Chapter 4: Analysis of the Case Law Involving Legitimate Expectations

2022 ◽  
pp. 187-310
Author(s):  
Niclas Landmann
Author(s):  
Noura Karazivan

SummaryThis article argues that states should have a limited obligation — and not only a privilege — to extend diplomatic protection to their nationals when they are facing violations of their most basic human rights abroad. The author addresses the current state of international law regarding diplomatic protection, with a focus on the International Law Commission's failed attempt to impose a duty on states to exercise protection in cases of jus cogens violations. A review of domestic case law, particularly in the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and South Africa, shows that while some courts recognize legitimate expectations to receive diplomatic protection, all are reluctant to exercise judicial review of a denial of diplomatic protection. The author nevertheless examines whether adherence to international human rights treaties could entail a positive obligation for states to exercise diplomatic protection in order to protect the human rights of their nationals that are ill-treated abroad.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-86
Author(s):  
Luis Arroyo Jiménez ◽  
Gabriel Doménech Pascual

This article describes the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law as a result of the influence of the EU law general principle of legitimate expectations. It examines, firstly, whether the formal incorporation of the principle of legitimate expectations into national legislation and case law has modified the substance of the latter, and if so, secondly, whether this has led to a weaker or a more robust protection of the legal status quo. To carry out that examination, the article considers the influence of the principle of legitimate expectations in two different areas: in individual administrative decision-making, and in legislative and administrative rulemaking. Our conclusion is that the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law through the principle of legitimate expectations has been variable and ambiguous.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-270
Author(s):  
Natassa Athanasiadou

The present article aims to examine the admissibility requirements of the European Citizens’ Initiative in the light of primary law provisions and general principles, in particular the principles of conferral, participatory democracy, legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations and good administration, as reflected in the recent case law of the General Court. More specifically, it is examined how these principles and the primary law features of the instrument provide a clear theoretical underpinning for determining its material scope and serve as guidance for the legislator when regulating the admissibility mechanism and for the European Commission when applying the relevant rules. The recent Commission proposal on a new Regulation on the European Citizens’ Initiative is also assessed against this backdrop.


Teisė ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 135-153
Author(s):  
Audronė Gedmintaitė

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo praktikoje yra suprantama ir vartojama sąvoka „teisėti lūkesčiai“. Teisėtų lūkesčių apsaugos doktrina ir taikymo dėsningumai atskleidžiami tiriant šios doktrinos kilmę ir raidą, turinio elementus bei Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo taikomą teisėtų lūkesčių apsaugos patikros metodologiją. The article considers the ways in which the notion „legitimate expectations“ is interpreted and applied in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It begins with the evolution of the concept of legitimate expectations and its features. This is followed by analysis of the main principles guiding the judicial review concerning the protection of legitimate expectations as they have been developed by the European Court of Human Rights.


Author(s):  
María Begoña CRESPO HIDALGO

LABURPENA: Etxebizitzak alokatzeko merkatua malgutzeko eta sustatzeko neurriei buruzko ekainaren 4ko 4/2013 Legearen bigarren xedapen gehigarriari buruz, urriaren 22ko 216/2015 KAE, maiatzaren 10eko 51/2018 KAE, eta maiatzaren 24ko 56/2018 KAE eman dira. Lehenengoa a) apartatuari buruzkoa da, zeinaren bitartez zehazten den ez direla berritu behar Etxebizitzako estatu mailako planetan emandako laguntzak eta diru-laguntzak, eta beste biak, b) apartatuari buruzkoak, zeinaren bitartez bi baldintza ezartzen diren babestutako etxebizitza bat eskuratzeko sarrerarako estatuko zuzeneko laguntzak jasotzeko eskubidea izateko. Epai horiek kontuan hartuta, lan honetan konfiantza legitimoaren printzipioaren urraketak duen garrantzi soziala aztertu da, etxebizitza duin eta egoki bat izateko eskubidean proiektatzen denean hain zuzen. Erabaki konstituzionalak, jurisprudentzialak eta doktrinalak aztertu dira estatu sozial batean konfiantza legitimoa bermatzeko segurtasun juridikoari eta legegileek duten mugei dagokionez, baita arauen aurreikusgarritasunari eta aurretik doktrina jurisdikzionala ez egotearen ondoriozko segurtasun juridiko ezari dagokionez. RESUMEN: A raíz de las SSTC 216/2015, de 22 de octubre, 51/2018, de 10 de mayo y 56/2018, de 24 de mayo, sobre la disposición adicional segunda de la Ley 4/2013, de 4 de junio, de Medidas de Flexibilización y Fomento del Mercado del Alquiler de Viviendas, la primera de ellas respecto al apartado a) que determina no renovar las ayudas y subvenciones concedidas en el marco de los Planes Estatales de Vivienda, y las otras dos, sobre el apartado b) que establece dos requisitos para obtener el derecho al abono de las ayudas estatales directas a la entrada para la adquisición de una vivienda protegida, en este trabajo se analiza la transcendencia social de la vulneración del principio de confianza legítima cuando se proyecta sobre un derecho como es el derecho a una vivienda digna y adecuada. Se estudian una serie de pronunciamientos constitucionales, jurisprudenciales y doctrinales en relación con la seguridad jurídica y los límites del legislador para garantizar la confianza legítima en un estado social, así como la previsibilidad de las normas y la inseguridad jurídica derivada de la no existencia de una doctrina jurisdiccional al respecto. ABSTRACT: As a result of judgments 216/2015 of October 22, 51/2018 of May 10 and 56/2018 of May 24 on the second additional provision to Act 4/2013 of June 4 on measures aimed at the flexibilization and promotion of the rental housing market, the first one regarding section a) that determines not to renew aids and subsidies awarded in the framework of the National Government Housing plans and the others regarding section b) that establishes two requirements in order to gain the right to be awarded with state direct aids for the deposit to buy a government-sponsored housing, we analyze the social significance of the infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations when a right such as the right to a decent and appropriate home is impaired. Some series of constitutional, court and doctrine declarations are studied in connection with legal certainty and the limits of the legislator to guarantee legitimate expectations in a Social state, together with the predictability of the rules and the legal insecurity that derivesfrom the lack of a case law doctrine in respect thereof.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-56
Author(s):  
Gian Maria Farnelli

