Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”

John Biro;

doi:10.5840/logos-episteme201910328

Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”

Logos & Episteme ◽

10.5840/logos-episteme201910328 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 327-331

Author(s):

John Biro ◽

Keyword(s):

Gettier Cases ◽

Belief Condition ◽

Turn On ◽

Justified Belief ◽

Central Claim

In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion.

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A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem

Grazer Philosophische Studien ◽

10.1163/18756735-069001011 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 69 (1) ◽

pp. 207-228 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Igor Douven

Keyword(s):

True Belief ◽

Contextual Factors ◽

Epistemic Luck ◽

Gettier Cases ◽

Gettier Problem ◽

Justified Belief ◽

Benign Nature ◽

Epistemic Duty ◽

Contextualist Solution ◽

The Gettier Problem

According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic duty with respect to a given proposition, many so-called Gettier cases, which are supposed to be cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge, will be seen to be not really cases of justified belief after all. A second important claim is that the remaining alleged Gettier cases can be qualified as cases of knowledge. This requires that we countenance a notion of epistemic luck, but the requisite kind of luck is of a quite benign nature.

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GETTIER FOR JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2014.12 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

pp. 305-318

Author(s):

Frank Hofmann

Keyword(s):

Virtue Epistemology ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Gettier Cases ◽

Justified Belief

AbstractI will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justified belief. Justified belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unified virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justification.

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Gettier Beliefs and Serious Beliefs

Logos & Episteme ◽

10.5840/logos-episteme20201117 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 113-118

Author(s):

James Simpson ◽

Keyword(s):

Gettier Cases ◽

Popular Opinion ◽

Belief Condition ◽

Good Shape ◽

Definition Of

In a recent exchange in the pages of this journal, John Biro responds to Gabor Forrai’s argument against Biro’s argument that in most, if not all, Gettier cases the belief condition, contra popular opinion, isn’t satisfied. In this note, I’ll argue that Biro’s response to Forrai satisfactorily resolves the first of Forrai’s two central objections to Biro’s argument that the belief condition isn’t satisfied in most, if not all, Gettier cases. But Biro’s response leaves mostly unaddressed the most plausible way of construing Forrai’s second objection. I’ll take up the mantle of successfully defending Biro’s argument from this more plausible construal of Forrai’s second objection. However, even though I’ll argue that Biro’s argument is in good shape with respect to Forrai’s objections, I’ll show that the definition of serious belief that Biro offers us is mistaken.

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Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

10.1093/oso/9780192846921.003.0002 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 26-59

Author(s):

J. Adam Carter

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Abilities ◽

Virtue Epistemology ◽

Propositional Knowledge ◽

Belief Condition ◽

Justified Belief ◽

Mental Structure ◽

The Subject ◽

Externalist Approach

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

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Perceptual Knowledge and Gettier Cases

10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0010 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Susanna Schellenberg

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Sufficient Evidence ◽

Gettier Cases ◽

Perceptual Knowledge ◽

Belief Condition ◽

The Subject

Chapter 9 exploits the consequences of capacitism for a view of perceptual knowledge. It argues that while factive evidence is sufficient evidence for knowledge, phenomenal evidence is not. In perceptual Gettier cases, it is standardly thought that the subject has sufficient evidence for knowledge, but fails to know for some other reason. Once we recognize the distinction between phenomenal evidence and factive evidence, we can say that in perceptual Gettier cases, the subject has mere phenomenal evidence; but since she does not have factive evidence, she fails to have sufficient evidence for knowledge. In this way, capacitism analyzes perceptual Gettier cases without appeal to any factor beyond that of sufficient evidence. Capacitism posits no belief condition on knowledge and it substantiates the idea that knowledge is a mental state. Moreover, it shows how perception yields knowledge even though one does not necessarily know that one knows.

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On the Very Possibility of Historiography

Journal of the Philosophy of History ◽

10.1163/18722636-12341329 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 11 (2) ◽

pp. 196-220 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Stephen Boulter

Keyword(s):

True Belief ◽

Abstract Objects ◽

Historical Events ◽

Theories Of Truth ◽

Turn On ◽

Fundamental Challenge ◽

The Cost ◽

Central Claim

The familiar challenges to historiographical knowledge turn on epistemological concerns having to do with the unobservability of historical events, or with the problem of establishing a sufficiently strong inferential connection between evidence and the historiographical claim one wishes to convert from a true belief into knowledge. This paper argues that these challenges miss a deeper problem, viz., the lack of obvious truth-makers for historiographical claims. The metaphysical challenge to historiography is that reality does not appear to co-operate in our cognitive endeavours by providing truth-makers for claims about historical entities and events. Setting out this less familiar, but more fundamental, challenge to the very possibility of historiography is the first aim of this paper. The various ways in which this challenge might be met are then set out, including ontologically inflationary appeals to abstract objects of various kinds, or to “block” theories of time. The paper closes with the articulation of an ontologically parsimonious solution to the metaphysical challenge to historiography. The cost of this approach is a revision to standard theories of truth. The central claim here is that the standard theories of truth have mistaken distinct causes of truth for truth itself. This mistake leads to distorted expectations regarding truth-makers for historiographical claims. The truth-makers of historiographical claims are not so much the historical events themselves (for they do not exist) but atemporal modal facts about the order of things of which those events were a part.

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Ubiquinone-BODIPY nanoparticles for tumor redox-responsive fluorescence imaging and photodynamic activity

Journal of Materials Chemistry B ◽

10.1039/d0tb02529a ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Byunghee Hwang ◽

Tae-Il Kim ◽

Hyunjin Kim ◽

Sungjin Jeon ◽

Yongdoo Choi ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Fluorescence Imaging ◽

Selective Activation ◽

Turn On ◽

Intracellular Environment ◽

Redox Responsive ◽

Photodynamic Activity

A ubiquinone-BODIPY photosensitizer self-assembles into nanoparticles (PS-Q-NPs) and undergoes selective activation within the highly reductive intracellular environment of tumors, resulting in “turn-on” fluorescence and photosensitizing activities.

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