scholarly journals On the One Hand or on the Other: Trade-Off in Timing Precision in Bimanual Musical Scale Playing

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-224
Author(s):  
Floris Tijmen van Vugt ◽  
Eckart Altenmüller
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Musical Scale ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Timing Precision ◽  
The One

scholarly journals Plasmodium infection decreases fecundity and increases survival of mosquitoes

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1744) ◽  
pp. 4033-4041 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Vézilier ◽  
A. Nicot ◽  
S. Gandon ◽  
A. Rivero
Keyword(s):  
Life History ◽  
Insecticide Resistance ◽  
Life History Traits ◽  
Experimental System ◽  
Adaptive Strategy ◽  
Genetic Variations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Plasmodium Infection ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The One

Long-lived mosquitoes maximize the chances of Plasmodium transmission. Yet, in spite of decades of research, the effect of Plasmodium parasites on mosquito longevity remains highly controversial. On the one hand, many studies report shorter lifespans in infected mosquitoes. On the other hand, parallel (but separate) studies show that Plasmodium reduces fecundity and imply that this is an adaptive strategy of the parasite aimed at redirecting resources towards longevity. No study till date has, however, investigated fecundity and longevity in the same individuals to see whether this prediction holds. In this study, we follow for both fecundity and longevity in Plasmodium- infected and uninfected mosquitoes using a novel, albeit natural, experimental system. We also explore whether the genetic variations that arise through the evolution of insecticide resistance modulate the effect of Plasmodium on these two life-history traits. We show that (i) a reduction in fecundity in Plasmodium- infected mosquitoes is accompanied by an increase in longevity; (ii) this increase in longevity arises through a trade-off between reproduction and survival; and (iii) in insecticide-resistant mosquitoes, the slope of this trade-off is steeper when the mosquito is infected by Plasmodium (cost of insecticide resistance).

Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suren Basov ◽  
M. Ishaq Bhatti
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Environment ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One ◽  
Contracting Model

AbstractMost research in contract theory concentrated on the role of incentives in shaping individual behavior. Recent research suggests that social norms also play an important role. From a point of view of a mechanism designer (a principal, a government, and a bank), responsiveness of an agent to the social norms is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it provides the designer with extra instruments, while on the other it puts restrictions on how these new and the more conventional instruments can be used. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this trade-off and study how it shapes different contracts observed in the real world. We consider a model in which agent’s cost of cheating is triggered by the principal’s show of trust. We call such behavior a norm of honesty and trust and show that it drives incentives to be either low powerful or high powerful, eliminating contracts with medium powerful incentives.

A Dynamic Model Balancing User Control and Workload in Automatic and Adaptive Systems

2007 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-190
Author(s):  
Shelley Roberts ◽  
Avi Parush
Keyword(s):  
User Interfaces ◽  
Adaptive Systems ◽  
Interactive Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Dynamic Changes ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Controlled Systems ◽  
Adaptive User Interfaces ◽  
Interface Adaptation ◽  
The One

Current interactive systems are criticized for having complex interfaces that overload users with information. Two possible solutions to manage overload are automatic interfaces that augment user capabilities, and user-controlled systems that provide support. These two types of interfaces introduce a trade-off: On the one hand, automatic interfaces alleviate workload but create performance problems associated with the absence of control. On the other hand, user-controlled interfaces afford users more control, which may come with additional workload. Based on the analysis of adaptive user interfaces and automation, a model is proposed where automatic and user interface adaptation are in a multidimensional and continuum-based space, allowing for modelling dynamic changes to the roles the human and machine play at various stages of interaction.

Authority

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfonso Troisi
Keyword(s):  
Divergent Thinking ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Extreme Dependence ◽  
Personality Changes ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One ◽  
Average Individual

Evolving organisms must balance the need to change at an appropriate rate in response to varying environmental conditions against the need to maintain a functioning phenotype. This trade-off between conservatism and adaptability, between stability and exploration, has an interesting analogue at the social and cultural level. On the one hand, humans are characterized by an extreme dependence on culturally transmitted information, and deference to the group norm is the average individual behavior in human societies. On the other hand, innovation and openness to experience are distinctive features of cultural revolutions. This chapter focuses on the biology of conformity and innovation, discussing a variety of related topics, including personality changes with aging, the neural bases of divergent thinking, the positive effects of conservatism on intragroup cohesion, and the link between creativity and psychosis.

