„Der Staat ist von Verfassungs wegen nicht gehindert..."

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Chr. van Ooyen ◽  
Martin H. W. Möllers

A problematic ‘German constant’ can be observed in the Federal Constitutional Court: It is the ‘Staat’ (state) as a sovereign political entity. And it is the ‘Volk’ (people) as a homogeneous community. The Constitutional Court’s political theory—so the thesis goes—‘oscillates’ between a liberal and pluralistic conception of citizens, constitution and society and a national and identitarian form of statism. In this book, this is exemplified by: the theories of constitution and democracy that are represented, fundamental rights in relation to domestic security, European integration, foreign policy and the emergency constitutional law as a result of 9/11 and the coronavirus pandemic

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Voßkuhle

AbstractThis article discusses the Federal Constitutional Court’s contribution to European “integration through law” over the past decades. The Basic Law’s openness to integration and to European Law is examined, as well as the co-operation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the execution of European Union law and the protection of fundamental rights. The author provides a number of examples to show how the instruments of identity review andultra viresreview developed by the Federal Constitutional Court secure the agenda of European integration as agreed upon in the European Treaties. He also shows how national governmental bodies are bound by the concept of responsibility with respect to the European integration process and how the Court ensures the necessary democratic legitimisation for the acts of European institutions by requiring the involvement of the German parliament in political decision-making processes related to the European Union. Finally, the author explores the idea of the legal community and the criticisms that have been levied against this concept. He concludes by positing that the European Union can only preserve itself by remaining a legal community, and that the rule of law in EU law is indispensable, particularly in times of crisis.


Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm

Dieter Grimm is one of Germany’s foremost scholars of constitutional law and theory with a high international reputation and an exceptional career. He teaches constitutional law at Humboldt University Berlin and did so simultaneously at the Yale Law School until 2017. He was one of the most influential justices of the German Constitutional Court where he served from 1987 to 1999 and left his marks on the jurisprudence of the Court, especially in the field of fundamental rights. He directed one of the finest academic institutions worldwide, the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study). He is also well known as a public intellectual who speaks up in questions of German politics and European integration. This book contains a conversation that three scholars of constitutional law led with Dieter Grimm on his background, his childhood under the Nazi regime and in destroyed post-war Germany, his education in Germany, France, and the United States, his academic achievement, the main subjects of his research, his experience as a member of a leading constitutional court, especially in the time of seminal changes in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and his views on actual challenges for law and society. The book is an invaluable source of information on an outstanding career and the functioning of constitutional adjudication, which one would not find in legal textbooks or treatises. Oxford University Press previously published his books on Constitutionalism. Past, Present, and Future (2016) and The Constitution of European Democracy (2017).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximilian Seyderhelm

The effect of fundamental rights among private individuals is breaking away from the usual patterns as a result of recent decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court. The work not only provides terminological clarity, but also elaborates the criteria that directly bind private individuals to fundamental rights. The author then looks at emerging constellations and examines the binding nature of fundamental rights there. The operator of Facebook fulfils both criteria described in more detail. These are the opening of a "public forum" and a predominant position of power. It is thus bound by fundamental rights. SCHUFA is not bound by this obligation, also because it is kept in check by existing (data protection) provisions of the legislator.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Wiechmann

The German state is a tax state and relies on current revenues. If a tax is declared incompatible with the constitutional law, the Federal Constitutional Court regularly orders its continued application until a new regulation is adopted. The taxpayer must then pay an unconstitutional tax without receiving any compensation for it. The order for continued application does not eliminate the constitutional infringement, but maintains it. The ECJ takes a much stricter approach to violations of EU law, since in its view the financial interests of a state are never suitable for maintaining an unconstitutional state. The work attempts to strike an appropriate balance between these two positions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-210
Author(s):  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou

Der Beitrag behandelt sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit als verfassungsrelevante Herausforderung unter dem Grundgesetz. Theoretisch sind unterschiedliche Wirkzusammenhänge zwischen Verfassung und sozio-ökonomischer Ungleichheit möglich. Insbesondere kann sozio-ökonomische Gleichheit als faktische Legitimitätsressource und als demokratische Funktionsbedingung wirken. Empirisch deutet die ökonomische Ungleichheitsforschung auf eine wachsende Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland hin. Verfassungstheorie und empirische Zustandsbeschreibung treffen sich in der Auslegung des geltenden Verfassungsrechts, das im Hinblick auf das Soziale nur schwach determiniert ist. Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts formuliert Mindestanforderungen, überlässt die Konkretisierung des Sozialen aber weitgehend der Politik. Die Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft sollte diesen Prozess konstruktiv begleiten, dabei aber zwischen Recht und Theorie unterscheiden. The article addresses socio-economic inequality as a constitutional challenge under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Theoretically, several causal relationships between the constitution and socio-economic inequality are possible and plausible. In particular, socio-economic equality can be a resource of de facto legitimacy and a condition of democracy. Empirically, current economic research indicates growing wealth inequality in Germany. Constitutional theory and empirical description meet in the interpretation and application of actual constitutional law, whose social dimension is only weakly determined. The Federal Constitutional Court formulates minimum requirements, but leaves the concretization of the social dimension essentially to the political branches of government. Constitutional law scholarship should analyse this process constructively, while distinguishing between law and theory.


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