scholarly journals Fertility, Union Wage Setting and Social Security System

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leran Wang

<p>This study analyzes how a social security system composed of a public pension, child allowances, and unemployment insurance affects endogenous fertility and unemployment when the wage level is endogenously set by monopolistic trade unions in an overlapping generations model. The analysis reveals, first, that increased pension tax rates lead to a higher fertility rate when wages are higher but a lower rate when wages are lower. Second, an increased child allowances tax rates lead to an increased fertility rate when wages are lower but a decreased rate when wages are higher. Therefore, both social security and wage setting should be considered in order to improve fertility and reduce unemployment.</p>

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Ju Chen ◽  
Koichi Miyazaki

Abstract We investigate the effects of pay-as-you-go pension and child allowances on fertility, labor supply of the old, and welfare. For this purpose, we analyze a small open overlapping-generations model in which fertility and an old agent’s labor supply (retirement time) are endogenized with pay-as-you-go pension and child allowances. We find that how the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate affects the fertility rate depends on whether an old agent retires. When an old agent fully retires, then the size of the interest rate and fertility rate determine the effect of the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate on the fertility rate. When an old agent works, the pay-as-you-go pension tax rate certainly reduces the fertility rate. In addition, how child allowances affect the fertility rate depends on whether an old agent works. If an old agent retires fully, then an increase in the child allowance tax rate increases the fertility rate. When an old agent works, this is not necessarily true, which suggests that an old agent’s labor status should be taken into account when we evaluate the effects of the social security system on economic variables. In addition, we examine the effect of the social security tax rates on welfare and provide numerical examples.


Author(s):  
Liliia Drobina

The issues of population social security are also urgent in Ukraine in the 21st century. A lotof these issues still remain poorly studied. The purpose of this article is to clarify the circumstances of the social insurance system formation in the post-war policy of Soviet social security system in the western regions of Ukraine. The social security system is characterized by the formation of trade unions according to the industrial-branch principle. The main and only participants in these funds were enterprises, institutions and organizations; therefore, social and insurance assistance was provided to citizens in a centralized manner and had a strictly targeted purpose. All members of trade unions (workers and employees) were entitled to pensions and free medical care being disabled in the event of injury and other illnesses. In kolkhozes, the peasants could not claim the state aid, they should have been paid the aid from the funds of the collective farms on the decision of the general meeting. In the system of social security, public organizations were formed: disablement association (Ukoopinrada and Ukrinstrakhkasa), mutual aid funds (MAF), the Society of deaf people (UTOG) and the Society of blind people (UTOS). Social security bodies lacked funds; therefore, in general, the decrees remained declarative, since all payments were scanty, much lower than the subsistence level. Keywords: social security, trade unions, mutual aid fund, members of kolgosp, pension, disablement


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Ju Chen ◽  
Koichi Miyazaki

Abstract This study analytically investigates the effects of pay-as-you-go social security and educational subsidies on the fertility rate, retirement age, and GDP per capita growth rate in an overlapping generations model, where parents invest resources toward their children’s human capital. We find that an old agent retires fully when his or her labor productivity is low and retires later when the labor productivity is high. Under the unique balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium, when an old agent is still engaged in work, tax rates are neutral to the fertility rate, higher tax rates encourage him or her to retire earlier, a higher social security tax rate depresses the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies can accelerate growth. However, when an old agent fully retires, higher tax rates increase the fertility rate, a higher social security tax rate lowers the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies boosts growth. Additionally, if an old agent’s labor productivity increases, the fertility rate also increases. We also conduct numerical simulations and analyze how an old agent’s labor productivity affects the retirement age, fertility rate, and GDP per capita growth rate under the BGP equilibrium.


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