The Virtues of Moderation

While rarely focusing on foreign affairs, studies of the 1964 election generally acknowledge that Lyndon Johnson’s decision to position himself as the moderate to Barry Goldwater’s extremist was a successful campaign tactic. There is little consensus, however, regarding the degree to which international issues affected the election’s outcome. This chapter goes beyond previous studies by providing a more holistic assessment of the complex interrelationship of foreign affairs and electoral politics. In assessing the manner in which foreign affairs shaped the campaigns of both candidates and examining key examples of how electoral concerns shaped Johnson’s thinking on global matters, it makes clear that the issues are inseparable.

Ending the Cold War without Debate

The contest for the American presidency in 1988 should have been a campaign with lively discussions and debates about international politics. It was not. Explaining why may raise important questions about the role of foreign affairs in American presidential politics. The contest for the White House in 1988 took place just before some of the most dramatic changes in and challenges to the international system that any modern presidency has ever known. It would have been good if and might have been expected that presidential candidates in that year had spent considerable time and energy discussing and debating those emerging changes. The debate did not occur.

1984, Regional Crises, and Morning in America

Despite Reagan’s favorable treatment in the recent historiography and his close association in contemporary public discourse with democracy promotion, key elements of the Reagan Doctrine presented an electoral liability in the run-up to the 1984 elections. This chapter examines the impact of regional conflicts in Nicaragua and Lebanon on the overall attempts to modify Reagan’s image for the 1984 elections. While foreign policy issues were rarely a primary concern during the election, Reagan’s pollsters and strategists wanted to diminish the early 1980s association in the public of the candidate as a warmonger as confrontation with the Soviet Union still resonated. Moreover, the prospects of intervention in Nicaragua frequently invoked the negative memories and reverberations of the Vietnam War. As Reagan’s identity was recast across 1984 through overtures to China and the Soviet Union, it was imperative to operate a form of damage control over the issues of Nicaragua and Lebanon. Keeping these issues out of the electoral discourse was considered to be crucial.

FDR’s Closest Contender

This chapter identifies twin foreign policy influences on the 1944 election. The first and most straightforward was that the United States was, like many others, a nation at war and that this had a huge impact on the campaign. The second influence was the decision by the Republican contender, Thomas E. Dewey, not to campaign on the extent of Roosevelt administration’s prior knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Dewey’s begrudging discretion strongly encouraged by US Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall, limited the scope of his ability to critique the administration and its prosecution of the war.

“A Godsend to the Country”?

This chapter argues that foreign policy debates in the election of 1940 have been underestimated. Franklin Roosevelt remained cautious regarding foreign policy issues, in part because he had an election to win, and also because his opponent, Wendell Willkie, did not wholly reflect the Republican Party on foreign policy matters. In addition, congressional isolationism was extremely strong. This chapter also argues that Willkie was more critical of Roosevelt on foreign policy issues than has generally been accepted. This was largely a result of straightforward party politics, and the selection of Willkie as the Republican candidate did not mean that foreign policy issues were off the table. In fact, they remained critical for both candidates throughout the campaign.

Conclusion

This conclusion summarizes the themes and chapters of the book. It also sets them in their historical context. Finally, it makes suggestions for further study of this topic.

Internationalism Challenged

1992 is remembered as the first post–Cold War election, fought primarily on domestic issues, when Bill Clinton overturned the high approval ratings enjoyed by President George H. W. Bush in the wake of victory in the Gulf. Clinton’s victory is conventionally ascribed to a combination of domestic issues, luck, and the candidacy of Ross Perot. This chapter will consider and broadly endorse these conventional points but will also demonstrate the degree to which the campaign involved the airing of major themes and tendencies within emerging US post–Cold War foreign policy.

The Domestic Politics of War and Peace

Issues of foreign policy were central to presidential politics in 1980. Not only did the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raise disturbing questions about America’s strength in the world, but, crucially, Jimmy Carter identified foreign policy as a way to salvage his political fortunes. The strategy, which reflected the bleakness of his domestic record, managed to score some successes. But these successes were incomplete. Impatience with limits on American power overseas was pushing public opinion toward hawkish skepticism of negotiation, assisting the late 1970s Republican revitalization, and allowing Ronald Reagan to unlock an anti-Carter mandate in which malaise about America’s standing overseas was as significant as the malaise about the domestic situation.

Dealing with Defeat

The election of 1976 took place in very unusual circumstances. Yet, in many ways, the election campaign itself was fairly conventional. Much of the election cycle, however, also revolved around the issues of presidential authority and credibility, and, in these areas, foreign policy was crucial. That Gerald Ford came so close to snatching the election in the finals days and weeks of the campaign suggests that foreign policy could have made the difference and that the president’s refusal or inability to exploit Republican foreign policy positions and divisions between his policies and those of his opponents, Ronald Reagan for the nomination and Jimmy Carter for the election, hampered his ability to develop a winning campaign.

The Peace Candidate

After the midterm elections of 1970, Richard Nixon believed that he might well be a one-term president. Deep dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, as well domestic disorder and a sluggish economy, all seemed to point to electoral defeat. However, over the next eighteen months, with the help of his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Nixon organized a foreign policy trifecta—the opening to China, a summit in the Soviet Union, and a tentative peace accord with the North Vietnamese—that helped secure an overwhelming electoral mandate. He proved to be the “peace candidate” in 1972 despite continuing to wage war in Southeast Asia.