FDR’s Closest Contender

Author(s):  
J. Simon Rofe

This chapter identifies twin foreign policy influences on the 1944 election. The first and most straightforward was that the United States was, like many others, a nation at war and that this had a huge impact on the campaign. The second influence was the decision by the Republican contender, Thomas E. Dewey, not to campaign on the extent of Roosevelt administration’s prior knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Dewey’s begrudging discretion strongly encouraged by US Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, limited the scope of his ability to critique the administration and its prosecution of the war.

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 303-333
Author(s):  
Masako R. Okura

This article, an elaboration on The Desperate Diplomat (2016), reexamines Japanese Special Envoy Kurusu Saburo’s mission to the United States before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, presenting a new “concurring opinion” in support of his innocence. The u.s. government firmly believed that Kurusu had been informed of the impending attack prior to coming to the United States and thus acted as a smoke screen. And so, the myth of the deceitful ambassador was born. Nevertheless, Kurusu insisted that he had no prior knowledge of Japan’s military action. Misunderstanding of his role in the Pearl Harbor attack and harsh remarks about it upset him. Utilizing Kurusu’s unpublished and previously unused materials in both Japanese and English housed in the National Diet Library in Tokyo, records from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and The Desperate Diplomat, based on his original memoir, this article helps Kurusu tell his side of the story to initiate scholarly debate on this insufficiently researched diplomat. This reassessment also presents excerpts from Kurusu’s unpublished personal correspondences with E. Stanley Jones, Bernard M. Baruch, and Joseph C. Grew.


Author(s):  
Jack Copeland

Once Enigma was solved and the pioneering work on Tunny was done, Turing’s battering-ram mind was needed elsewhere. Routine codebreaking irked him and he was at his best when breaking new ground. In 1942 he travelled to America to explore cryptology’s next challenge, the encryption of speech. Turing left Bletchley Park for the United States in November 1942. He sailed for New York on a passenger liner, during what was one of the most dangerous periods for Atlantic shipping. It must have been a nerve-racking journey. That month alone, the U-boats sank more than a hundred Allied vessels. Turing was the only civilian aboard a floating barracks, packed to bursting point with military personnel. At times there were as many as 600 men crammed into the officers’ lounge—Turing said he nearly fainted. On the ship’s arrival in New York, it was decreed that his papers were inadequate, and this placed his entry to the United States in jeopardy. The immigration officials even debated interning him on Ellis Island. ‘That will teach my employers to furnish me with better credentials’ was Turing’s laconic comment. It was a private joke at the British government’s expense: since becoming a codebreaker in 1939, his employers were none other than His Majesty’s Foreign Office. America did not exactly welcome Turing with open arms. His principal reason for making the dangerous trip across the Atlantic was to spend time at Manhattan’s Bell Telephone Laboratories, where speech encryption work was going on, but the authorities declined to clear him to visit this hive of top-secret projects. General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, declared that Bell Labs housed work ‘of so secret a nature that Dr. Turing cannot be given access’. While Winston Churchill’s personal representative in Washington, Sir John Dill, struggled to get General Marshall’s decision reversed, Turing spent his first two months in America advising Washington’s codebreakers—no doubt this was unknown to Marshall, who might otherwise have forbidden Turing’s involvement. During this time Turing also acted as consultant to the engineers who were designing an electronic version of his bombe for production in America.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
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Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 228-237
Author(s):  
Marina Shpakovskaya ◽  
Oleg Barnashov ◽  
Arian Mohammad Hassan Shershah ◽  
Asadullah Noori ◽  
Mosa Ziauddin Ahmad

The article discusses the features and main approaches of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Particular attention is paid to the history of the development of Turkish-American relations. The causes of the contradictions between Turkey and the United States on the security issues of the Middle East region are analyzed. At the same time, the commonality of the approaches of both countries in countering radical terrorism in the territories adjacent to Turkey is noted. The article also discusses the priority areas of Turkish foreign policy, new approaches and technologies in the first decade of the XXI century.


Author(s):  
D.B. Izyumov ◽  
E.L. Kondratyuk

The article discusses issues related to the development and use of training means and facilities in order to improve the level of training of US Army personnel. An overview of the main simulators used in the US Armed Forces at present is given, and the prospects for the development of the United States in this area are presented.


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