scholarly journals Options to design more ethical and still successful default nudges: a review and recommendations

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Dominic Lemken

Abstract On the one hand, default nudges are proven to strongly influence behavior. On the other hand, a number of consumer autonomy and welfare concerns have been raised that hinder public policy applications. Both nudge success and ethical concerns depend heavily on the design of defaults. We identify six taxonomic characteristics that matter to the ethical and the nudge success dimension. We review the default nudge literature (N = 61) and review ethical studies to assess both dimensions concerning the taxonomy. When designing a default, a choice architect inevitably makes a decision concerning the characteristics. Among others, the results show three main findings. (1) The initial choice architecture regularly imposes welfare losses and impedes consumer autonomy. Forced active choosing can mitigate both issues. (2) Empirical evidence suggests that transparent defaults are similarly effective as the non-transparent counterparts. (3) The framing of the choice in combination with a choice structuring default leads to greater nudge success and tends to involve the reflective decision-making patterns. Choice architects can trade-off nudge success for legitimacy but a design change may also benefit one without harming the other. We discuss further options of choice architects to legitimize a default.

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1744) ◽  
pp. 4033-4041 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Vézilier ◽  
A. Nicot ◽  
S. Gandon ◽  
A. Rivero

Long-lived mosquitoes maximize the chances of Plasmodium transmission. Yet, in spite of decades of research, the effect of Plasmodium parasites on mosquito longevity remains highly controversial. On the one hand, many studies report shorter lifespans in infected mosquitoes. On the other hand, parallel (but separate) studies show that Plasmodium reduces fecundity and imply that this is an adaptive strategy of the parasite aimed at redirecting resources towards longevity. No study till date has, however, investigated fecundity and longevity in the same individuals to see whether this prediction holds. In this study, we follow for both fecundity and longevity in Plasmodium- infected and uninfected mosquitoes using a novel, albeit natural, experimental system. We also explore whether the genetic variations that arise through the evolution of insecticide resistance modulate the effect of Plasmodium on these two life-history traits. We show that (i) a reduction in fecundity in Plasmodium- infected mosquitoes is accompanied by an increase in longevity; (ii) this increase in longevity arises through a trade-off between reproduction and survival; and (iii) in insecticide-resistant mosquitoes, the slope of this trade-off is steeper when the mosquito is infected by Plasmodium (cost of insecticide resistance).


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suren Basov ◽  
M. Ishaq Bhatti

AbstractMost research in contract theory concentrated on the role of incentives in shaping individual behavior. Recent research suggests that social norms also play an important role. From a point of view of a mechanism designer (a principal, a government, and a bank), responsiveness of an agent to the social norms is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it provides the designer with extra instruments, while on the other it puts restrictions on how these new and the more conventional instruments can be used. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this trade-off and study how it shapes different contracts observed in the real world. We consider a model in which agent’s cost of cheating is triggered by the principal’s show of trust. We call such behavior a norm of honesty and trust and show that it drives incentives to be either low powerful or high powerful, eliminating contracts with medium powerful incentives.


Author(s):  
Shelley Roberts ◽  
Avi Parush

Current interactive systems are criticized for having complex interfaces that overload users with information. Two possible solutions to manage overload are automatic interfaces that augment user capabilities, and user-controlled systems that provide support. These two types of interfaces introduce a trade-off: On the one hand, automatic interfaces alleviate workload but create performance problems associated with the absence of control. On the other hand, user-controlled interfaces afford users more control, which may come with additional workload. Based on the analysis of adaptive user interfaces and automation, a model is proposed where automatic and user interface adaptation are in a multidimensional and continuum-based space, allowing for modelling dynamic changes to the roles the human and machine play at various stages of interaction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-224
Author(s):  
Floris Tijmen van Vugt ◽  
Eckart Altenmüller

Author(s):  
Alfonso Troisi

Evolving organisms must balance the need to change at an appropriate rate in response to varying environmental conditions against the need to maintain a functioning phenotype. This trade-off between conservatism and adaptability, between stability and exploration, has an interesting analogue at the social and cultural level. On the one hand, humans are characterized by an extreme dependence on culturally transmitted information, and deference to the group norm is the average individual behavior in human societies. On the other hand, innovation and openness to experience are distinctive features of cultural revolutions. This chapter focuses on the biology of conformity and innovation, discussing a variety of related topics, including personality changes with aging, the neural bases of divergent thinking, the positive effects of conservatism on intragroup cohesion, and the link between creativity and psychosis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-430
Author(s):  
Francesco Bagnardi ◽  
Valentina Petrović

