scholarly journals An Introduction to Institutional Coordination as An Alternate Model for Neo-Institutional Economic Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-197
Author(s):  
Rubén Méndez Reátegui
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Institutional Interaction ◽  
Positive Interaction ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
The Real ◽  
Formal And Informal Institutions ◽  
Informal Rules

In this paper, through the formulation of an alternate conceptual model, the author links the concepts of functional entrepreneurship and institutions, understood as a set of categories —formal and informal rules— showing a complex, dynamic and interactive character. Furthermore, the aim of this paper is to introduce an exploration of the concept of institutional coordination or positive institutional interaction as an essential element for neo institutional economics analysis. This aim proposes the hypothesis that institutional coordination or positive interaction among formal and informal institutions is the real key element for a theoretically consistent and com-prehensive analysis, evaluation and testing of institutions. Moreover, the paper is attached to the «meta» concept of society, represented as a process of dynamic collaboration among individuals. This assumption seeks to suggest an improved theoretical standard through the insertion of concepts taken from classical legal theory such as «desuetude» and «contra legem custom». This theoretical standard leads the author to introduce a set of contributions to the contemporary heterodox economics literature: a. Negative institutio-nal interaction is a process where overlapping and displacement between formal and informal rules cannot be leaved outside the model; b. A discussion in terms of institutional marginal rate of technical substitution becomes im-portant for deciding the best possible combination of formal and informal institutions; c. An exploration of the determinants for institutional elasticity, as the author assumes, that determinants of institutional elasticity mainly co-rrespond to the ease with which a «formal institution» can be replaced by an «informal institution» and vice versa; d. The use of the brain reward system and the Neuroscience approach introduced as a tool to improve the analysis of institutional coordination. Together the significance of these contributions brings a secondary hypothesis: traditional neo institutional analysis is weak, in the sense that, it avoids dealing with the real role and relevancy of in-formal institutions shouldering the prevalence of the formal institutional frame-work to reach institutional predictability and a sustainable social order. There-fore, the author claims that the traditional analysis is mistaken as it indirectly supports a separation and confrontation between contributions emerging from the legal abstract theory of the sources of law (Ghersi, 2007) and eco-nomic analysis. Key words: Functional Entrepreneurship, Formal and Informal Rules, Institutional Coordination, Positive Institutional Interaction, Institutional Elasticity, Sources of Law. JEL Classification: B52, K00, Z13. Resumen: En este trabajo, mediante la formulación de un modelo conceptual, el autor vincula los conceptos de empresarialidad funcional e instituciones apuntando a presentar una exploración del concepto de coordinación institu - cional o interacción institucional positiva como elemento esencial para el análisis económico. El objetivo es introducir la hipótesis de que la coordina-ción institucional entre las instituciones formales e informales es el elemento clave a dilucidar con miras a completar la elaboración de una teoría de las instituciones más consistente. Esta dilucidación se expresa a través de las siguientes contribuciones: a) La interacción institucional negativa es un pro-ceso en el que los desplazamientos y sobre posiciones entre reglas formales e informales no pueden ser dejadas fuera del modelo; b) Una discusión de la relevancia y características de la tasa marginal de sustitución técnica en el ámbito de lo institucional —relevante sobre todo al momento de estimar la mejor combinación posible de las instituciones formales e informales—; c) Una exploración de los determinantes de la elasticidad institucional —que se corresponderían con la facilidad con la que una «institución formal» puede ser sustituida por una «institución informal» y viceversa—; d) El uso del enfoque de Neurociencias y del sistema de recompensa del cerebro, los cuales son presentados como una herramienta para mejorar el análisis de la coordi-nación institucional. Palabras clave: Empresarialidad Funcional, Reglas Formales e Informales, Coordinación Institucional, Interacción Institucional Positiva, Elasticidad Insti - tucional, Fuentes del Derecho. Clasificación JEL: B52, K00, Z13.

scholarly journals Development of institutional bases of leasing

Vestnik MGSU ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. 146-158
Author(s):  
Natal’ya Yur’evna Yas’kova ◽  
Tat’yana Romanovna Alekseeva
Keyword(s):  
Structural Changes ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Opportunistic Behavior ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Institutional Approach ◽  
Formal And Informal Institutions ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
Informal Rules

Institutional approach to the research of leasing in modern conditions is considered in the article. Formal and informal institutions of the leasing relations are investigated. Ratios of public and subjective expenses and benefits in institutional system of leasing are shown. Features of interaction of agents of the leasing relations, their interests and tendency to manifestation of opportunistic behavior are investigated. The typology of mechanisms of implementation of institutional changes is considered. The need of structural changes of the institutes of leasing relations is proved. It is offered to introduce “institution of engineering” in the structure of institutions of leasing relations. It will allow providing harmonization of the interests of the agents of leasing relations, decreasing their opportunistic behavior, and reducing the transactional expenses of the participants of leasing. It will promote prevention of their opportunistic behavior and reduction of transaction expenses of the participants of leasing. In our opinion, “the institution of leasing” is a set of formal and informal rules, norms and mechanisms of enforcement of their performance (institutes of property, financial rent (leasing), crediting, insurance and other institutes of leasing relations), which govern the property and economic relations, the arising relations with acquisition of ownership and its subsequent assignment for use for a certain time with payment. These norms and rules are necessary for ensuring stability and definiteness in the relations between the participants of leasing, and also for protection of their rights and economic interests.

