scholarly journals A reconfiguração do empirismo: química, medicina e história natural a partir do programa baconiano de conhecimento

DoisPontos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciana Zaterka
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Francis Bacon ◽  
George Berkeley ◽  
Historia Natural

O conceito de empirismo evoca tanto uma tradição histórica quanto uma rede de questões filosóficas. Ambas frequentemente associadas a nomes como os de Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753) e David Hume (1711-1776). Porém, lembremos que nenhum desses filósofos utilizaram o termo empirismo, e nem compartilharam de uma única escola epistemológica. Do ponto de vista histórico é comum encontrarmos estudos de História e Filosofia da Ciência que relacionam o conceito de ‘empirismo’ com a chamada Escola Empírica Médica, desenvolvida na Grécia Antiga (século III a.C.). Porém, mais uma vez, temos que ter cautela com essas simplificações históricas, afinal se por uma Escola médica compreendemos um número de médicos que se reconhecem como pertencentes a um grupo que defendem exatamente as mesmas ideias e conceitos, a Escola Empírica Médica é simplesmente uma invenção histórica. De fato, observaremos alguns elementos comuns dentro dessas escolas, mas não correntes unívocas. Essa postura historiográfica usualmente acarreta sérias consequências. Assim, por exemplo, os estudos que marcam a diferença entre as filosofias do continente europeu e as da Inglaterra do século XVII, distinguindo-a por meio de noções amplas, tais como racionalismo e empirismo, podem cair em reducionismos importantes. Se, por um lado, vincular o empirismo moderno à escola médica antiga acarreta numa compreensão histórica equivocada; por outro lado, aceitar a dicotomia empirismo x racionalismo como a única narrativa possível para compreendermos a gênese da filosofia moderna carrega consigo problemas de cunho epistemológico. Dos vários problemas que surgem dessa perspectiva historiográfica, isto é, de aceitarmos acriticamente a narrativa padrão, dois deles nos importam mais de perto: ela fornece uma ênfase às questões de cunho epistemológico, subestimando, então, a importância dos debates em outras áreas, como filosofia natural, ética e política, por exemplo; e deixa de lado pensadores que combinam elementos das duas correntes e, portanto, não operam stricto sensu com a dicotomia entre razão e experiência. Nesse sentido, objetivamos problematizar e aprofundar essa questão, ao discutir aspectos epistêmicos e metodológicos do chamado “programa baconiano” de conhecimento, bem como alguns de seus desdobramentos, especialmente no âmbito da química e da medicina no século XVII inglês. 

The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-66
Author(s):  
Robert Elliott Allinson ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Argument Structure ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
External World ◽  
George Berkeley ◽  
René Descartes

The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.

Origins of British Enlightenment Rhetoric

2014 ◽  
pp. 522-534
Author(s):  
Arthur Walzer
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Rhetorical Theory ◽  
Francis Bacon ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
George Campbell ◽  
Joseph Priestley ◽  
Literature History

British rhetorical theory in the eighteenth century departs from classical theory in significant ways. First, influenced by the empiricism of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and especially David Hume, Joseph Priestley and George Campbell recast traditional theory in psychological terms. Second, influenced by the belles lettres tradition, Adam Smith and Hugh Blair shift the focus of rhetoric from composition to criticism and create a theory intended to account for literature, history, philosophy, and oratory. Furthermore, in terms of rhetoric’s formative ideal, Quintilian’s ideal orator would share his place of privilege with the polite person of “taste” and “sensibility,” who would speak in a conversational register, as the coffeehouse emerged as a venue to rival the forum. Some scholars have welcomed these innovations; others have seen them as a radical wrong turn. This chapter discusses this transformation of rhetoric during the Enlightenment and reviews and attempts to resolve the scholarly debates the transformation has prompted.

