scholarly journals CEO Characteristics and Real Earnings Management in Jordan

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abedalrahman Alhmood ◽  
Hasnah Shaari ◽  
Redhwan Al-dhamari

The Chief Executive Officer (CEOs) tends to be the most influential member of a corporation as they exert control over corporate decisions such as financial disclosure, board structure, and company performance in ensuring enhanced corporate performance and earnings. The issue of earnings management (EM) that has captured the attention of researchers may be among the most critical factors that are linked to financial statement manipulation. Therefore, the current study explored the effects of the personal characteristics of CEOs on real earnings management (REM) practices in Jordan. Data of 58 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for six years from 2013 to 2018 were utilised to achieve this study’s objectives. The results of this study revealed that CEOs’ experience had a significantly positive association with REM. Meanwhile, CEOs’ tenure had no impact on REM among Jordanian firms. Also, the results exposed the presence of a significantly negative association between CEO duality and REM. Finally, CEOs’ political connection was found to have a significantly positive association with REM. This study offers empirical evidence on the effect of CEO characteristics on REM and how such characteristics can lead to exploitation, which brings an impact on the financial reporting quality.

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-18
Author(s):  
Ahmad Haruna Abubakar ◽  
Peter U Anuforo ◽  
Dahiru Hussaini ◽  
Musa Isa

There is currently exists an important question on whether firm’s political network affect the level of their earning information. The aim of this study is to examine the influence of political connection on real earnings management. The analyses involve a sample of 72 non-financial firms with 360 firm-year observations for a five-year period (2014-2019). Data was obtained from the annual reports of these companies as well as from Thompson Reuters and Bloomberg databases. The Panel Corrected Standard Error was used to test the model studied. The finding shows that firms board with political connection are possible to have earnings manipulation which deteriorate the earnings quality. Thus, this study recommends that increased attention should be given to internal control mechanisms to help curtail corporate earnings manipulations, reduce the effect of political connection, and enhance the financial reporting quality.


Author(s):  
Lars Helge Hass ◽  
Monika Tarsalewska

Financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide financing, they also play an active role in firm governance and in financial practices before a firm goes public. Venture capitalists are actively engaged in monitoring and advising their portfolio firms. Thus, one also expects them to exert significant influence over the development of financial reporting practices. This chapter reviews recent literature and empirical evidence on VCs and financial reporting quality in newly public firms. It surveys the role of VCs in such activities as earnings management. In particular, it discusses how their monitoring activities and reputation can impact how their portfolio firms establish financial reporting practices. Subsequently, it also reviews the consequences of misreporting, and whether they affect VC behavior ex ante. Finally, the chapter uses recent data to provide empirical evidence on the effect of VCs on accrual and real earnings management.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (8) ◽  
pp. 909-929
Author(s):  
Armaya'u Alhaji Sani ◽  
Rohaida Abdul Latif ◽  
Redhwan Ahmed Al-Dhamari

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of CEO discretion on the real earnings management and to explore whether the discretion of the CEO to ensure accurate and reliable financial reports is influenced by the political connection of board members. Design/methodology/approach Using the generalized method of movement to control the potential endogeneity on the sample of listed companies in Nigeria, the study conducted several checks using Driscoll–Kraay panel data regression with standard error to robust the main findings. Findings The paper provides evidence that CEO Discretion reduces the tendency of real earnings management and improve the reporting quality. However, the CEO’s discretion to provide reliable financial reports and to reduce the likely earnings manipulation is overturn by the presence of politically connected directors. Originality/value Existing studies on CEO attributes and earnings management in Nigeria fail to explain why CEOs were involved in corporate financial scandals. This paper suggests that the presence of politically connected directors is what override and upturn the CEO discretion to dwell into real earnings manipulations. Prior studies measured political connection using a dummy variable (Chaney et al., 2011; Osazuwa et al., 2016; Tee, 2018), this paper measured political connection using the proportion of politically connected directors. This is on the idea that the presence of more politically connected directors may give them the power to override the CEOs decision.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Jimmy Lee ◽  
Terry Shevlin

ABSTRACT We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G32; M40.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-219
Author(s):  
Yongtae Kim

ABSTRACT Guo, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou (2015) examine whether foreign investors encourage or limit real earnings management in Japanese firms. They find that firms with higher foreign ownership engage less in real earnings management than other firms as evidenced by higher abnormal cash flows from operations, lower abnormal production costs, and higher abnormal discretionary expenses. While the results suggest that foreign ownership and real earnings management in Japanese firms are negatively correlated, it remains unclear whether foreign investors improve the corporate governance of firms and thus limit real earnings management or that they are attracted to firms that have better governance and more transparent earnings. One fruitful avenue for future research is to examine whether the negative relation between foreign ownership and financial reporting quality reflects monitoring by foreign investors or selection.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sana Mardessi

