scholarly journals VENEZUELA EN EL PROCESO DE INCORPORACIÓN AL MERCOSUR

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-129
Author(s):  
Dani José Villalobos Soto ◽  
Enio Enrique Ortiz Valenzuela

Diversos han sido los esquemas de integración que han experimentado en sus prácticas los países de Latinoamérica, en su lucha por lograr una concentración de esfuerzos frentes a las vicisitudes en aras de alcanzar intereses comunes para la región. Esta investigación enfoca al MERCOSUR como un proceso de integración que busca la conformación de un mercado común por medio de la eliminación de barreras arancelarias y para arancelarias. En ese sentido el presente estudio considera la participación de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela como posible miembro pleno del bloque, también se analiza el escenario asimétrico que caracteriza a Venezuela para su ingreso al MERCOSUR, donde se destacan las asimetrías de Venezuela para con los países miembros del bloque sureño, considerando de esta forma los potenciales beneficios y costos que tendrá para Venezuela la inclusión real al conglomerado de países que integran el MERCOSUR. Se ha basado en un trabajo de tipo documental, donde se realiza un análisis sobre la inclusión de Venezuela al esquema integracionista. Como conclusión es importante destacar que el objetivo de MERCOSUR se basa en crear una zona de libre comercio para beneficio de los países que integran América del Sur. SUMMARY Various scheme of integration have been experienced in practices of Latin American countries in their struggle to achieve a concentration of efforts against the vicissitudes in order to accomplish common interests for the region. This research focuses on MERCOSUR as an integration process that seeks the creation of a common market through the elimination of tariff wall and nontariff. In this sense, the present study considers the participation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as a full member of the bloc; it also analyzes the asymmetric scenario that characterizes Venezuela for its entry into MERCOSUR, highlighting Venezuela’s asymmetries with members of the southern bloc, thus considering the potential benefits and costs that it represent for Venezuela the real inclusion to the group of countries that are part of MERCOSUR. The present study is based on a documentary work, making an analysis on the inclusion of Venezuela to the integration scheme. In conclusion it is important to note that the goal of MERCOSUR is based on creating a free trade area for the benefit of the countries of South America.

Author(s):  
ANIL HIRA

This paper applies Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on negotiations as a two level game, to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations process. The paper compares the domestic ratification processes with the existing web of regional and bilateral trade agreements for insights into the relative bargaining strength and key issues for the most important economies in the hemisphere: the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. This paper delivers important insights into how the existing international and domestic legal and political context will affect the dynamic shape of FTAA negotiations, with the aim of finding strategies by which Latin American countries (LACs) can maximize their bargaining power.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 424-447
Author(s):  
André Luiz Reis da Silva ◽  
Isadora Loreto da Silveira

 Este trabalho procura, primeiramente, analisar o processo de negociações da Área de Livre Comércio das Américas (Alca), que reuniria 34 países do continente americano, ou seja, todos que o compõem, à exceção de Cuba. Busca-se também examinar os desdobramentos diretos e indiretos das negociações, pois se infere que o impacto desse projeto sobre as relações entre os EUA e os países da América Latina e Caribe, e entre os próprios países latino-americanos, foi muito significativo. A proposta foi lançada na I Cúpula das Américas, em 1994, por iniciativa dos EUA, e tinha o encerramento de suas negociações previsto para 2005. Embora não tenha sido implementada, a negociação da Alca produziu efeitos, contrabalançando processos de integração latino-americanos. A corroboração do fracasso da proposta da Alca, em 2005, em Mar del Plata, sublinhou a importância dos processos próprios de integração e concertação política sul e latino-americanos. Esse acontecimento é relevante, pois tais processos se configuram como vias para o desenvolvimento e a defesa dos interesses nacionais dos países da região. A análise deste artigo parte das negociações da Alca durante o governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso, examina a proposta de "Alca light" do governo Lula, e culmina na derrocada do projeto da Alca, nas iniciativas latino-americanas autônomas - como a CALC e a CELAC - e na nova estratégia dos EUA para a região.   Abstract: Firstly, this paper seeks to analyze the Free Trade Area of ??the Americas (FTAA) negotiation process, which would bring together 34 countries in the Americas, that is, all who compose it, except for Cuba. We also examine the direct and indirect consequences of negotiations, because the impact of this project on relations between the U.S. and Latin America and the Caribbean, and also among Latin American countries, was very significant. The proposal was launched at the 1st Summit of the Americas in 1994, as a U.S. initiative, and the closure of negotiations was scheduled for 2005. Although it has not been implemented, the FTAA has produced effects, counterbalancing processes of Latin American integration. The corroboration of the failure of the proposed FTAA, in 2005, in Mar del Plata, stressed the importance of the development of Latin and South America's own processes of integration and political coordination. This event is relevant, since such processes constitute ways for the development and defense of national interests of the countries in the region. This paper's analysis departs from the negotiations during the Cardoso government, examines the Lula administration proposal of a "light FTAA", and culminates with the collapse of the FTAA project, with autonomous Latin American initiatives - such as CALC and CELAC - and with the new U.S. strategy for the region. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilherme Casarões

