Analysis of the Legislative Resolution of the European parliament on the Common European Sales Law

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.

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International Sales of Goods in the European Union Before and after the Adoption of the Common European Sales Law

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2161350 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Filip Celadnik

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

The European Union ◽

Before And After ◽

The Common ◽

Common European Sales Law ◽

International Sales

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The European Parliament and the Layered Politicization of the External Dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy

Politics and Governance ◽

10.17645/pag.v7i3.2178 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 7 (3) ◽

pp. 237-247 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Hubert Zimmermann

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Policy Process ◽

Empirical Test ◽

European Parliament ◽

Veto Players ◽

Political Dynamics ◽

Fisheries Policy ◽

Decision Making Processes ◽

The Common ◽

Policy Fields

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect, the European Parliament became a core player in the decision-making processes of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its external dimensions. This new role suggested a shift towards stronger politicization in what had previously been a rather technocratic policy field. However, the CFP is not yet marked by a clear and consistent level of politicization. I use the concept of ‘layered politicization’ to explain this pattern. Although it is not comparable to the degree of political controversy shaping fully politicized policy fields, some similar political dynamics can be observed. Among them is a transformation in the policy process due to higher ratification requirements; a higher likelihood of political deadlock resulting from an increasing number of veto-players; and a strengthening of the contested legitimacy of EU decision-making. An empirical test of these theoretical propositions is provided here in the form of two case studies; the negotiation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Morocco and Mauritania.

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