In this article we examine the episode of labour discontent that occurred at the Fiat-Chrysler assembly plant in Kragujevac, Serbia, in the summer of 2017. The article traces the process through which the two main trade unions organised and channelled labour unrest at the plant level. Drawing on Offe and Wiesenthal’s conceptualisation of workers’ collective action dilemma, the case highlights the trade-off between on the one hand the need for institutional legitimation and on the other hand responsiveness to workers’ demands. We attempt to show that unions still have space in which to represent workers’ interests effectively when disputes emerge, regardless of unfavourable structural constraints and legacies. The article shows that not even traditionally non-conflictual and legacy unions can be fully sheltered from democratic pressures from workers and competitor organisations. Therefore, the ability to mediate between democratic and bureaucratic logics of action and legitimation remains crucial for any union and determines unions’ ability to represent effectively the interests of labour. Dans cet article, les auteurs examinent l’épisode de mécontentement des travailleurs qui s’est produit à l’usine d’assemblage Fiat-Chrysler à Kragujevac, en Serbie, à l’été 2017. L’article retrace le processus par lequel les deux principaux syndicats ont organisé et canalisé les conflits de travail au niveau de l’usine. En se fondant sur la conceptualisation développée par Offe et Wiesenthal du choix de l’action collective des travailleurs, ce cas met en évidence le compromis entre, d’une part, le besoin de légitimation institutionnelle et, d’autre part, la capacité à répondre aux demandes des travailleurs. Les auteurs tentent de montrer que les syndicats disposent encore de l’espace nécessaire pour représenter efficacement les intérêts des travailleurs lorsque des conflits surgissent, indépendamment des contraintes structurelles et de l’héritage défavorables qui leur ont été laissés. Cet article montre que même les syndicats traditionnellement non conflictuels et ceux issus du passé ne peuvent pas être totalement à l’abri des pressions démocratiques des travailleurs et des organisations concurrentes. Par conséquent, la capacité de médiation entre les logiques démocratiques et bureaucratiques de l’action et de la légitimation demeure primordiale pour tout syndicat et détermine la capacité des syndicats à représenter efficacement les intérêts des travailleurs. Im vorliegenden Artikel untersuchen wir die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der Belegschaft und der Unternehmensleitung im Fiat-Chrysler-Montagewerk in Kragujevac, Serbien im Sommer 2017. Der Artikel zeichnet nach, wie die beiden großen betrieblich vertretenen Gewerkschaften die Unzufriedenheit der Arbeitnehmer auf der Werksebene kanalisiert und organisiert haben. Unter Bezugnahme auf Offes und Wiesenthals Konzeptualisierung des Dilemmas des kollektiven Handelns von Arbeitnehmern ist dieser Fall symptomatisch für den Zielkonflikt zwischen der Notwendigkeit institutioneller Legitimation einerseits und dem Reaktionsvermögen auf Forderungen von Arbeitnehmern andererseits. Wir versuchen nachzuweisen, dass Gewerkschaften nach wie vor Handlungsspielräume haben, um in Konfliktfällen Arbeitnehmerinteressen ungeachtet struktureller Einschränkungen und Altlasten effektiv zu vertreten. Der Artikel zeigt, dass nicht einmal traditionell konsensorientierte Gewerkschaften und Rechtsnachfolger der früheren sozialistischen Gewerkschaften umfassend vor demokratisch legitimiertem Druck von Arbeitnehmern und Mitbewerberorganisationen geschützt werden können. Die Fähigkeit, zwischen demokratischer und bürokratischer Handlungslogik und Legitimation vermitteln zu können, ist deshalb für alle Gewerkschaften von entscheidender Bedeutung und bestimmt ihre Fähigkeit, die Interessen von Arbeitnehmern wirksam zu vertreten.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timm Betz

AbstractExisting arguments across political science posit that parties in government use domestic and international institutions to lock in their own policy preferences by tying the hands of successors. I demonstrate that these arguments contrast with the assumption of office-seeking parties and therefore portray an incomplete picture of the incentives of governments. The paper emphasizes the trade-off between implementing policy preferences, on the one hand, and exploiting partisan differences for electoral success, on the other hand: locking in a policy takes an issue off the table, but it also undermines a party’s ability to leverage differences to the opposition in elections. Because office-seeking parties need to take into account these electoral consequences, they have a disincentive to tie their successors’ hands. I advance this argument in the context of the establishment of independent central banks, provide empirical evidence, and suggest implications for the literature on international institutions.


Leonardo ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Elizabeth Ryan

This paper elucidates two positions (the positivist and the critical) that inform the creative design of technological fashion. On the one side is the instrumentalist trend toward the minimized or disappearing interface. On the other, some theorists and artists suggest that increased invisibility presents social and ethical concerns (such as invasiveness and control) when networking and communication devices are involved. The positivist side has roots in modernist design. Positivist designers create responsive and controllable fabrics using shape-changing polymers, e-textiles, and nano-scale electronics to resolve clumsy and prohibitive problems of hardware vs. body. The critical side draws upon archetypal ideas about technology and the body that are familiar from literature and science fiction, and includes writers and media artists who emphasize the intractable or mechanic nature of technological clothing to enhance, rather than erase, the body. The paper concludes that both positions must be considered as the field of technological fashion moves forward.


Author(s):  
Peter-J. Jost

AbstractWe study the formation of an entrepreneurial network in an environment, in which entrepreneurs who are contesting with each other for the development of a new venture have the possibility to collaborate. On the one hand, such bilateral knowledge collaborations are beneficial because they allow the integration of external knowledge. On the other hand, external knowledge collaborations reduce an entrepreneur’s incentive to invest in her internal knowledge. We analyze this trade-off and show that if the knowledge transfer between collaborating partners is complete, the only stable entrepreneurial network is one with exactly one collaboration of each entrepreneur. If, however, knowledge transfers are only partial, entrepreneurial networking becomes more important and entrepreneurs form more knowledge collaborations. Moreover, internal or external knowledge spillovers reduce the incentives to form knowledge collaboration. These results have several practical implication for entrepreneurs and managers of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in their pursuit to better understand factors that influence knowledge collaborations with competitors and to devise their co-opetition strategy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Jan-erik Lane

<p><em>The COP21 Agreement harbours a conflict between Third </em><em>w</em><em>orld and First world countries that has cropped up in tensions in all meetings by the UNFCCC. On the one hand, there is the catch-up set of countries—emerging economies—that have recently “taken off” economically and that will not accept a trade-off between economic development and environmental need of cutting emissions. On the other hand, there is the set of mature economies that grow sluggishly and have started to cut back on fossil fuels, especially coal. The first set of nations want the second set to pay for their gigantic energy transformation in a few decades—decarbonisation. The first set claimed that they had not created the big problem originally, and that fairness requires that the rich help the poor. At the COP21 summit, a deal was struck, worth 100 billion dollars per year to fund a Stern (2007) like Super Fund. But will it really be put in place and made operational?</em></p>


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