scholarly journals غیر مسلموں کے حقوق شریعت اور قانون کی روشنی میں اور پاکستان کا اس میں عصری اطلاق

AL-HIDAYAH ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
قدسیہ خاکوانی ◽  
خدیجہ بی بی

Islam seeks to establish such a society where all citizens of the state enjoyequal rights and religion should not become the basis for any discrimination. Sharialaws hold both Muslims and non-Muslims equal and no superiority or privilege isgiven to the Muslims on any ground in Islamic state. Islamic state is responsible forthe protection and security of minorities. If it has entered into an agreement withanother nation. The protection and security of the latter also falls under its domain ofresponsibility. The Islamic state is responsible for the protection of lives, honor andproperty of the minorities. On the map of world, Pakistan was established in August1947 as a homeland for the Muslims. It is a predominately Muslim Country but thereare several religious groups within Pakistan; the Hindus and the Christian’s being thebiggest religious minorities. The Constitution 1973 describes Pakistan as an “Islamicrepublic State”. It is a predominately Muslim State but there are several nonMuslims groups living here as citizens. Pakistan’s Constitution stands for equality ofall citizens irrespective of religion, caste, region, language and gender. Islam thestate of Pakistan stands for respect, peace and toleration for all non-Muslims citizens.This paper examines the population and constitutional position of minorities inPakistan and sharia laws. It also provides a general picture of major religiouscommunities: the Hindus, the Christians and the Sikhs etc, who are living inPakistan. Pakistan’s religious minorities have freedom to practice their religion and Pursue their cultural heritage.

Author(s):  
Thomas Schmidinger

When the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) attacked Iraq’s Nineveh Governorate, the region’s religious minorities became victims of genocide and displacement. This chapter focuses on the region of Sinjar (Kurdish: Şingal) and the displacement of the Yazidi (Kurdish: Êzîdî) along with other religious minorities living there. The displacement of these groups directly resulted from their vulnerability as religious minorities. IS targeted them as religious minorities, and their current problems as internally displaced persons (IDPs) also resulted from their status as relatively small communities without a historically strong political lobby or military force. This chapter analyzes the living conditions and political framework in which these IDPs and refugees must survive and presents their personal perspectives from inside and outside of Iraq. Interviews were centered on the following questions: What conditions prevent Yazidi, Christians, and other groups from returning to Sinjar? What are their perspectives on building a future in the region? What would they need in order to return and rebuild their homes? And how do the displaced adherents of the different religious groups interpret the 2014 genocide within a longer history of perceived genocidal acts against religious minorities in the area?


2018 ◽  
pp. 164-194
Author(s):  
Muhammad Qasim Zaman

This chapter focuses on two Muslim minorities, the Ahmadis and the Shi`a, and some of the contestations around their position in the state. How these communities have fared in Pakistan is part of the story here, with the Ahmadis being declared a non-Muslim minority in 1974 and significant Shi`i-Sunni sectarian violence in the country since the 1980s. The principal concern of the chapter is, however, to explore the anxieties that the existence and activities of these minority communities have generated among the `ulama and the Islamists. In case of the Ahmadis, the anxieties in question have had to do not merely with the peculiarities of Ahmadi beliefs about the Prophet Muhammad, but with Islamic modernism itself. The anxieties generated by the Shi`a have a different locus, and also go beyond Sunni discomfort with particular Shi`i beliefs and practices. Much more than the Ahmadis, the Shi`a have raised difficult questions about what, if any, kind of Islamic law can be given public force in Pakistan, laying bare in the process nagging uncertainties about whether Pakistan can ever fully claim to be an Islamic state.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 345-363
Author(s):  
Paul E. Walker

Dhimmī (non-Muslim subjects, mostly Christians and Jews, who were afforded protection by the Islamic state) persecution in Islamic Egypt included most notably that instigated by the Fatimid caliph al-Ḥākim from about 395/1004 until near the end of his reign in 411/1021. This ruler imposed burdensome restrictions and sumptuary regulations on Jews and Christians, causing significant numbers of them to adopt Islam. He also commenced the state-sponsored destruction of churches and synagogues, most famously the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. And yet, near the end, this same caliph relented, mitigating the severity of his previous policies. A general picture of what happened already exists, but the precise chronological order of these events and many of the exact details remain vague. Most importantly, we continue not to have a reason for his radically new policy. Al-Maqrīzī’s various accounts provide useful evidence although they hardly suffice. The Jewish reaction is far from clear. Two Christian histories, those by the Melkite Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd of Antioch and the History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria, confirm many particulars. However none of this information explains why. Was al-Ḥākim moved to act as he did in response to, or in imitation of, the strikingly similar set of restrictive regulations imposed long before under the so-called “Pact of ʿUmar”?


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 284-295
Author(s):  
Muridan Muridan

M. Natsir was one of the most prominent figures in religious discourse and movement in Indonesia. He was ada’wa reformer as well as a politician and a statesman.His most well known ideas were about the relationship between Islamand state, Islam and Pancasila, and his idea on da’wa. He stated that a country would be Islamic because of neither itsformal name as an Islamic state nor its Islamic state principles. The principles of the state could be generally formulated aslong as they referred to the Islamic values. Natsir also stated that the essence of Pancasila didn’t contradict with Islam; evensome parts of it went after the goals of Islam. However, it didn’t mean that Pancasila was identical with Islam. In relation toda’wa, he stated that it should be the responsibility of all Muslims, not only the responsibility of kiai or ulama. To make a da’wamovement successful, he suggested that it needed three integrated components; masjid, Islamic boarding school, andcampus.


1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
Muridan Muridan

M. Natsir was one of the most prominent figures in religious discourse and movement in Indonesia. He was ada’wa reformer as well as a politician and a statesman. His most well known ideas were about the relationship between Islamand state, Islam and Pancasila, and his idea on da’wa. He stated that a country would be Islamic because of neither itsformal name as an Islamic state nor its Islamic state principles. The principles of the state could be generally formulated aslong as they referred to the Islamic values. Natsir also stated that the essence of Pancasila didn’t contradict with Islam; evensome parts of it went after the goals of Islam. However, it didn’t mean that Pancasila was identical with Islam. In relation toda’wa, he stated that it should be the responsibility of all Muslims, not only the responsibility of kyai or ulama. To make ada’wamovement successful, he suggested that it needed three integrated components; masjid, Islamic boarding school, andcampus.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quraysha Bibi Ismail Sooliman

This paper considers the effect of violence on the emotions of IS fighters and the resultant consequences of those emotions as a factor in their choice to use violence. By interrogating the human aspect of the fighters, I am focusing not on religion but on human agency as a factor in the violence. In this regard, this paper is about reorienting the question about the violence of IS not as “religious” violence but as a response to how these fighters perceive what is happening to them and their homeland. It is about politicising the political, about the violence of the state and its coalition of killing as opposed to a consistent effort to frame the violence into an explanation of “extremist religious ideology.” This shift in analysis is significant because of the increasing harm that is caused by the rise in Islamophobia where all Muslims are considered “radical” and are dehumanised. This is by no means a new project; rather it reflects the ongoing project of distortion of and animosity toward Islam, the suspension of ethics and the naturalisation of war. It is about an advocacy for war by hegemonic powers and (puppet regimes) states against racialised groups in the name of defending liberal values. Furthermore, the myth of religious violence has served to advance the goals of power which have been used in domestic and foreign policy to marginalise and dehumanise Muslims and to portray the violence of the secular state as a justified intervention in order to protect Western civilisation and the secular subject.


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