The institutional framework of Latin American integration saw a period of intense transformation in the 2000s, with the death of the ambitious project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), spearheaded by the United States, and the birth of two new institutions, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). This article offers a historical reconstruction of regional integration structures in the 2000s, with emphasis on the fault lines between Brazil, Venezuela and the US, and how they have shaped the institutional order across the hemisphere. We argue that the shaping of UNASUR and CELAC, launched respectively in 2007 and 2010, is the outcome of three complex processes: (1) Brazil’s struggle to strengthen Mercosur by acting more decisively as a regional paymaster; (2) Washington’s selective engagement with some key regional players, notably Colombia, and (3) Venezuela’s construction of an alternative integration model through the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and oil diplomacy. If UNASUR corresponded to Brazil’s strategy to neutralize the growing role of Caracas in South America and to break apart the emerging alliance between Venezuela, Argentina, and Bolivia, CELAC was at the same time a means to keep the US away from regional decisions, and to weaken the Caracas-Havana axis that sustained ALBA.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 206-207 ◽  

The seventeenth session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was held in Geneva from October 31 to November 19, 1960, under the chairmanship of Mr. Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva (Brazil). One of the main items of discussion was regional economic integration, considered in terms of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the proposed Latin American free trade area, and the European Economic Community (EEC). Examination of the Stockholm Convention establishing EFTA, begun at the sixteenth session, was resumed, with the contracting parties concluding that the provisions concerning the setting up, within the time limit set forth in the convention, of a free trade area were within the definition of such an area, as contained in Article XXIV of GATT. Delegates felt, however, that there remained some legal and practical issues which could be more fruitfully discussed in the light of experience of the operation of the convention, and thus welcomed the willingness of EFTA members to furnish additional information as the organization evolved. In examining the Montevideo Treaty proposing a Latin American free trade area, delegates reached much the same conclusions. In response to the report on developments within EEC, particularly with regard to tariffs, delegates expressed a desire to receive details on the common agricultural policy of the Community, and raised queries as to the harmful effect of the Community's progressively favorable treatment of the associated territories on the trade of certain outside countries with EEC.


Author(s):  
Fernando Guirao

The 1970 Agreement was intended to regulate trade relations between the Six and Spain for six years. At the end of 1972, however, Chapter 8 shows, for the Six/Nine the question was no longer that of negotiating additional concessions for Spanish exports but of the inclusion of Spain into the pan-European Free-Trade Area, to begin by 1977. In the summer of 1975, the Spanish Council of Ministers, under the influence of the minister of commerce, refused to ratify the FTA with the EEC. The Spanish government wished to avoid a transformation into a customs union or inclusion in an FTA in which Spanish producers would face mounting competition by West-European producers. The 1970 Agreement remained in force until Spain became a full member of the three European Communities, on 1 January 1986, transforming it into a sort of pre-accession arrangement for which it was not prepared.


2002 ◽  
Vol 44 (04) ◽  
pp. 127-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Feinberg

Abstract With remarkable success, Latin Americans have sought to impose their free trade policy agenda on a very reluctant and internally fractious United States. They have an ally in President George W. Bush, whose senior appointments notably support hemispheric trade integration even as political pressures sometimes have yielded protectionist outcomes. Bush's trade negotiator, Robert Zoellick, pursues a doctrine of competitive liberalization while accepting some linkage between trade and social and political goals. In negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the administration will have to balance many domestic pressures without alienating Latin America. Ultimately, FTAA ratification will signal a new Western Hemisphere economic-security alliance for the twenty-first century.


World Economy ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 783-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Salazar‐Xirinachs ◽  
José Tavares de Araujo Jr

1973 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-92
Author(s):  
Z. A. Vaince

Harry G. Johnson edited the book under review when trade policy after the Kennedy Round was in a state of flux. In the United States there was a resurgence of protectionism. Britain suffered another EEC rebuff in the same period, with Western Europe remaining at Sixes and Sevens. The imbalance of European Currencies and the inadequacy of international reserves were a threat to international trade. Generalised Tariff Preferences for developing countries were agreed in principle, but agreement in practice was not in sight. President Kennedy's Grand Design needed a revision. A New Trade Strategy was required. The present collection of papers seems to have been designed to provide this new strategy. In broad terms, what is proposed is the establishment of a free trade regime in industrial products amongst a group of countries touching the Atlantic, together with some subsidiary proposals for action in related areas of trade policy. The nucleus of what would thus initially be a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) would be the United States, Canada and Britain and other members of the European Free Trade Associa¬tion (EFTA). But the plan would be an "open-ended" arrangement which other industrialised nations — Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the countries - of the European Economic Community—could also join, provided they were prepared to conform to the rules that this integration scheme would entail. The launching of a multilateral free trade association could be the means of continuing the momentum towards world trade liberalisation and of countering the inward-looking tendencies of the EEC.


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