Peirce’s British Connection

1996 ◽  
pp. 17-36
Author(s):  
Vincent G. Potter
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
George Berkeley ◽  
British Isles ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
British Philosopher ◽  
William Whewell

This chapter focuses on Charles Sanders Peirce's sojourn in England in the 1870s. It also shows the influence on his work of three philosophers from the British Isles—John Duns Scotus, William Whewell, and Alexander Bain. These three were chosen not only because of their impact on Peirce's pragmatism, but also because their influence on him is less well known than that of John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume—Peirce's so-called “British Connection.” Even so, the chapter shows how Peirce is not simply a British philosopher who happened to grow up in the Colonies. His pragmatism has a distinctively American spirit about it. That spirit, put roughly, was that ideas, if they are to merit serious attention, must be practical.

scholarly journals AESTHETIC IDEAS IN UKRAINIAN AND BRITISH PHILOSOPHY OF 17-18TH CENTURIES

2020 ◽  
pp. 10-15
Author(s):  
Viktoriya Havrylenko
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
George Berkeley ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
The World ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Aesthetic Ideas ◽  
The Universe

Understanding of beauty is one of the valid exponents of the individual worldview. And aesthetics ideas express a worldview of the historical and cultural age. Why is the world beautiful? What is the beauty of the Universe, nature, and human proves? Those issues troubled both Ukrainian and British philosophers of the 17-18 centuries. In this article, I outline and compare philosophical views of aesthetics of Vitaliy from Dubno, Kyrylo Tranquilion- Stavrovetsky, Theophan Prokopovych, Heorhiyi Konysky, John Locke, George Berkeley, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume. The aesthetics ideas of these philosophers are in many common. They regard the Universe and the person in terms of beauty and divinity. Humanistic tendencies of the era expressed in recognition of the perfectness and beauty of the human. On the whole, the ideas of philosophers sound like peculiar Aesthetical Optimism. Because, even ugliness is not excessive, and enhances the beauty and perfection of the Universe.

scholarly journals La noción de “cúmulo (congeries) de percepciones” en los Comentarios filosóficos de George Berkeley [The notion of ‘congeries (cúmulo) de percepciones’ in the Philosophical Commentaries of George Berkeley]

2020 ◽  
Vol 135 (135) ◽  
pp. 55-65
Author(s):  
Hazel Castro Chavarría
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
George Berkeley ◽  
Palabras Clave

Durante la época moderna predominó la idea de que no podíamos explicar la ejecución de nuestros actos mentales sin admitir la existencia de un sujeto que llevara a cabo dicha actividad. Esto último repercutió de manera importante en la aceptación de la propuesta que en el Tratado de la naturaleza humana David Hume hiciera en torno al ‘yo’; que éste consistía únicamente en ser un haz de percepciones. Sin embargo, esta concepción no era nueva. Ya en los Comentarios filosóficos de George Berkeley encontramos vestigios de una noción similar. Esta concepción, como observaremos, dejaría fuera cualquier representación de la mente en términos de una entidad independiente de nuestras percepciones que, además, ejecutaría las actividades propias de una vida mental. Finalmente, el eje de esta breve investigación girará en torno al supuesto de que no habría una sustancia espiritual individual distinta a un conjunto (haz/cúmulo) de percepciones. Palabras clave Actos mentales; Yo; Entidad independiente; Sustancia espiritual individual; Haz/Cúmulo de percepciones   Referencias Berkeley, George. Comentarios filosóficos. Introducción manuscrita a los Principios del conocimiento humano. Correspondencia con Johnson. Traducido por José Antonio Robles. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, 1989. _____________________ Tratado sobre los principios del conocimiento humano. Traducido por Carlos Mellizo. Madrid: Alianza, 2014. Castro, Hazel. “La idea de una ‘mente singular’ en Hume: el ‘qué o quién’ ejecuta las actividades propias de una vida mental”, en Laura Benítez y Luis RamosAlarcón (coords.), El concepto de sustancia de Spinoza a Hegel, UNAM, 2018. Descartes, René. Meditaciones metafísicas y otros textos. Traducido por E. López y M. Graña. Madrid: Gredos, 1997. Hume, David. Tratado de la naturaleza humana. Traducido por Félix Duque. Madrid: Tecnos, 1988. Locke, John. Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano. Traducido por E. O’Gorman. México: Fondo de cultura económica, 2005. Mellizo, Carlos. En torno a David Hume: Tres estudios de aproximación. Zamora: Ediciones Monte Casino, 1978. Olson, Eric T., “Personal Identity”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  Robles, José Antonio.“Génesis de la noción de sustancia desde George Berkeley I.” Diánoia, Vol. 30, no. 30, 1984.  

