Modal logic and logic of fiction

This paper analyzes the views of representative theoreticians of possible worlds semantics and possible worlds theory in an attempt to ascertain the degree and manner of interdisciplinary borrowing through focusing on possible worlds and individuals in those worlds. The paper first clarifies the general perceptions of possible worlds, perceptions in the field of modal restrictions, transworld identity, and identity over time, as presented in the works of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and Nicholas Rescher, the representative semanticists of possible worlds, and then ascertains the degree and manner of their adaptations in the theory proposed by Ljubomir Dolezel within literary theory. The conclusion is that the cooperation between the two disciplines stands on fertile ground but that it is necessary to perform more systematic adaptations due to different subjects of research and different objectives.

Download Full-text

Do Proper Names Always Rigidly Designate?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1978.10717066 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 8 (3) ◽

pp. 475-484 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Donald Nute

Keyword(s):

Possible Worlds ◽

Proper Names ◽

Alternative Interpretation ◽

Single Individual ◽

Saul Kripke ◽

Possible Worlds Semantics ◽

Referring Expressions ◽

The Individual ◽

Naming And Necessity

Many philosophers have claimed possible worlds semantics is incoherent because of insoluble problems involved in the notion of identifying a single individual in different worlds. One frequent approach to trans-world identification has been to assume that all the possible worlds, complete with their populations, are described by means of qualities alone prior to our considering the question of identification of the same individual in each world in which it exists. If we interpret possible worlds semantics in this way, trans-world identification could only be accomplished on the basis of some properties the individual has uniquely in every world in which it exists. This becomes problematic since the individual doesn't have the same properties in every world. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ and ‘Identity and Necessity’ Saul Kripke rejects such an account of both possible worlds and trans-world identification, developing an alternative interpretation of the new semantics. His approach involves a distinction between referring expressions which designate different individuals in different worlds according to the distribution of properties within each world and referring expressions which designate the same individual in every world.

Download Full-text

Meaning, Modality, and Possible Worlds Semantics

Philosophy of Language ◽

10.23943/princeton/9780691138664.003.0004 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Scott Soames

Keyword(s):

Natural Language ◽

Classical Logic ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

David Lewis ◽

Formal Languages ◽

Possible Worlds Semantics ◽

Natural Languages ◽

Counterfactual Conditionals ◽

Richard Montague ◽

Close Parallel

This chapter begins with a discussion of Kripke-style possible worlds semantics. It considers one of the most important applications of possible worlds semantics, the account of counterfactual conditionals given in Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. It then goes on to examine the work of Richard Montague. Montague specified syntactic rules that generate English, or English-like, structures directly, while pairing each such rule with a truth-theoretic rule interpreting it. This close parallel between syntax and semantics is what makes the languages of classical logic so transparently tractable, and what they were designed to embody. Montague's bold contention is that we do not have to replace natural language natural languages with formal substitutes to achieve such transparency. The same techniques employed to create formal languages can be used to describe natural languages in mathematically revealing ways.

Download Full-text

Modeling a Perspective on the World

Knowledge and Conditionals ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198810346.003.0005 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 69-83

Author(s):

Robert C. Stalnaker

Keyword(s):

Possible Worlds ◽

David Lewis ◽

Cognitive State ◽

The World ◽

Over Time

It is argued, following David Lewis, that we should model a cognitive state by a set of centered possible worlds, since this is required to represent the believer’s self-locating or indexical knowledge and belief. But it is also argued, contra Lewis, that we should take the contents of belief to be propositions, represented by sets of uncentered possible worlds, since this is required to give a perspicuous account of agreement and disagreement of different agents, and of change of belief over time. Reconciling these two thoughts requires a defense of Propositionality: roughly, the thesis that any ignorance of where one is in the world is also ignorance about what the world in itself is like. This thesis is defended against some criticisms, and motivated by an externalist picture of knowledge and intentionality.

Download Full-text

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s003441251600010x ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 52 (4) ◽

pp. 561-572 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

CHAD VANCE

Keyword(s):

Actual World ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

David Lewis ◽

Counterpart Theory ◽

Possible Worlds Semantics ◽

Intrinsic Properties ◽

Modal Realism ◽

Possible World ◽

Necessary Being ◽

Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Download Full-text

Taking Possible Worlds Seriously

Death and Nonexistence ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190247478.003.0006 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 106-126

Author(s):

Palle Yourgrau

Keyword(s):

Modal Logic ◽

Real World ◽

Actual World ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

David Lewis ◽

Saul Kripke ◽

Abstract Entities

The discussion so far has been employing the notion of possible worlds, popularized via the semantics of modal logic. How seriously, however, should possible worlds be taken? David Lewis held them to be genuine, concrete worlds, no less real than ours, the actual world, whereas Robert Stalnaker and Saul Kripke take them to be, rather, abstract entities, properties of the actual world—the only real world—which it might possibly possess. I agree with Lewis that possible worlds are no less real than the actual world, but I also agree with Stalnaker that only our world actually exists. I affirm that merely possible worlds, though they lack existence, possess being. I develop the notion of possible worlds, in which possible individuals exist, but also point to unsolved problems, such as how to account for the contingency of the actuality of the actual world.

Download Full-text

The Failure of Conceptual Analysis

10.1093/oso/9780198717805.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Jennifer McKitrick

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Analysis ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Causal Power ◽

Possible Worlds Semantics ◽

Conditional Statements ◽

Reductive Analysis

Dispositions are often regarded with suspicion. Consequently, some philosophers try to semantically reduce disposition ascriptions to sentences containing only non-dispositional vocabulary. Typically, reductionists attempt to analyze disposition ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. These conditional statements, like other modal claims, are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds semantics. However, conditional analyses are subject to a number of problems and counterexamples, including random coincidences, void satisfaction, masks, antidotes, mimics, altering, and finks. Some analyses fail to reduce disposition ascriptions to non-modal vocabulary. If reductive analysis of disposition ascriptions fails, then perhaps there can be metaphysical reduction of dispositions without semantic reduction. However, the reductionist still owes us an account of what makes disposition ascriptions true. But to posit a causal power for every unreduced dispositional predicate is an overreaction to the failure of conceptual analysis.

Download Full-text

‘Your duplicitous point of view’: Delayed revelations of hypothetical focalisation in Ian McEwan’s Atonement and Sweet Tooth

Language and Literature ◽

10.1177/09639470211009734 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 096394702110097

Author(s):

Naomi Adam

Keyword(s):

Case Studies ◽

21St Century ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Point Of View ◽

Theoretical Frameworks ◽

Possible Worlds Theory ◽

Ian Mcewan

Framed by cognitive-poetic and possible worlds theories, this article explores two 21st century novels by the British postmodernist author Ian McEwan. Building upon Ryan’s (1991) seminal conceptualisation of the theory in relation to literature and using the novels as case studies, possible worlds theory is used to explain the unique and destabilising stylistic effects at play in the texts, which result in a ‘duplicitous point of view’ and consequent disorientation for the reader. With reference to the stylistically deviant texts of McEwan, it is argued that revisions to current theoretical frameworks are warranted. Most significantly, the concepts of suppositious text-possible worlds and (total) frame readjustment are introduced. Further to this, neuropsychiatric research is applied to the novels, highlighting the potential for interdisciplinary overlap in the study of narrative focalisation. It is concluded that the duplicity integral to both novels’ themes and texture is effected through artful use of hypothetical focalisation and suppositious text-possible worlds.

Download Full-text