Habits and Explanation

1998 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Louis Caruana
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Causal Chain ◽  
Psychological Explanation ◽  
Normal Human ◽  
The Many ◽  
Crucial Part

Habits form a crucial part of the everyday conceptual scheme used to explain normal human activity. However, they have been neglected in debates concerning folk-psychology which have concentrated on propositional attitudes such as beliefs. But propositional attitudes are just one of the many mental states. In this paper, I seek to expand the debate by considering mental states other than propositional attitudes. I conclude that the case for the autonomy and plausibility of the folk-psychological explanation is strengthened when one considers an example from the non-propositional-attitude mental states: habits. My main target is the radical eliminativist program. As regards habits, eliminativists could argue in two distinct but related ways. They can either abandon the concept "habit" altogether or retain the folk-psychological term "habit" by reducing it to the causal chain of the observed behavior pattern, as is sometimes done in social theory. I contend that both of these strategies are defective. The correct way to talk about habits is in terms of manifestations and activating conditions, not in terms of causal chains. Hence, if eliminativists take up either of the two arguments given above, they will not succeed. Correspondingly, by the added generality gained through the consideration of habits, the case for folk-psychology is strengthened.

Davidson on the Ontology and Logical Form of Belief

Philosophy ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M. S. HACKER
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Technical Sense ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Many ◽  
Conceptual Confusion

1. Belief and mental statesDavidson holds that intentional verbs occurring in the form ‘A Vs that p’ signify propositional attitudes. These are, he claims, (i) mental states (MS 160; KOM passim), and (ii) dispositions (FPA 103). Davidson does not conceive of himself as introducing a special technical sense of the common intentional verbs. He insists that ‘the mental states in question are beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on, as ordinarily conceived' (KOM 51f.). Consequently he contends that believing that p is a mental state, disposition or dispositional state. These ontological claims about the nature of belief inform his account of the logical form of belief sentences. I shall address the question of whether believing that p can justly be deemed a mental state, a disposition or dispositional state. Subsequently I shall examine Davidson's account of the logical form of belief sentences.Our concept of a mental state, like so many of the concepts which philosophers treat as categorial, is none too sharply defined. It has a respectable use, which can be described. But, like other such general psychological terms, e.g. ‘mental process’, ‘mental activity’, far from being the ‘hardest of the hard’ - a sharply circumscribed categorial term akin to a variable in a well-constructed formal system — it has blurred boundaries and is elastic. Like all our ordinary psychological concepts, it evolved in order to meet everyday needs. As Wittgenstein observed, ‘The concepts of psychology are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purposes, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry.’Although our ordinary concepts can be replaced by technical ones for specialized purposes, they cannot be abused without generating conceptual confusion and incoherence. If the expression ‘mental state’ is being employed in its ordinary sense, then it is wrong to hold that believing that p is to be in any mental state. If it is being employed in a special technical sense, then those who employ it thus owe us an account of what it means and how it is to be used. This Davidson and the many other philosophers who subscribe to the view that believing is a mental state have not done. Until such an account is forthcoming, one may presume that they think of themselves as deploying our ordinary concept of a mental state. And if so, I shall argue, they are misusing it.

The Mental States of Persons and their Brains

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Crane
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The World ◽  
The Brain

AbstractCognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that ‘the brain represents the world’ might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.

scholarly journals Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harmen Ghijsen
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Prediction Problem ◽  
Difference Problem ◽  
Promising Solution ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Interaction Problem ◽  
The Way

Abstract According to pluralistic folk psychology (PFP) we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which (some of) PFP’s methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation can interact; and third, the difference problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how all of its methods are truly different if it also assumes a dispositionalist account of belief. I argue that a promising solution to these problems should not overestimate the importance and ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution even if the difference between propositional attitude attribution and other types of attribution is a matter of degree rather than kind. Instead, a solution should be sought in a better appreciation of the breadth of folk psychological theorizing and the way in which this can be incorporated into model theory.

The psychology of folk psychology

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Visual Object ◽  
Memory Representation ◽  
Visual Object Recognition ◽  
Qualitative Properties ◽  
Qualitative Phenomenological

AbstractFolk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.

Implicit representation, mental states, and mental processes

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 761-762
Author(s):  
Richard A. Carlson
Keyword(s):  
Explicit Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Significant Advance ◽  
Implicit Representation ◽  
Real Time Processing ◽  
Time Processing ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Points Of View

Dienes & Perner's target article constitutes a significant advance in thinking about implicit knowledge. However, it largely neglects processing details and thus the time scale of mental states realizing propositional attitudes. Considering real-time processing raises questions about the possible brevity of implicit representation, the nature of processes that generate explicit knowledge, and the points of view from which knowledge may be represented. Understanding the propositional attitude analysis in terms of momentary mental states points the way toward answering these questions.

Truth and Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes

The first part of the chapter explores the relations between knowledge and truth and between knowledge and belief. It challenges a number of muddles in the literature concerning propositional attitudes, particularly the idea that while belief is a propositional attitude, knowledge is not. Second, it explores ancient words for ‘truth’, and how truth and being are related in ancient thought, including the so-called veridical sense of the verb einai. It argues that truth is (both for Plato, and in truth) first a property of things, and is then derivatively found in likenesses, such as reflections, pictures, and descriptions, where it comes in degrees according to the representation’s faithfulness to the truth. Finally, it connects this to the iconic method in Plato, whereby he uses such images as a means of accessing the truth that cannot be seen.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Internal State ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Special Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Intentional State ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Vice Chancellor ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

We believe that there is coffee over there; we believe the special theory of relativity; we believe the Vice-Chancellor; and some of us believe in God. But plausibly what is fundamental is believing that something is the case – believing a proposition, as it is usually put. To believe a theory is to believe the propositions that make up the theory, to believe a person is to believe some proposition advanced by them; and to believe in God is to believe the proposition that God exists. Thus belief is said to be a propositional attitude or intentional state: to believe is to take the attitude of belief to some proposition. It is about what its propositional object is about (God, coffee, or whatever). We can think of the propositional object of a belief as the way the belief represents things as being – its content, as it is often called. We state what we believe with indicative sentences in ‘that’-clauses, as in ‘Mary believes that the Democrats will win the next election’. But belief in the absence of language is possible. A dog may believe that there is food in the bowl in front of it. Accordingly philosophers have sought accounts of belief that allow a central role to sentences – it cannot be an accident that finding the right sentence is the way to capture what someone believes – while allowing that creatures without a language can have beliefs. One way of doing this is to construe beliefs as relations to inner sentences somehow inscribed in the brain. On this view although dogs do not have a public language, to the extent that they have beliefs they have something sentence-like in their heads. An alternative tradition focuses on the way belief when combined with desire leads to behaviour, and analyses belief in terms of behavioural dispositions or more recently as the internal state that is, in combination with other mental states, responsible for the appropriate behavioural dispositions. An earlier tradition associated with the British Empiricists views belief as a kind of pale imitation of perceptual experience. But recent work on belief largely takes for granted a sharp distinction between belief and the various mental images that may or may not accompany it.

Overview of Agent Modelling

2008 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Helder Coelho
Keyword(s):  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Current State ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
State Of The Field

The field of agents is presented, taking in mind what means to be a rational entity, how it operates, can be specified, and formally described. After giving a glimpse of the current state of the field, we use the BDI model, supported by folk psychology, to discuss new challenges concerning the mentality and the behaviour of an agent. This is done with the help of our own research around new mental states and properties of the agency. Defining the character and personality of an entity can be rather interesting to attack real applications where complexity is a stong ingredient.

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