scholarly journals How Institutions Shape Uncertainty and Risk

Internext ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-251
Author(s):  
Stephanie Tonn Goulart Moura ◽  
Christian Daniel Falaster ◽  
Christine Elena Bianchi ◽  
Érica de Souza Mazato ◽  
Laura Taysa Espig
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Formal And Informal Institutions ◽  
Shape Uncertainty

Purpose: The study proposes a conceptual framework on how institutions influence risk and uncertainty. Beyond the nuances in defining the concepts in the existing literature, the role of institutions in shaping risks and uncertainties remains understudied. This paper adopts the new institutional economics (NIE) perspective to revisit the concepts of risk and uncertainty and provide a deeper reflection about its interactions with formal and informal institutions. Method: Our conceptual model is based on four propositions that support a theoretical explanation about the relationships between institutions and uncertainties, institutions and risks, and uncertainties and risks. Findings: While formal institutions have a primary role in reducing uncertainties, informal institutions can be seen as a source of risk. These findings imply firms’ strategic decisions. In this regard, we also provide a research agenda for future empirical studies in the area. Originality/value: The study highlights the importance of institutions for companies to deal with risk and uncertainties. The institutions have a primary role in defining the “known part” of the uncertainty, allowing the companies to evaluate the different scenarios for decision-making. Theoretical/Methodological Contributions: This study differentiates risk and uncertainty interaction according to institutional theory. Additionally, we offer an academic discussion of how formal and informal institutions can shape risks and uncertainties.

scholarly journals INTRODUCTION

Africa ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
Sarah-Jane Cooper-Knock ◽  
George H. Karekwaivanane
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Colonial Period ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Legal Professionals ◽  
Formal And Informal Institutions ◽  
Postcolonial Africa ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

From the colonial period onwards, there has been a marked expansion in the range of formal and informal institutions enforcing regimes of law and social order across Africa. At the same time, practices and ideas about law, justice, policing and professionalism have proliferated, drawing on a diverse range of influences. This themed part issue explores the lived realities of law and social order in colonial and postcolonial Africa. Building on a rich and growing literature, the articles examine how diverse actors such as ‘ordinary’ citizens, the police and legal professionals understand, enact and contest ideas about law and social order. The articles that follow adopt different disciplinary perspectives and draw on fieldwork from Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The papers also illustrate how thinking about law and social order can cast a light on important themes for Africanist scholars, such as processes of formal and informal institutionalization on the continent and the public's investment in such institutions.

Informal Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Chile (1990–2015)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Franceschet
Keyword(s):  
Political Representation ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Women's Ministry ◽  
Gender Parity ◽  
Formal And Informal Institutions ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
National Congress ◽  
Gender Quota ◽  
Female President ◽  
Elected Office

Despite electing a female president, Michelle Bachelet, and at one point achieving gender parity in cabinet appointments, women’s presence in Chile’s national congress remains small, is only slightly higher at local levels, and is extremely limited among party and coalition leaders. In her gendered analysis of representation, Susan Franceschet argues this is because of the strong formal and informal institutions that limit the size of electoral districts, require large thresholds to win seats, and require coalition negotiation over candidates for elected office. Even though women have a mixed record of representation, their presence has had important policy consequences. A gender-focused presidency has been critical for passage of gender-attentive policies. Women in Chile’s legislative arenas have been more likely to bring gender issues to the agenda. Franceschet points out that Sernam, the women’s ministry, has played a critically important role in this. The electoral reforms approved by congress in 2015 include a gender quota, creating expectations that improvements will continue.

The Conceptual Framework: Growth, Institutions, and Social Orders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Reversible Process ◽  
Main Determinant ◽  
Social Orders

This chapter lays out one part of the theoretical framework of the book, drawn from institutional economics. This literature maintains that institutions are the main determinant of long-term growth, and that to remain ‘appropriate’ institutions must evolve in synchrony with an economy’s progress through the stages of its development. Their evolution depends on a society’s openness to political creative destruction. Limited-access social orders tend to constrain it, to safeguard elites’ rents, and typically undermine progressive institutional reforms, breaking that synchrony. The transition from that social order to the open-access one is an endogenous and reversible process, in which inefficient institutions, which allow elites to extract rents, coexist with appropriate ones, which constrain their power and make it contestable. The hypothesis is advanced that Italy has not yet completed this transition, and that the tension between its efficient and inefficient institutions can endogenously generate shocks, which open opportunities for equilibrium shifts.

The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Private Goods

This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962–4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992–4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.

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