The Illusion of Progress, 1956
Eisenhower’s reservations in December 1955 did not keep his special assistant from unveiling a new package of proposals in January 1956. As always, Stassen’s work was fast and thorough. He characterized the results as a compromise, although Dulles and the Joint Chiefs groused that they failed to find any evidence of it. His plan contained elements of both the incremental approach to disarmament that he and the president had advocated in the past and other, more extravagant ideas encompassing a wide range of steps toward disarmament. He believed that the UN General Assembly substantially endorsed his views. Stassen also justified his haste, noting that a delay “would cause a serious loss of US initiative.” Not surprisingly, he encountered the continuing hostility of Dulles, who “believed that adoption by the U.S. of the position which you recommend would not be sufficient to maintain for us our leadership in the free world coalition and to secure the essential support of world public opinion.”