Remarks on Graham Priest’s Views on Transworld Identity

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-91
Author(s):  
Piotr Warzoszczak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transworld Identity

Modal Fragmentalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (280) ◽  
pp. 570-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuele Iaquinto
Keyword(s):  
Outright Rejection ◽  
Modal Analogue ◽  
Transworld Identity

Abstract In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity.

Transworld identity sentences

Philosophia ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Aryeh Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Transworld Identity

scholarly journals D. Chalmers’ argument from logical supervenience in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Vladimir Binhi
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Modal Term ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Transworld Identity

The subject of this research is D. Chalmers’ argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness –sentience or qualia – explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term “possibility”, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature – nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.

scholarly journals In Memoriam

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-109
Author(s):  
Abraham D. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Postdoctoral Fellow ◽  
The World ◽  
In Memoriam ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Transworld Identity

I remember distinctly the moment I learned that David Lewis had died. It was during my years as a postdoctoral fellow, when I was more than a little isolated, and so it turned out to have been some time—months, maybe—since the event. I recall thinking: the world in which I thought I was living, during those months, turned out not to be the actual world, and so I turned out not to be the person I thought I was, but merely a counterpart of that person. And thus arose the half-formed thought (still only half-formed now, alas) that therein lay some insight into what is actually at stake in the conflict between counterpart theory and transworld identity.

scholarly journals Modal logic and logic of fiction

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-62
Author(s):  
Vladimir Nocic ◽  
Jasmina Nocic
Keyword(s):  
Literary Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Nicholas Rescher ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Transworld Identity

This paper analyzes the views of representative theoreticians of possible worlds semantics and possible worlds theory in an attempt to ascertain the degree and manner of interdisciplinary borrowing through focusing on possible worlds and individuals in those worlds. The paper first clarifies the general perceptions of possible worlds, perceptions in the field of modal restrictions, transworld identity, and identity over time, as presented in the works of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and Nicholas Rescher, the representative semanticists of possible worlds, and then ascertains the degree and manner of their adaptations in the theory proposed by Ljubomir Dolezel within literary theory. The conclusion is that the cooperation between the two disciplines stands on fertile ground but that it is necessary to perform more systematic adaptations due to different subjects of research and different objectives.

scholarly journals Counterfactuals and unphysical ceteris paribus: An explanatory fallacy

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 143-160
Author(s):  
Milan Cirkovic
Keyword(s):  
Nonlinear Dynamical Systems ◽  
Evolutionary Development ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Nonlinear Dynamical ◽  
Historical Reasoning ◽  
The Galaxy ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Crucial Ingredient ◽  
Planetary Habitability ◽  
Transworld Identity

I reconsider a type of counterfactual argument often used in historical sciences on a recent widely discussed example of the so-called ?rare Earth? hypothesis in planetary sciences and astrobiology. The argument is based on the alleged ?rarity? of some crucial ingredient for the planetary habitability, which is, in Earth?s case, provided by contingent evolutionary development. For instance, the claim that a contingent fact of history which has created planet Jupiter enables shielding of Earth from most dangerous impact catastrophes, thus increasing Earth?s habitability, leads often to the conclusion that such state-of-affairs must be rare in the Galaxy. I argue that this reasoning is deeply flawed, for several closely related reasons. In addition, the relevance of the philosophical problem of transworld identity for this kind of historical reasoning in science is put forward. This highlights many explanatory problems one faces when using historical counterfactuals in study of complex, nonlinear dynamical systems - and bolsters the relevance of philosophy for evaluation of scientific explanatory claims.

scholarly journals Modal Noneism: Transworld Identity, Identification, and Individuation

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Impossible Worlds ◽  
Nonexistent Objects ◽  
Double Move ◽  
Transworld Identity ◽  
Graham Priest

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke's notorious 'stipulation' solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to.

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