§ 2. Legal foundations, definition and interpretation of the concepts of arbitrator impartiality and independence

2022 ◽  
pp. 31-67
Author(s):  
Stavroula Angoura
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Byrkovych

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to identify the fundamental values of the Ukrainian people, on the basis of which not only his mentality, but also all national-state institutions, including institutions of justice and justice, as well as to identify trends of influence of these values on the further development of legal foundations of the judiciary and justice of Ukraine. Method. The methodological basis of the study was the combination of principles and methods of scientific knowledge. For the objectivity of the research, a set of general scientific, special-legal, special-historical and philosophical methods of scientific knowledge was used. Results. At the current stage of reforming the institutions of the judiciary and the judiciary, the notion of fair justice, which is formed on the basis of popular national culture, plays an important role. Given the functioning of the modern Constitutional Court of Ukraine, whose representatives are formed by delegation to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the judiciary, this institution needs radical reform as it has repeatedly made political rather than constitutional decisions. Scientific novelty. Based on the analysis of the national tradition of justice, it is established that the Constitutional Court should be formed by public organizations, which are formed by legal experts. There are several higher scientific institutions in Ukraine which have departments, constitutional law research institutes. Their representatives should delegate the best experts in the constitutional right to competitive selection to fill vacancies in the constitutional court. Practical importance. The results of the study can be used in further historical and legal studies, preparation of special courses.


Author(s):  
Konstantin Kupchenko ◽  
Nikolay Fedoskin

The article analyzes the results of the state policy implementation withing the formation and development of the Soviet judicial system on the example of Smolensk Governoral Court. The authors set the goal, based on the analysis of sources not introduced into a wide scientific circulation, primarily stored at the State Archive of the Smolensk Region to restore the history of the creation and operation of justice institutions in the Smolensk region in the 1918s–1923s. The source base of the study was composed of documents stored at Smolensk State Regional Archive, materials on the history of the judiciary, statistical materials of the period under the study, documents on the history of the party-state bodies of the Smolensk region. The article studies current office documentation of both the higher and regional state bodies (Workers 'and Peasants' Government, People's Commissariat of Justice, Smolensk Governoral Executive Committee) and local authorities (Smolensk Council of Working People's Deputies, Executive Committee of Smolensk Governoral Council of Workers, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies), as well as Smolensk Governoral Court. The authors analyze the Soviet experience in the formation and development of judicial bodies under specific historical conditions; they consider transformations in the judicial system of the Smolensk Governorate in the 1917s–1922s, as well as the formation of Smolensk Governoral Court. The article studies legal foundations of the Soviet judicial system formation, characterizes processes of creating a judicial apparatus in the first years of Soviet power and analyzes activities of Smolensk Governoral Court during its formation. The authors reveal the essence, degree of efficiency, concrete results, political and socio-economic consequences, positive and negative lessons from the Soviet judicial system existed in Russia. The authors assume that the development of new legislation system in the 1920s was caused by the need to reform legal sources as the main means of socialism building. The authors conclude that the transformation of the Soviet judicial system completed the transition from the principle of «revolutionary expediency» to the principle of «revolutionary legality».


Author(s):  
Gus Van Harten

Governments are rightly discussing reform of investment treaties, and of the powerful system of ‘investor–state dispute settlement’ (ISDS) upon which they rest. It is therefore important to be clear about the crux of the problem. ISDS treaties are flawed fundamentally because they firmly institute wealth-based inequality under international law. That is, they use cross-border ownership of assets, mostly by multinationals and billionaires, as the gateway to extraordinary protections, while denying equivalent safeguards to those who lack the wealth required to qualify as foreign investors. The treaties thus have the main effect of safeguarding an awe-inspiring set of rights and privileges for the ultra-wealthy at the expense of countries and their populations. This book shows how ISDS came to explode in a global context of extreme concentration of wealth and of widespread poverty. The history of early ISDS treaties is highlighted to show their ties to decolonization and, sometimes, extreme violence and authoritarianism. Focusing on early ISDS lawsuits and rulings reveals how a small group of lawyers and arbitrators worked to create the legal foundations for massive growth of ISDS since 2000. ISDS-based protections are examined in detail to demonstrate how they give exceptional advantages to the wealthy. Examples are offered of how the protections have been used to reconfigure state decision making and shift sovereign minds in favour of foreign investors. Finally, the ongoing efforts of governments to reform ISDS are surveyed, with a call to go further or, even better, to withdraw from the treaties.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
David Gindis ◽  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Abstract In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.


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