CEO duality and the choice of partial acquisition

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (1) ◽  
pp. 10401
Author(s):  
Qunyong Xie
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Partial Acquisition

Board diversity and firm risk-taking in the tourism sector: Moderating effects of board independence, CEO duality, and free cash flows

2021 ◽  
pp. 135481662110143
Author(s):  
Ozgur Ozdemir ◽  
Ezgi Erkmen ◽  
Fatemeh Binesh
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Composite Index ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Reduction Effect ◽  
Task Oriented ◽  
Free Cash Flows

This study examines the effect of board diversity on risk-taking for tourism firms and analyzes the moderating effect of board independence, CEO duality, and free cash flows in this proposed relationship. Using a composite index of board diversity and a sample of tourism firms from the US hotel, restaurant, and airline industries, we find that greater board diversity leads to lower risk-taking, measured in standard deviation of return on assets. Moreover, we report that the risk-reduction effect of board diversity is more profound when tourism firms have less board independence and less free cash flows for investments. When board diversity is decomposed into relation-oriented and task-oriented diversity attributes, we find that only the task-oriented diversity is influential in reducing firm risk-taking for tourism firms. Akin to main analysis, the board independence and free cash flows are significant moderators of the relationship between task-oriented diversity and firm risk-taking.

scholarly journals Board Attributes and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: A Meta-Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4808 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime Guerrero-Villegas ◽  
Leticia Pérez-Calero ◽  
José Hurtado-González ◽  
Pilar Giráldez-Puig
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Capital Costs ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure ◽  
Corporate Social

Many studies have examined the relationships between board attributes (board independence, CEO duality, board size, and women on boards) and corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) as a means to improve a firm’s reputation. This research was performed in various international settings and uneven outcomes were obtained. We therefore meta-analyzed 88 studies to summarize scattered evidence and found that CEO duality had a significantly negative relationship with CSRD, while board independence, board size and women representation had a significantly positive relationship with CSRD. These relationships were more significant in countries with low levels of commitment to sustainable goals. Thus, our study revealed differences in the relationship between board attributes and CSRD, and that these differences were conditioned by the institutional contexts in which firms operate. Our research has practical implications for practitioners and policy makers alike as we offer guidelines on the most suitable corporate governance mechanisms to achieve lower capital costs and better access to finance.

CEO Duality and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiding Chen ◽  
Fangfang Zhang ◽  
Shunming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Ceo Duality

Board involvement in corporate performance: evidence from a developing country

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaminda Wijethilake ◽  
Athula Ekanayake ◽  
Sujatha Perera
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the understanding of the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance within the context of developing countries. Design/methodology/approach – A number of aspects related to board involvement, including board’s shareholdings, frequency of board meetings, availability of independent board committees, board size, CEO duality, and CEO is being a promoter, were examined in order to explore their influence on corporate performance measured in terms of earnings per share. The study mainly draws on agency theory, and is supplemented by resource dependence and stewardship theories. Multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the data gathered from a sample of 212 publicly listed companies in 20 industries in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka. Findings – Among the aspects of board involvement considered, board’s shareholdings, board meetings frequency, independent committees, and CEO duality showed a positive influence on corporate performance. However, two other aspects, namely CEO being a promoter, and the size of corporate boards showed a negative effect. The findings also suggest that the use of multiple theories, rather than depending on a single theory, is more effective in understanding the relationships examined in this study. Further, the study highlights the need to be cautious in utilizing the theories that are more applicable to matured western economies when analyzing issues relating to developing countries. Originality/value – This study makes an original contribution to corporate governance literature by examining the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance in a developing country, namely Sri Lanka. The study also adds to the existing literature by utilizing multiple theories to examine the issue under investigation.

