Bernard Arthur Owen Williams 1929–2003

Author(s):  
Simon Blackburn

Bernard Williams is considered by distinguished contemporaries from many fields as one of the great, inspirational humanists of his time. Aside from his terrifying brilliance, his dazzling speed of mind and extraordinary range of understanding, his zest, and his glittering wit, he was also admired for the deep humanity that had infused his life and work, and the seriousness with which he had tried to transform the role of the moral philosopher. The paradoxical combination of exhilaration and pessimism, of complete facility in the academic exercises of philosophy juxtaposed with an almost tragic sense of the resistance that the human clay offers to theory and analysis, let alone to recipes and panaceas, made Williams a unique, and uniquely admired, figure in his generation.

Author(s):  
Oliver Leaman

Like so many of his contemporaries in the fourth and fifth centuries AH (tenth and eleventh centuries ad) Ibn Miskawayh was eclectic in philosophy, basing his approach upon the rich variety of Greek philosophy that had been translated into Arabic. Although he applied that philosophy to specifically Islamic problems, he rarely used religion to modify philosophy, and so came to be known as very much an Islamic humanist. He represents the tendency in Islamic philosophy to fit Islam into a wider system of rational practices common to all humanity. Ibn Miskawayh’s Neoplatonism has both a practical and a theoretical side. He provides rules for the preservation of moral health based on a view of the cultivation of character. These describe the ways in which the various parts of the soul can be brought together into harmony, so achieving happiness. It is the role of the moral philosopher to prescribe rules for moral health, just as the doctor prescribes rules for physical health. Moral health is based upon a combination of intellectual development and practical action.


This chapter contains selected letters from the correspondence of Catharine Trotter Cockburn, an English moral philosopher of Scottish descent. It includes a large selection of Cockburn’s letters to and from her niece Ann Hepburn Arbuthnot, spanning the period from 1731 to 1748, as well as letters from Cockburn’s exchanges with the philosophers John Locke and Edmund Law. The topics of the letters concern ethical and moral-theological issues such as the metaphysical foundations of moral obligation and the role of reason in discerning the will of God. The chapter begins with an introductory essay by the editor, arguing that the letters provide insight into how Cockburn developed her mature ethical position in relation to her philosophical contemporaries, especially the freethinkers, deists, mystics, and advocates of self-interest in her time. The text includes editorial annotations to assist the reader’s understanding of early modern words and ideas.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The final chapter develops the conception of a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory moral philosophy established throughout the book and investigates the relationship between moral philosophy and moral life. It expands on two central suggestions of this work, namely that moral philosophy is fundamentally descriptive, and that the moral cannot be delineated, but is a pervasive presence in moral life. This leads to a discussion of how we are to understand the practicality of moral philosophy, and how it can be said to be aiding moral life, namely by advancing moral orientation, by making recommendations for moral attention, and by inviting us to develop and engage with new forms of moral thought, even forms of moral change. A central discussion concerns the role of the moral philosopher, and it is argued that philosophical work is an activity that itself involves a two-sided responsibility, an inward responsibility to continuously work on one’s wants and expectations and an outward responsibility to continuously stay open and attentive towards the investigated phenomenon. The last section recapitulates and evaluates the work done in the book.


Author(s):  
Toni Erskine

Unlike considerations of agency and structure, the role of luck in attributions of moral responsibility in international politics has been sorely neglected. This chapter aims to redress this neglect by exploring the idea of “moral luck,” a purposely paradoxical concept introduced by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, in relation to institutional agents as the objects of moral responsibility judgements. Specifically, this chapter suggests that luck can affect the nature of agents’ choices, the consequences of their actions, and, perhaps most profoundly, their very character and the way they define themselves, thereby infusing our ethical analyses of practical problems ranging from climate change to protecting vulnerable populations from mass atrocity. The crucial question that accompanies this proposal is whether acknowledging the influence of luck threatens to shift the ground upon which our evaluations of moral responsibility rest, or, instead, simply affords a more nuanced and accurate account of the existing landscape.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Lauren Kopajtic

It has been claimed that Adam Smith, like David Hume, has a ‘reflective endorsement’ account of the authority of morality. On such a view, our moral faculties and notions are justified insofar as they pass reflective scrutiny. But Smith's moral philosophy, unlike Hume's, is also peppered with references to God, to divine law, and to our being ‘set up’ in a specific way so as to best attain what is good and useful for us. This language suggests that there is another strategy available for accounting for the authority of morality, one that would align Smith with teleological accounts of human nature and theological accounts of morality. The authority of Smith's impartial spectator would, on such an account, be derivative – it would be derived from the supreme authority of God. Such a view poses a serious challenge for contemporary interpreters of Smith who seek to read him as an empiricist, naturalist, and sentimentalist moral philosopher. This paper examines the textual evidence for this view, focusing on the role of the explicitly religious language found in a key section of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that this language should neither be interpreted as merely ornamental, nor as providing a theological justification of morality. Rather, it is part of Smith's illustration of the psychological influence of religious beliefs, especially the beliefs in an all-seeing judge and in a just afterlife where all human actions will be accounted for and appropriately rewarded or punished.


Author(s):  
Ewa Mazierska

MORAL LUCK IN THE FILMS OF WOODY ALLEN We happened to have won the war. But if we didn't win the war, then history would be created differently.(Judah's aunt in Crimes and Misdemeanors) The purpose of this essay is to discuss how moral issues are represented in two films of Woody Allen: Crimes and Misdemeanors (1989) and Match Point (2005). My principal tool of analysis is the concept of 'moral luck', elaborated in an essay of the same title by Bernard Williams (1929-2003) (see Williams 1981a), widely cited as the most important British moral philosopher of his time. I am using this concept because these two Allen films can serve as a perfect illustration of its validity or, conversely, because the idea of moral luck supports the way the director deploys moral problems in his films. My discussion will consist of three parts. In the...


JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winnifred R. Louis ◽  
Craig McGarty ◽  
Emma F. Thomas ◽  
Catherine E. Amiot ◽  
Fathali M. Moghaddam

AbstractWhitehouse adapts insights from evolutionary anthropology to interpret extreme self-sacrifice through the concept of identity fusion. The model neglects the role of normative systems in shaping behaviors, especially in relation to violent extremism. In peaceful groups, increasing fusion will actually decrease extremism. Groups collectively appraise threats and opportunities, actively debate action options, and rarely choose violence toward self or others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


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