Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law’s Claim to Authority

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Moral Duties

Political authorities claim to be able to impose moral duties on citizens by the mere expedient of legislating. This claim is problematic -- in fact, among theorists, it is widely denied that political authorities have such powers. I argue that the legitimacy of political authority is not contingent upon the truth of its claim to be able to impose moral duties by mere legislation. Such claims are better seen as exercises of semiotic techniques to alter social meanings. These alterations serve to facilitate desirable social change that may not have been antecedently obligatory because of the nonfulfillment of a compliance condition, which normally attaches to any "fair-play" duty. Where political authority uses the semiotic technique of announcing a legal -- and by implication moral -- duty, thereby altering social meaning as a means of bringing about the satisfaction of a compliance condition, it makes a claim whose literal falsehood (if false it be) does not derogate from the authority’s legitimacy.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

Co-variation, style and social meaning: the implicational relationship between (h) and (ing) in Debden, Essex

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Amanda Cole
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Linguistic Features ◽  
Rates Of Change ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Casual Speech

Abstract This paper demonstrates that the differing social meanings held by linguistic features can result in an implicational relationship between them. Rates of (h) and (ing) are investigated in the casual speech of sixty-three speakers from a community with Cockney heritage: Debden, Essex. The indexicalities of h-dropping in Debden (signalling Cockney) are superordinate to and incorporate the indexicalities of g-dropping (working-class, “improper”), resulting in an implicational relationship. H-dropping implies g-dropping, but g-dropping can occur independently of h-dropping. This occurs in terms of co-variation at the between-speaker level and clustering effects at the within-speaker level which is measured through a novel approach using the number of phonemes as the denomination of distance. The features’ differing social meaning are also related to rates of change. Young speakers are shifting away from linguistic features which index Cockney heritage (h-dropping; the [-Iŋk] variant of -thing words) in favor of more general, southeastern, working-class norms (g-dropping).

The Social Characterizations of Price: The Fool, the Faithful, the Frivolous, and the Frugal

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 363-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick F. Wherry
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Systematic Approach ◽  
Social Location ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Ideal Types ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Meaning Systems ◽  
Pricing System ◽  
Meaning Of Money

This article extends both Viviana Zelizer's discussion of the social meaning of money and Charles Smith's proposal that pricing is a definitional practice to the under-theorized realm of the social meanings generated in the pricing system. Individuals are attributed with calculating or not calculating whether an object or service is “worth” its price, but these attributions differ according to the individual's social location as being near to or far from a societal reference point rather than by the inherent qualities of the object or service purchased. Prices offer seemingly objective (quantitative) proof of the individual's “logic of appropriateness”—in other words, people like that pay prices such as those. This article sketches a preliminary but nonexhaustive typology of the social characterizations of individuals within the pricing system; these ideal types—the fool, the faithful, the frugal, and the frivolous—and their components offer a systematic approach to understanding prices as embedded in and constituents of social meaning systems.

“Mock Jewish” in Early Twentieth-Century Tunisia: Linguistic Form and Social Meaning

Arabica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 216-280
Author(s):  
Benjamin Koerber
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Public Culture ◽  
Visual Media ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Linguistic Difference ◽  
Linguistic Form ◽  
Early Twentieth Century ◽  
Social Meanings

Abstract The article presents a sociolinguistic profile of “Mock Jewish,” or the stylized varieties of Judeo-Arabic deployed for humorous purposes in early twentieth-century Tunisian public culture. We assembled a corpus of texts from both print and audio-visual media, including newspaper columns, television and radio performances, folktales, and plays, in which “Jewish” (yahūdī) or “Israelite” (isrāʾīlī) voices are stylized with exaggerated forms of linguistic difference. The purpose of the analysis is not to evaluate the inauthenticity of Mock Jewish vis-à-vis Judeo-Arabic proper, but to understand how performers deploy these markedly “Jewish” stylistic tactics to create diverse social meanings and assess the effects of these performances on language and society. We argue that Mock Jewish forms part of the broader “ideologies of linguistic differentiation” that construct Jewish speech as separate and distinct from non-Jewish varieties. However, the performances of Mock Jewish are not limited to sectarian polemic, but engage diverse targets, derive from different motivations, and provoke divergent responses from audiences.

scholarly journals Guns or Food: On Prioritizing National Security over Global Poverty Relief

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco García-Gibson
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Global Poverty ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Risk Of Death ◽  
Poverty Relief ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
International Anarchy

Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.

scholarly journals The Legal Authority of the Jurist and Its Scope in Modern Iran

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Seyfeddin Kara
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Legal Authority ◽  
Intrinsic Connection ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Subject

The development of Shīʿi jurisprudence has mostly been studied from the perspective of its relation to political authority. A handful of works that have examined the subject from a purely legal perspective, neglected the influence of Muslim societies on the evolution of Shīʿi legal theory. The paper examines the development of Shīʿi jurisprudence from a legal perspective and argues that there is an intrinsic connection between Islamic law (both Sunni and Shiʿi laws) and Muslim societies. Therefore, the changing values and expectations of society prompt changes in Islamic rulings. In this sense, the evolution of Shīʿi legal theory is no different to Sunni legal theory, and there are striking similarities between Khomeini's theory of Wilāyat al-Faqīh and the Sunni legal notion of maṣlaḥa which both aim to respond to the exigencies of the social change.

scholarly journals Social inferences from the use of just as an exclusive particle

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 746
Author(s):  
William C. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Semantic Meaning ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Meanings ◽  
Discourse Particle ◽  
Social Inferences

Recent work has begun to investigate the interaction between semantics and social meaning. This study contributes to that line of inquiry by investigating how particular social meanings that are popularly believed to arise from the English discourse particle just are related to the conventional semantic meaning of just. In addition to proposing an inferential process by which the social meanings associated with just arise, this paper reports the results of a social perception experiment designed to test whether those social inferences arise when just is used in particular speech acts and whether they depend on the speaker’s gender and level of authority relative to the addressee. The use of just was found to significantly increase the perceived insecurity of men but not of women. This suggests that listeners may more strongly perceive speaker qualities that stereotypes cause them not to expect.

scholarly journals Intersectionality and the social meanings of variation: Class, ethnicity, and social practice

2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 629-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Kirkham
Keyword(s):  
Social Class ◽  
Secondary School ◽  
Communities Of Practice ◽  
Community Of Practice ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Social Meaning ◽  
Class Relations ◽  
Phonetic Variation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Meanings

AbstractThis article examines how the social meanings of phonetic variation in a British adolescent community are influenced by a complex relationship between ethnicity, social class, and social practice. I focus on the realisation of the happy vowel in Sheffield English, which is reported to be a lax variant [ε̈] amongst working-class speakers but is undergoing change towards a tense variant [i] amongst middle-class speakers. I analyse the acoustic realisation of this vowel across four female communities of practice in a multiethnic secondary school and find that the variable's community-wide associations of social class are projected onto the ethnographic category of school orientation, which I suggest is a more local interpretation of class relations. Ethnographic evidence and discourse analysis reveal that local meanings of the happy vowel vary further within distinctive community of practice styles, which is the result of how ethnicity and social class intersect in structuring local social practices. (Intersectionality, indexicality, social meaning, identity, ethnicity, social class)*

A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Christian Barry ◽  
Emily McTernan
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Duties

Abstract When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.

UNDERIVATIVE DUTY: PRICHARD ON MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
History Of ◽  
Three Stages

AbstractThis paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics.

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