Upward Pricing Pressure in Partial Acquisitions: Application to the Essilor Case

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-367
Author(s):  
Yangsoo Jin
Keyword(s):  
Asian Countries ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Partial Acquisitions ◽  
Partial Acquisition

Abstract The price effects of a partial acquisition may be far more complex than those of a full merger. The discussion on this issue, however, has not been well developed in Asian countries, including Korea. However, a partial acquisition case occurred in Korea in which Essilor intended to acquire fifty-percent shares of its competitor, DM Optical. In this paper, we modify and reorganize theories of upward pricing pressure (UPP) in partial acquisitions and apply them to this case. This paper, therefore, intends not only to initiate a discussion, but also to suggest an exemplary method to conduct UPP analysis in partial acquisition environments. Specifically, it will contribute to methodological advances by analyzing the case in a fashion that circumvents limitations of time and data, the main obstacles merger reviewers often face, in practice.

scholarly journals Emperical Data on the Correlation between CEO Duality and the Performance of a Corporate

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emira Spahaj
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Significant Implication ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Panoramic Analysis ◽  
Board Directors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

An independent CEO’s discipline is greatly influenced by the way a corporate is managed, hence improving the firm’s value in those corporate that are developing and the ones that have already developed. Additionally, the shareholders’ interest can as well be safeguarded by the CEO and the board through creation of more safeguard guidelines. Macro-economic and micro-economic level corporate experiences significant implication from the governance, whereby corporate governance that is poor may lead to corporations’ failure, for instance Worldcom and Enron experienced this type of failure. This paper scrutinizes the connection between dual and separated Chairs-CEOs structures and implications in the performance of corporate. The interest of CEO Duality emanates from the idea that CEO duality would make a difference to the performance of a firm and corporate governance . There exists controversy in the manner which the company is affected by the CEO duality. The most commonly used instruments in the implementation of corporate governance include independent directors, board size, board directors, chief executive officer, political administration, judiciary, regulatory authority and the government itself. Corporate governance also gives a specific structure via which objectives of the firm are set. Corporate governance also provides the means of accomplishing these objectives and also how to monitor the firm’s performance. Corporate success and board performance does not solely depend on the chief executive’s position or the position held by the chief. It does matter whether these two positions are held by one or two people. This Lack of adequate evidence in the scientific research in order to support the argument concerning separate or combined roles of a CEO, result in management dilemma. A theory supporting joint positions, is that integrating the positions of CEO and Chair minimizes the cost of transferring information which should take place if different persons hold the position of CEO and Chair. Since the transfer of information might be expensive, imperfect or untimely, having essential information reside in one joint CEO and Chair might enhance the individual’s ability to carry out the responsibilities of management. In the other side a theory that supporting of split CEO and Chair positions propose that the board also carry out its supervisory duty better when the Chair is a non-executive individual. The paper aims at introducing and giving a panoramic analysis of the relevant perceptions of management and corporate governance like the CEO Duality and the implications it has in the performance of corporate. Should a CEO take action simultaneously as the Corporate Board Chairman? Would the CEO Duality hamper or improve the performance of a corporate?

scholarly journals Proposing a model for limiting earning management practices: The case of Jordanian listed firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dea’a Al-Deen Omar Al-Sraheen ◽  
Khalid Alkhatib
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Do So

The key objective of this paper is to propose a model for limiting earning management practices among manufacturing firms in Jordan. In order to do so, two independent variables are examined in this paper, namely, political influence and CEO Duality. Discretionary total accruals according to the modified Jones model (1991) was used in order to estimate the level of earnings management, which is the dependent variable. The sample comprised 64 companies for the financial year 2013. The results suggest that a positive and significant association existed among both political influence and CEO duality and earning management. This means that both independent variables exacerbated earnings management. Further research is required to determine what urgent legislation should be developed to restrict the presence of members who have political connections on the board of directors. Also, the need exists for the separation of roles of Chairman and CEO to ensure the independence and complying with the requirements of corporate governance.

scholarly journals The effect of diversification on firm performance: Evidence from Listed Companies in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (02) ◽  
pp. 2072-2180
Author(s):  
Dai Long Khuc ◽  
Thi Thu Bui ◽  
Quynh Mai Ha
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
And Gender ◽  
The Relationship

The study was conducted to investigate the relationship between diversification on Board and firm performance. The investigation has been performed using panel data procedure for a sample of 204 Vietnamese listed companies in two different groups: Large cap and Mid cap, listed in HOSE and HNX during the period of five years from 2015 to 2019. The study uses three performance measures (including return on equity, return on asset, Tobin’s Q) as dependent variable. The independent variables for measurement of diversification on Board are the number of females and the diversification for Supervisory Board are the number of females only. Other independent variables are average age of Board member, CEO duality and the number of independent directors. The results indicated that firm performance have positive relationship with nationality diversity on Board and gender diversity on Supervisory Board. CEO duality shows a significant result of negative effect on firm performance.

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