Bad Guys Have Good Gongfu?—A Preliminary Exploration of Gongfu Ethics

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 9-31
Author(s):  
Peimin Ni
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Martial Arts ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Third ◽  
One Stage ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Art Of Life ◽  
The Rich

This paper tries to explore a gongfu ethics on the basis of traditional Chinese ethical theories. Used in the sense that the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians did, “gongfu” means the art of life in general and not merely the martial arts, although martial arts can be taken as a paradigm example of gongfu. The paper begins with the question “can bad guys have good gongfu,” which leads to three answers, each representing one stage of the dynamic relationship between morality and gongfu: The first is yes, since gongfu and morality belong to two different categories, i.e., the art of life and moral responsibilities. The second is no, because each moral goodness or badness corresponds to a respective gongfu virtuosity or the lack of it. The third answer is that moral persons, as long as they still have to invoke morality, are not true gongfu masters. Those who have real good gongfu transcend moral duties and become amoral. The analysis suggests a gongfu ethics that can include, but goes beyond moral goodness. The rest of the essay articulates the rich implications of this gongfu ethics by comparing it with virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics, and relativism-subjectivism.

12. Intensive Animal Farming and Moral Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 172-186
Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Consumption ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Animal Farming ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Relevant Community

This chapter studies which principles should govern the state’s regulation of the treatment of non-human animals raised for human consumption. It defends the claim that it is wrong to inflict pain on or to kill animals, and that the state should prohibit intensive animal farming on these bases. The chapter then considers the objection that there is no moral duty to act in this way because animals are not part of the relevant community of moral concern. It demonstrates that it is implausible to restrict the scope of moral duties in this way. Finally, the chapter explores the claim that it would be wrong for the state to enforce compliance with these duties, but it contends that limiting the state’s role in this way leads to various implausible conclusions regarding how it should regulate the treatment of both animals and humans.

DAVID HUME E O “NÚMERO DE DUNBAR”: UMA HIPÓTESE EVOLUCIONISTA SOBRE OS FUNDAMENTOS DA MORALIDADE

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (138) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Marcelo De Araújo
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
David Hume ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Convention ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Personal Histories ◽  
The One ◽  
Number Of Individuals

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é caracterizar o conceito de justiça como uma convenção social indispensável para a emergência de obrigações morais no contexto de grupos que ultrapassam o “numero de Dunbar”. O artigo retoma, por um lado, a teoria da justiça proposta por David Hume na terceira seção de Uma Investigação sobre os Princípios da Moral, e, por outro lado, a hipótese de Robin Dunbar acerca do número máximo de indivíduos com os quais uma pessoa pode manter relações sociais estáveis que envolvam laços de amizade, vínculos de família, e histórias pessoais compartilhadas.Abstract: The aim of this article is to characterize the concept of justice as na indispensable social convention for the emergence of moral duties in the contexto of groups that surpass the so-called “Dunbar’s number”. The article resumes, on the one hand, David Hume’s theory of justice, as it is discussed in the third section of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and on the other hand it resumes Robin Dunbar’s hypothesis relative to the maximum number of individuals with whom a person may keep stable social relationships that comprise kinship, fellowship, and a sense of shared personal histories.

scholarly journals The Universality of Moral Requirements and Duties to Close Persons

2018 ◽  
pp. 103-113
Author(s):  
A. V. Prokofyev
Keyword(s):  
Moral Duty ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Preferential Treatment ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Special Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
High Level ◽  
Moral Requirements

The article traces origins of the contradiction that calls into being the polemics on the moral status of duties to close persons (special obligations). Special obligations are created by the unique life narrative of an actor that makes different recipients of her actions more or less distant. Those who are less distant are “close ones.” Those who are more distant are “strangers.” The basis of this distance can be different: individual sympathy, consanguinity, belonging to cultural, territorial and political communities. Special obligations presuppose that the preferential treatment of “close ones” is not only permissible but obligatory. This feature of moral duties to close persons makes moral philosophers suspicious because they are prone to endow moral requirements with two interrelated properties: universality and the high level of generality. The main reason for this is that the typical moral duty is a duty of every human being to another human being without any further qualifications. Against the background of such duties, any preference to close persons looks like the breach of moral equality and manifestation of impermissible partiality. Though, common moral beliefs persistently include special obligations in the whole system of moral duty. R. Goodin thinks that they have a priority over positive general duties and yield to negative general duties. The empirical researches of moral evaluations which reviewed in this article in general confirm this conclusion. The ethical theory cannot ignore fundamental features of common moral beliefs. That is why it is doomed to look for ways of reconciling the moral equality and impartiality with the preferential treatment of close persons embedded into special obligations.

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