Post-socialist labour and the dual logic of collective action: workers’ unrest and trade union strategy in Fiat Automobiles Serbia

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-430
Author(s):  
Francesco Bagnardi ◽  
Valentina Petrović
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Assembly Plant ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Plant Level ◽  
The One

In this article we examine the episode of labour discontent that occurred at the Fiat-Chrysler assembly plant in Kragujevac, Serbia, in the summer of 2017. The article traces the process through which the two main trade unions organised and channelled labour unrest at the plant level. Drawing on Offe and Wiesenthal’s conceptualisation of workers’ collective action dilemma, the case highlights the trade-off between on the one hand the need for institutional legitimation and on the other hand responsiveness to workers’ demands. We attempt to show that unions still have space in which to represent workers’ interests effectively when disputes emerge, regardless of unfavourable structural constraints and legacies. The article shows that not even traditionally non-conflictual and legacy unions can be fully sheltered from democratic pressures from workers and competitor organisations. Therefore, the ability to mediate between democratic and bureaucratic logics of action and legitimation remains crucial for any union and determines unions’ ability to represent effectively the interests of labour. Dans cet article, les auteurs examinent l’épisode de mécontentement des travailleurs qui s’est produit à l’usine d’assemblage Fiat-Chrysler à Kragujevac, en Serbie, à l’été 2017. L’article retrace le processus par lequel les deux principaux syndicats ont organisé et canalisé les conflits de travail au niveau de l’usine. En se fondant sur la conceptualisation développée par Offe et Wiesenthal du choix de l’action collective des travailleurs, ce cas met en évidence le compromis entre, d’une part, le besoin de légitimation institutionnelle et, d’autre part, la capacité à répondre aux demandes des travailleurs. Les auteurs tentent de montrer que les syndicats disposent encore de l’espace nécessaire pour représenter efficacement les intérêts des travailleurs lorsque des conflits surgissent, indépendamment des contraintes structurelles et de l’héritage défavorables qui leur ont été laissés. Cet article montre que même les syndicats traditionnellement non conflictuels et ceux issus du passé ne peuvent pas être totalement à l’abri des pressions démocratiques des travailleurs et des organisations concurrentes. Par conséquent, la capacité de médiation entre les logiques démocratiques et bureaucratiques de l’action et de la légitimation demeure primordiale pour tout syndicat et détermine la capacité des syndicats à représenter efficacement les intérêts des travailleurs. Im vorliegenden Artikel untersuchen wir die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der Belegschaft und der Unternehmensleitung im Fiat-Chrysler-Montagewerk in Kragujevac, Serbien im Sommer 2017. Der Artikel zeichnet nach, wie die beiden großen betrieblich vertretenen Gewerkschaften die Unzufriedenheit der Arbeitnehmer auf der Werksebene kanalisiert und organisiert haben. Unter Bezugnahme auf Offes und Wiesenthals Konzeptualisierung des Dilemmas des kollektiven Handelns von Arbeitnehmern ist dieser Fall symptomatisch für den Zielkonflikt zwischen der Notwendigkeit institutioneller Legitimation einerseits und dem Reaktionsvermögen auf Forderungen von Arbeitnehmern andererseits. Wir versuchen nachzuweisen, dass Gewerkschaften nach wie vor Handlungsspielräume haben, um in Konfliktfällen Arbeitnehmerinteressen ungeachtet struktureller Einschränkungen und Altlasten effektiv zu vertreten. Der Artikel zeigt, dass nicht einmal traditionell konsensorientierte Gewerkschaften und Rechtsnachfolger der früheren sozialistischen Gewerkschaften umfassend vor demokratisch legitimiertem Druck von Arbeitnehmern und Mitbewerberorganisationen geschützt werden können. Die Fähigkeit, zwischen demokratischer und bürokratischer Handlungslogik und Legitimation vermitteln zu können, ist deshalb für alle Gewerkschaften von entscheidender Bedeutung und bestimmt ihre Fähigkeit, die Interessen von Arbeitnehmern wirksam zu vertreten.

The electoral costs of policy commitments

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timm Betz
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
The One ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Incomplete Picture

AbstractExisting arguments across political science posit that parties in government use domestic and international institutions to lock in their own policy preferences by tying the hands of successors. I demonstrate that these arguments contrast with the assumption of office-seeking parties and therefore portray an incomplete picture of the incentives of governments. The paper emphasizes the trade-off between implementing policy preferences, on the one hand, and exploiting partisan differences for electoral success, on the other hand: locking in a policy takes an issue off the table, but it also undermines a party’s ability to leverage differences to the opposition in elections. Because office-seeking parties need to take into account these electoral consequences, they have a disincentive to tie their successors’ hands. I advance this argument in the context of the establishment of independent central banks, provide empirical evidence, and suggest implications for the literature on international institutions.

scholarly journals Options to design more ethical and still successful default nudges: a review and recommendations

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Dominic Lemken
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Choice Architecture ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Design Change ◽  
Ethical Concerns ◽  
Welfare Losses ◽  
The One ◽  
Consumer Autonomy ◽  
Initial Choice ◽  
Influence Behavior

