GETTIER FOR JUSTIFICATION

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-318
Author(s):  
Frank Hofmann
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Justified Belief

AbstractI will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justified belief. Justified belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unified virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justification.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem

2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 207-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Douven
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Benign Nature ◽  
Epistemic Duty ◽  
Contextualist Solution ◽  
The Gettier Problem

According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic duty with respect to a given proposition, many so-called Gettier cases, which are supposed to be cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge, will be seen to be not really cases of justified belief after all. A second important claim is that the remaining alleged Gettier cases can be qualified as cases of knowledge. This requires that we countenance a notion of epistemic luck, but the requisite kind of luck is of a quite benign nature.

Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-331
Author(s):  
John Biro ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Central Claim

In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion.

scholarly journals Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter aims to develop a novel virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief, which gives the view a knowledge first spin. It is virtue epistemological in that it offers accounts of knowledge and justified belief in terms of exercises of epistemic abilities. It has a knowledge first twist because, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the relevant notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know. In addition, this chapter aims to show that the resulting knowledge first virtue epistemology compares favourably with its traditional cousins as it offers an appealing new solution to the Gettier problem.

The New Evil Devil Problem and Deontological Internalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-109
Author(s):  
Mikhail G. Khort ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
The Social ◽  
Introductory Part ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

The article defends an internalist version of the virtue epistemology. This point contradicts many contemporary theories of epistemic virtues, as they are mostly externalistic. This is partly due to the fact that externalism is more consistent with cognitive science, situationism and the social epistemology. Another reason is that it was the externalists who revived interest in the aretic approach within the framework of modern epistemology. Nevertheless, the author shows that it is internalism that offers the best answer to the question about the essence of epistemic virtues. In the introductory part of the article, the classical definitions of internalism and externalism are given. It is explained that the author use an extended definition of internalism, which is characterized by the inclusion epistemic virtues in the structure of justification. The second part is devoted to critic of externalism. The New Evil Demon Problem is the instrument of analysis. The author shows that there are scenarios in which the function of justification as a reliable “guide” to truth cannot serve as a criterion for epistemic evaluation. Situations are possible in which the subject has a false but justified belief. Externalism cannot explain such scenarios, which motivates to abandon this approach. The third part of the article discusses internalism as a possible response to The New Evil Demon Problem. The author believes that justification should be considered as a deontological concept. The condition of reliability, which is an important element of externalism, must be replaced by the condition of correct motivation and epistemic debt. This means that the assessment of beliefs and subjects should be based on what motives they have and how they manifest them in cognition.

Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-59
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Mental Structure ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Externalist Approach

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

Revisiting Anti-Luck Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-115
Author(s):  
Patrick Bondy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge ◽  
Modal Notion

According to anti-luck approaches to the analysis of knowledge, knowledge is analyzed as unlucky true belief, or unlucky justified true belief. According to virtue epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is true belief which a subject has acquired or maintained because of the exercise of a relevant cognitive ability. ALE and VE both appear to have difficulty handling some intuitive cases where subjects have or lack knowledge, so Pritchard (2012) proposed that we should take an anti-luck condition and a success-from-ability condition as independent necessary conditions on knowledge. Recently, Carter and Peterson (2017) have argued that Pritchard’s modal notion of luck needs to be broadened. My aim in this paper is to show that, with the modal conception of luck appropriately broadened, it is no longer clear that ALE needs to be supplemented with an independent ability condition in order to handle the problematic Gettier cases.

Some Contributions to the Theory of Near-Critical Bisexual Branching Processes

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (02) ◽  
pp. 492-505
Author(s):  
M. Molina ◽  
M. Mota ◽  
A. Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Branching Process ◽  
Branching Processes ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Limit Laws ◽  
Bisexual Branching Processes ◽  
Probabilistic Evolution

We investigate the probabilistic evolution of a near-critical bisexual branching process with mating depending on the number of couples in the population. We determine sufficient conditions which guarantee either the almost sure extinction of such a process or its survival with positive probability. We also establish some limiting results concerning the sequences of couples, females, and males, suitably normalized. In particular, gamma, normal, and degenerate distributions are proved to be limit laws. The results also hold for bisexual Bienaymé–Galton–Watson processes, and can be adapted to other classes of near-critical bisexual branching processes.

The extinction time of a general birth and death process with catastrophes

1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 851-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Brockwell
Keyword(s):  
Laplace Transform ◽  
Size Distribution ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Death Process ◽  
Extinction Time ◽  
Birth And Death Process ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Laplace Transform ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

The Laplace transform of the extinction time is determined for a general birth and death process with arbitrary catastrophe rate and catastrophe size distribution. It is assumed only that the birth rates satisfyλ0= 0,λj> 0 for eachj> 0, and. Necessary and sufficient conditions for certain extinction of the population are derived. The results are applied to the linear birth and death process (λj=jλ, µj=jμ) with catastrophes of several different types.

Normal approximations to discrete unimodal distributions

1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 1013-1018
Author(s):  
B. G. Quinn ◽  
H. L. MacGillivray
Keyword(s):  
Stationary Distribution ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Hypergeometric Distribution ◽  
Death Process ◽  
Normal Approximations ◽  
Discrete Random Variables ◽  
Birth Death

Sufficient conditions are presented for the limiting normality of sequences of discrete random variables possessing unimodal distributions. The conditions are applied to obtain normal approximations directly for the hypergeometric distribution and the stationary distribution of a special birth-death process.

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