Descriptive Moral Theories

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

The Question of Moral Philosophy

This chapter provides the motivation for the book by arguing for a need to address the question of the role and status of moral philosophy in light of the criticisms directed against the theory-based understanding of moral philosophy of the twentieth century. The chapter also presents the three main aims of the book, to discuss what form of moral theory—if any—can be a fruitful part of moral philosophy; to investigate the moral importance of the particular; and to offer an alternative descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. In addition, it identifies the context of the discussion which is that of contemporary analytical moral philosophy, broadly conceived, and it determines the central categories of the book, moral philosophy, moral theory, and moral life; all chosen to avoid the ambiguity of ‘ethics’ which covers both moral philosophy and what is investigated in moral philosophy, the moral. Finally, the chapter clarifies the philosophical approach adopted in the book which is modelled on an understanding of the dialogical structure and the conception of philosophy found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. The final section of the chapter offers a short summary of the remaining chapters and an overview of the overall argument of the book.

Particularities of Moral Lives

The chapter presents a critique of the idea that morality is impersonal and an investigation of how and to what extent personal features of our lives may be morally relevant and shape us as moral agents. In doing so, the chapter explains why moral life resists theorisation of the form criticised in Chapter 2, and it provides a better understanding of the challenges involved in developing a form of moral philosophy that can take the particularities of moral life into consideration. The chapter opens with a clarification of the approach and the central concepts of chapters 5 and 6, before turning to two suggestions of how to account for the personal dimension of moral life in terms of agent-relativity and strong moral self-definition. As these suggestions are shown to be inadequate, this leads to an investigation of the role of personal particularities in the moral formation and the moral positions of individuals. The centrality of the personal in moral life furthermore creates a demand on the subject to engage in justification in relation to others and self-understanding in relation to oneself, where self-understanding in many cases is to be understood as a process of both self-discovery and self-determination; of striving to settle both who one is and who one wants to be.

Generality and Particularity in Moral Thought

This chapter explores the role of particularities in moral thought and moral life and the forms of understanding of these particularities necessary in moral philosophy in order to substantiate the idea, developed in Chapter 3, that moral philosophy is a descriptive activity facing a dual task, both general and particular. The chapter falls into two parts. The first part is an investigation of the role of general principles in moral thought that aids an understanding of how far general descriptions (for example in the form of moral theories) may be of help to us in philosophy. The second part provides an understanding of the role of the particular in moral thought that serves to substantiate the claim that moral philosophy has to provide a substantial understanding of moral development, imagination, and discernment. This part also investigates whether the qualification of the role of general principles in moral thought can be reconciled with the idea that moral considerations are objective, universal, and absolute. The chapter concludes that moral philosophy should rediscover itself as one practice among others that aim to assist and improve moral life, while taking into account the most comprehensive understanding of human life.

Descriptive Moral Philosophy

The final chapter develops the conception of a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory moral philosophy established throughout the book and investigates the relationship between moral philosophy and moral life. It expands on two central suggestions of this work, namely that moral philosophy is fundamentally descriptive, and that the moral cannot be delineated, but is a pervasive presence in moral life. This leads to a discussion of how we are to understand the practicality of moral philosophy, and how it can be said to be aiding moral life, namely by advancing moral orientation, by making recommendations for moral attention, and by inviting us to develop and engage with new forms of moral thought, even forms of moral change. A central discussion concerns the role of the moral philosopher, and it is argued that philosophical work is an activity that itself involves a two-sided responsibility, an inward responsibility to continuously work on one’s wants and expectations and an outward responsibility to continuously stay open and attentive towards the investigated phenomenon. The last section recapitulates and evaluates the work done in the book.

Literature and Moral Philosophy

The chapter contributes to the development of a pluralistic conception of moral philosophy consisting of a diversity of descriptive activities by exploring one example of how to combine an understanding of the particulars of moral life with the more general and abstract insights traditionally developed in moral philosophy, namely via moral philosophy’s engagement with literature. The chapter is motivated by the argument that the irreducible role of the particular in moral life raises a demand for moral philosophy to interact with other disciplines which may serve as sources of knowledge about the particularities of moral life. It is argued that engagement with literature offers us knowledge by acquaintance and possibilities of moral cultivation, and that literature can be a suitable partner for moral philosophy in three activities that differ from the development of moral theories: namely in the exploration, the critique, and the development of moral life. The last type of activity, where literature is a partner for moral philosophy in initiating forms of moral change, is given special attention, and it is shown that this is an integrated part of moral philosophy, even if it is currently underexplored.

Particularities of Moral Contexts

We can only become competent moral thinkers by engaging in our community, but even if our communal practices and language in this way provide us with the resources necessary for moral thought, they may also be the source of moral bias, distortion, and corruption, a problem which is explored in this chapter with the aim of understanding the connection between moral thought and moral context. In opening, the chapter addresses the question of whether the embeddedness of the moral subject in a particular context or community challenges the possibility of moral responsibility, but its main part is devoted to the question of how context influences our moral thought and responsibility. An investigation of cases of changes in language use and linguistic practices demonstrates how we face a twofold moral responsibility, both for what we say and do and for the practices in which these sayings and doings are embedded. A further discussion of moral practices leads to the insight that even if particular practices can inhibit or distort moral thought, they cannot make certain moral thoughts or judgements inaccessible to us. Nonetheless, even if we in principle may think any moral thought in any context, context still greatly influences what thoughts we have reason to think, making some moral insights readily accessible while hiding or marginalising others. This again points to a general moral responsibility for critical moral reflection on context.

The Critique of Moral Theories

This chapter surveys criticisms raised against moral theory from positions such as virtue ethics, particularism, anti-theory, and Wittgensteinian moral philosophy in order to identify the most central and damaging objections. It locates the origin of theory critique in two classic papers by Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe and proceeds to give an overview of the most influential points of criticism from the second half of the twentieth century. This overview is contrasted with an explication of the dominant understanding of moral theory presented in the work of Martha Nussbaum, which allows for an identification of the crucial objections to moral theory, here presented in the form they take in the work of Bernard Williams. The objections are that theories cannot provide a foundation for moral practice, and that they do not possess the authority necessary to serve as action-guiding in any substantial sense. The conclusion of the chapter is that proponents of the dominant understanding of moral theory cannot offer convincing answers to these objections, and that this points to a need to re-evaluate our understanding of both the role and the form of moral theories.