Purpose The purpose of this study is to address the impact of audit quality on financial reporting quality proxied by real earnings management. To further clarify the mentioned links, this study empirically assesses the moderating effect of audit quality. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a sample consisting of 90 non-financial companies that are listed in the Amsterdam stock exchange in AEX all share index over the 2010–2017 period. This study applies a quantitative approach and secondary data as the main source of information for analysis. This paper performs an ordinary least squares regression to examine the moderating effect of audit quality on the relationship between financial reporting quality. Findings Empirical findings demonstrate that corporate governance mechanism, mainly independence members, financial expert and audit committee size has a statistically significant relationship with real earnings management. However, the effect of audit committee meetings on real earnings management is not significant. There is also evidence that audit quality moderates the audit committee – real earnings management links. Originality/value This study extends the existing literature by examining the moderating effect of audit quality on the relationship between financial reporting quality proxied by real earnings management in the Dutch context.


Author(s):  
Mohamed M. Mandour ◽  
Ali M. Elharidy ◽  
Ekramy S. Mokhtar

The purpose of the paper is to determine the impact of the voluntary adoption of the joint external audit approach in reducing earnings management practices through accruals and real operations compared with the adoption of the dual external audit approach. The research follows a quantitative approach to collect and analyze data from companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange during the period 2010-2014. 104 firm-year observations are tested in the sample. The findings of the empirical study shows evidence that there are consistent earnings management practices in the studied sample regardless of the type of audit (joint or dual). There is a negative association between joint audit and discretionary accruals compared to dual audit. This means that firms with joint audit are less engaged in accrual earnings management practices. In addition, large firms that adopt joint audit are less engaged in accrual earnings management. However, there is no effect of joint audit on real earnings management practices compared to dual audit. Our results are consistent for firm size, profitability and leverage. Both firm profitability and leverage show positive association with earnings management practices while size did not have a significant effect on either type of practice. Finally, we find that firms with high (low) profitability that adopt joint audits are less (more) likely to engage in real earnings management practices. Our results are of use to regulators, external auditors and investors.


2011 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 645-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T. McGuire ◽  
Thomas C. Omer ◽  
Nathan Y. Sharp

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of religion on financial reporting. We predict that firms in religious areas are less likely to engage in financial reporting irregularities because prior research links religiosity to reduced acceptance of unethical business practices. Our results suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of financial reporting irregularities. We also examine whether religiosity influences managers' methods of managing earnings. Although we find a negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals, we find a positive association between religiosity and two measures of real earnings management, suggesting that managers in religious areas prefer real earnings management over accruals manipulation. We provide evidence that our results are not driven by firms headquartered in rural areas and conclude that religious social norms represent a mechanism for reducing costly agency conflicts, particularly when other external monitoring is low. Data Availability: Contact the authors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorra Talbi ◽  
Mohamed Ali Omri ◽  
Khaled Guesmi ◽  
Zied Ftiti

<p>This study seeks to provide empirical evidence of the efficacy of board characteristics in constraining management opportunism, measured by real earnings management. The paper uses regression analysis to document empirical evidence regarding the impact of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees on real earnings management in 7,481 US firms over the period 2000 to 2009. This study contributes to empirical studies on the role of corporate governance in financial reporting quality by demonstrating the role of the independence of boards of directors and the independence of committees in constraining real earnings management. These results should contribute to providing an orientation for future regulators regarding possible amendments, especially in the wake of the current financial crisis.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Mohammad I. Almaharmeh ◽  
Adel Almasarwah ◽  
Ali Shehadeh

Here, the link between the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Real Earnings Management (REM), as well as Accrual Earnings Management (AEM), will be examined for non-financial listed firms in the London Stock Exchange. Robust regression analysis of the mandatory IFRS adoption will be conducted on the panel data, as well as earnings management using three AEM models and three REM models. Mixed results with respect to the qualities of AEM and REM were notably garnered, with mandatory IFRS adoption positively relating to the Roychowdhury of abnormal cash flow and the Roychowdhury of abnormal production. Meanwhile, the Roychowdhury of abnormal discretionary expenses, standard Jones, and Kothari negatively related to mandatory IFRS adoption, whilst modified Jones showed an insignificant relation to mandatory IFRS adoption. Changes in IFRS adoption and guidelines for UK firms may have an impact on AEM and REM, and, as predicted, mandatory IFRS adoption mostly affects the Kothari model followed by the standard Jones model as proxies for accounting earnings quality.


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