scholarly journals THERE IS NO STANDARD INTERPRETATION. MISREADING VERSUS THE MUSEUM PUBLIC

Muzealnictwo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 233-239
Author(s):  
Leszek Karczewski

Resorting to the arguments of the theory of the interpretation of culture texts, particularly Harold Bloom’s concept of misreading, the power of interpretative ascertainment achieved by the museum public and the museum institution is equalled. Relating the literature theories to the museum realm, the Author discloses the contingency (namely the conditioning always dependent on the context) of the interpretative activity in a museum institution. In a series of four intellectual experiments the interpretative instability of a museum object is approximated, while its possible consequences for a museum institution are pointed to.

Author(s):  
Tiago Camarinha Lopes

Abstract The paper presents both the key arguments and the historical context of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that Oskar Lange presented the most developed strategy to deal with bourgeois economics, decisively helping to create the scientific consensus that rational economic calculation under socialism is possible. Lange’s arguments based on standard economic theory reveal that the most ardent defenders of capitalism cannot reject socialism on technical terms and that, as a consequence, the Austrian School was left with no choice but to diverge from mainstream economics in its search to develop a framework that could support its political position. This shows that Mises’ challenge from 1920 was solved and has been replaced by a political posture developed by Hayek and leading Austrians economists, who have been struggling since the 1980s to revise the standard interpretation of the socialist economic calculation debate. I argue that this revision should not be uncritically accepted and conclude that socialism cannot be scientifically rejected; it can only be politically rejected, by those whose economic interests it opposes.


Author(s):  
Norihiro Yamada ◽  
Samson Abramsky

Abstract The present work achieves a mathematical, in particular syntax-independent, formulation of dynamics and intensionality of computation in terms of games and strategies. Specifically, we give game semantics of a higher-order programming language that distinguishes programmes with the same value yet different algorithms (or intensionality) and the hiding operation on strategies that precisely corresponds to the (small-step) operational semantics (or dynamics) of the language. Categorically, our games and strategies give rise to a cartesian closed bicategory, and our game semantics forms an instance of a bicategorical generalisation of the standard interpretation of functional programming languages in cartesian closed categories. This work is intended to be a step towards a mathematical foundation of intensional and dynamic aspects of logic and computation; it should be applicable to a wide range of logics and computations.


ECONOMICS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-94
Author(s):  
Željko V. Račić

Summary The theory of fuzzy sets allows to analyze insufficiently precise, accurate, complete phenomena which can not be modeled by the theory of probability or interval mathematics. We define fuzzy sets as sets where the boundary of the set is unclear and depends on subjective estimation or individual preference. In addition to the standard interpretation scale, described above, a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. In addition to the standard interpretation scale a set of numbers to each qualitative attribute must be assigned. First of all, it is necessary to determine the procedure for determining fuzzy numbers describing the attributes. One of the imperfections of the fuzzy sets is subjectivism when defining the boundaries of fuzzy sets and functions of belonging, which can significantly influence the final decision. The decision maker’s subjectivity is also present in the determination of weighted coefficients. However, in case of giving weight, fixed values are necessary. Some decisions require multidisciplinary knowledge, so the decision-making process includes more group decision-makers, who independently give their grades.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Camilla Ruud

<div><p>The article discusses how a malformed set of twins turned into a museum object at the late eighteenth-century el Real Gabinete de Historia Natural in Madrid. Foregrounding the practices through which the twins transformed, it is made clear how museum objects result from de-centered processes. Two different enactments are discussed. The first encompasses the process by which the malformed set of twins transformed into a specimen of interest to the learned. The second enactment addresses how the twins were transported to Madrid through practices of charity. These two versions differed radically, yet they were intimately intertwined, and dependent upon one another.</p><div> </div></div>


Problemos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys

The article raises the question what is the content of Frege’s infamous notion of Bedeutung? It is claimed that the so–called standard interpretation of this notion – Bedeutung as referential relation between a name and an object – was developed and established evaluating Frege’s ideas in philosophy of language in isolation from his logicist ideas. However, precisely his logicist concerns have motivated Frege’s interest in semantic issues. A broader consideration of Frege’s works reveals an internalist and rationalist notion of meaning, that is based on the context principle, and that should not be reduced to mere reference. The question of the meaning of subsentential components, for Frege, is closely related to the question of the meaning of the whole sentence, that is, the meaning of sub–sentential components should be construed as secondary with regard to the meaning of the whole sentence.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Vanzo

AbstractThis article reconstructs Kant's view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (theAandIsentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (EandO) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant's formal logic. Unlike traditional logic and modern standard quantification theory, Kant's formal logic is free from existential commitments.


Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (212) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.


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