Abstract On the one hand, default nudges are proven to strongly influence behavior. On the other hand, a number of consumer autonomy and welfare concerns have been raised that hinder public policy applications. Both nudge success and ethical concerns depend heavily on the design of defaults. We identify six taxonomic characteristics that matter to the ethical and the nudge success dimension. We review the default nudge literature (N = 61) and review ethical studies to assess both dimensions concerning the taxonomy. When designing a default, a choice architect inevitably makes a decision concerning the characteristics. Among others, the results show three main findings. (1) The initial choice architecture regularly imposes welfare losses and impedes consumer autonomy. Forced active choosing can mitigate both issues. (2) Empirical evidence suggests that transparent defaults are similarly effective as the non-transparent counterparts. (3) The framing of the choice in combination with a choice structuring default leads to greater nudge success and tends to involve the reflective decision-making patterns. Choice architects can trade-off nudge success for legitimacy but a design change may also benefit one without harming the other. We discuss further options of choice architects to legitimize a default.

scholarly journals Friend or foe? Co-opetition and entrepreneurial networking

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter-J. Jost
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
Practical Implication ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
External Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Transfers ◽  
The One ◽  
Entrepreneurial Networking

AbstractWe study the formation of an entrepreneurial network in an environment, in which entrepreneurs who are contesting with each other for the development of a new venture have the possibility to collaborate. On the one hand, such bilateral knowledge collaborations are beneficial because they allow the integration of external knowledge. On the other hand, external knowledge collaborations reduce an entrepreneur’s incentive to invest in her internal knowledge. We analyze this trade-off and show that if the knowledge transfer between collaborating partners is complete, the only stable entrepreneurial network is one with exactly one collaboration of each entrepreneur. If, however, knowledge transfers are only partial, entrepreneurial networking becomes more important and entrepreneurs form more knowledge collaborations. Moreover, internal or external knowledge spillovers reduce the incentives to form knowledge collaboration. These results have several practical implication for entrepreneurs and managers of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in their pursuit to better understand factors that influence knowledge collaborations with competitors and to devise their co-opetition strategy.

scholarly journals The Conflict Within the Cop21 Treaty: Catch-up Countries against Mature Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Jan-erik Lane
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
The Other ◽  
Energy Transformation ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The One ◽  
First World

<p><em>The COP21 Agreement harbours a conflict between Third </em><em>w</em><em>orld and First world countries that has cropped up in tensions in all meetings by the UNFCCC. On the one hand, there is the catch-up set of countries—emerging economies—that have recently “taken off” economically and that will not accept a trade-off between economic development and environmental need of cutting emissions. On the other hand, there is the set of mature economies that grow sluggishly and have started to cut back on fossil fuels, especially coal. The first set of nations want the second set to pay for their gigantic energy transformation in a few decades—decarbonisation. The first set claimed that they had not created the big problem originally, and that fairness requires that the rich help the poor. At the COP21 summit, a deal was struck, worth 100 billion dollars per year to fund a Stern (2007) like Super Fund. But will it really be put in place and made operational?</em></p>

Centering: A Parametric Theory and Its Instantiations

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Poesio ◽  
Rosemary Stevenson ◽  
Barbara Di Eugenio ◽  
Janet Hitzeman
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Systematic Fashion ◽  
Local Coherence ◽  
Relational Coherence ◽  
The One ◽  
Centering Theory ◽  
Central Claim

Centering theory is the best-known framework for theorizing about local coherence and salience; however, its claims are articulated in terms of notions which are only partially specified, such as “utterance,” “realization,” or “ranking.” A great deal of research has attempted to arrive at more detailed specifications of these parameters of the theory; as a result, the claims of centering can be instantiated in many different ways. We investigated in a systematic fashion the effect on the theory's claims of these different ways of setting the parameters. Doing this required, first of all, clarifying what the theory's claims are (one of our conclusions being that what has become known as “Constraint 1” is actually a central claim of the theory). Secondly, we had to clearly identify these parametric aspects: For example, we argue that the notion of “pronoun” used in Rule 1 should be considered a parameter. Thirdly, we had to find appropriate methods for evaluating these claims. We found that while the theory's main claim about salience and pronominalization, Rule 1—a preference for pronominalizing the backward-looking center (CB)—is verified with most instantiations, Constraint 1–a claim about (entity) coherence and CB uniqueness—is much more instantiation-dependent: It is not verified if the parameters are instantiated according to very mainstream views (“vanilla instantiation”), it holds only if indirect realization is allowed, and is violated by between 20% and 25% of utterances in our corpus even with the most favorable instantiations. We also found a trade-off between Rule 1, on the one hand, and Constraint 1 and Rule 2, on the other: Setting the parameters to minimize the violations of local coherence leads to increased violations of salience, and vice versa. Our results suggest that “entity” coherence—continuous reference to the same entities—must be supplemented at least by an account of relational coherence.

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