Classical Liberalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual History ◽  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Market Society ◽  
Economic Liberty ◽  
Service Programs ◽  
Revolutionary America

This chapter offers an intellectual history of liberalism, focusing on the classical view that was eventually displaced by modern, “high” liberalism. It first considers classical liberalism's notion of equality and property rights as well as economic liberty before discussing the ideas of thinkers like John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, and F. A. Hayek. It then explores the emergence of market society, with particular emphasis on what Smith called “the system of natural liberty.” It also examines classical liberal ideas in action during under revolutionary America and concludes with an analysis of the essential features of classical liberalism: a thick conception of economic liberty grounded mainly in consequentialist considerations; a formal conception of equality that sees the outcome of free market exchanges as largely definitive of justice; and a limited but important state role in tax-funded education and social service programs.

Hume and the Legacy of Academic Scepticism

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
David Hume ◽  
General Framework ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Early Modernity ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Pierre Bayle ◽  
The Middle Ages

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.

Philosophy

Unfelt ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 24-68
Author(s):  
James Noggle
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Eliza Haywood ◽  
Robert Boyle ◽  
David Hartley ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Contents

This chapter examines how the late seventeenth-century British philosophy of sensation, feeling, and selfhood responded to the challenges of mechanism with the idiom of the insensible. It shows how this idiom carries forward from John Locke and Robert Boyle to philosophers of the mid-eighteenth century, the age of sensibility, who use it to address a variety of problems. The consistent, Lockean element in these usages by David Hartley, Étienne Bonnet de Condillac and David Hume, Eliza Haywood and Adam Smith, is that they do not refer to mental contents. One does not hear of “insensible perceptions.” There are no “unconscious thoughts” or “unfelt sensations” in the British tradition surveyed here. Writers in this tradition rather describe insensible powers that affect the mind without themselves being mental. They are nonconscious, not unconscious. This is an implication carried by the idiom into articulations of quite a wide variety of other ideas. All of them indicate the persistent usefulness in philosophies of feeling of a stylistic gesture toward something beyond the reach of both feeling and philosophy.

Special Concern and Personal Identity

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-38
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Compensation Principle ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
Explanatory Priority ◽  
Special Concern ◽  
Joseph Butler ◽  
Equal Concern

As discussed by John Locke, Joseph Butler, and Thomas Reid, prudence involves a special concern for the agent’s own personal good that she does not have for others. This should be a concern for the agent’s overall good that is temporally neutral and involves an equal concern for all parts of her life. In this way, prudence involves a combination of agent relativity and temporal neutrality. This asymmetrical treatment of matters of interpersonal and intertemporal distribution might seem arbitrary. Henry Sidgwick raised this worry, and Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit have endorsed it as reflecting the instability of prudence and related doctrines such as egoism and the self-interest theory. However, Sidgwick thought that the worry was unanswerable only for skeptics about personal identity, such as David Hume. Sidgwick thought that one could defend prudence by appeal to realism about personal identity and a compensation principle. This is one way in which special concern and prudence presuppose personal identity. However, as Jennifer Whiting has argued, special concern displayed in positive affective regard for one’s future and personal planning and investment is arguably partly constitutive of personal identity, at least on a plausible psychological reductionist conception of personal identity. After explaining both conceptions of the relation between special concern and personal identity, the chapter concludes by exploring what might seem to be the paradoxical character of conjoining them, suggesting that there may be no explanatory priority between the concepts of special concern and personal identity.

scholarly journals Conhecimento testemunhal – A visão não reducionista

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe De Mattos Müller
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Thomas Reid

Neste ensaio, consideramos a possibilidade de o conhe- cimento ser transmitido ou transferido via testemunho. Apresentamos inicialmente uma introdução à epistemologia do testemunho, indicando a sua origem em uma tradição que tem John Locke, David Hume e Thomas Reid como seus representantes. Apresentamos uma versão da tese não-reducionista. Mmostramos que o não-reducionista acerca do conhecimento testemunhal deve requerer um desempenho epistêmico conducente à verdade por parte do falante e a integridade intelectual do ouvinte.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document