Abstract The article addresses how the obligation not to frustrate legitimate expectations has been interpreted and applied in recent investment disputes arising out of amendments in domestic regimes in the renewable energies sector. The analysis will address cases against Czechia, Italy and Spain, the Countries currently facing the majority of disputes for alleged breaches of the Energy Charter Treaty. Jurisdictional issues related to the case law at hand, such as those stemming from intra-EU arbitration, will not be addressed. The contribution is divided in three parts, next to the introduction. First, the notion of legitimate expectations will be analysed. Second, the Czech, Italian and Spanish cases will be addressed, briefly sketching the respective domestic legal frameworks. As a conclusion, it will be suggested that tribunals have considered the fact that a State is exercising its regulatory power, and a potential lack of investors’ due diligence, in diminishing the quantum of compensation, and that such case law adds to the establishment of general “interpretative elements” of FET.


Author(s):  
Francisco Jiménez García

May the representatives of states undertake commitments unilaterally and thus limit their freedom to act? Are unilateral acts as an independent source of international obligations possible in a legal system based on consensualism and in the principle of pacta sunt servanda? Are the subjects of the decentralized international community entitled to rely on such unilateral declarations and to require that such obligations be respected under the principles of good faith and legitimate expectations? What should be the requirements and conditions necessary to affirm the existence of such acts? How would such statements have to be interpreted, and can they be revoked or modified? These would be the main questions of the debate about the legal effects of unilateral acts and their consequences, and the dispute between those who confirm its legal validity and those who question it or deny its autonomous nature in the face of other regulatory processes. In order to define the scope of study, we must differentiate between those unilateral declarations or acts involved in the various regulatory processes (conventional, customary, and institutional) and those unilateral acts that have enough capacity to create, autonomously and independently, legal obligations to their authors and rights to third parties or to the international community as a whole, depending on the principles of good faith and legitimate expectations. The criterion of material autonomy becomes the defining element of such acts because the (potential) legality of the unilateral act is justified in itself and does not depend on its adequacy or conformity with other international enabling norms or rules. Unilateral acts do not create international norms for themselves, but they can have sufficient capacity to create legal obligations if this is the clear and unequivocal will of the state in this regard. Such acts represent an exception to the established principle of pacta sunt servanda and to the conception of the international regulatory system as a result of a process or consensus to become a unilateral procedure for the creation of international obligations (acta sunt servanda). For this reason, unilateral acts in a strict sense differ from unilateral acts subject to the general system of the law of treaties (acts of authentication and manifestation of consent to be bound by a treaty, reserves, interpretative declarations, treaty denunciation or withdrawal, etc.), from the executive acts of binding or generally accepted international rules (maritime delimitations, for example), and from various unilateral acts that can integrate the regulatory process of a customary norm as precedent or evidence of the opinio iuris. Despite the existence of previous case law, practice, and doctrine, the judgments delivered in the cases concerning nuclear tests and resolved by the International Court of Justice on 20 December 1974 are used as the point of reference for the production of the general doctrine of unilateral acts. This case law was reiterated by the Court of The Hague and other international jurisdictions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147377952110188
Author(s):  
Kenny Chng

An idea that has gained significant traction in both case law and academic commentary as a justification for the protection of legitimate expectations is the concept of ‘good administration’. Going beyond the usual criticisms of the concept’s ambiguity, this article aims to highlight an additional set of difficulties with the invocation of ‘good administration’ as the normative justification for the doctrine. This article’s central argument is that the concept of ‘good’ invoked by the idea of ‘good administration’ inevitably falls to be substantiated by a particular conception of what the ‘good’ requires as a matter of political philosophy. And given that there are multiple competing conceptions of what ‘good’ law and government are, this magnifies the challenges of coming to a landing on the precise content of ‘good administration’. This article will illustrate that the various formulations of the normative foundation of the doctrine track closely with four different conceptions of ‘good’ law and government and will explore the implications of this diagnosis for the formulation of the proper justification for the protection of legitimate expectations.


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