scholarly journals La liberté est-elle divisible? Comment rapprocher les concepts de mission et de sécurité dans une politique étrangère américaine

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-531
Author(s):  
Cathal J. Nolan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
International System ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
American Diplomacy ◽  
American Mission

This article seeks to outline the complex pattern of liberty and national security in international relations through a survey of the historical relationship between those concerns in the foreign policy of what is still the world's most important democratic country, the United States. This study is not a history per se of American diplomacy concerning this cluster of issues, although it is historical in approach. Nor is it directly concerned with an on-going theoretical debate over whether or not democracies are inherently more peaceful than other types of states, despite drawing upon elements of that debate and having implications for it. Instead, what is presented here is an interpretive survey of the importance in U.S. foreign policy of a set of key ideas about international order — specifically, the attempt to resolve ideas of "American mission " with the requirements of security, through increasingly active linkage of U.S. national security to the internal character of foreign regimes. It then explores how that tension became manifest in two policy settings : the United Nations, one of America's major multilateral relationship s, and the Soviet Union, its principal bilateral relationship. In short, this study is concerned with governing ideas in American diplomacy; with how such ideas arise and are sustained or challenged; with how they have been disseminated among allies (and even adversaries) ; and the implications of the reality that the United States have succeeded in imbedding these notions in the structures of the international System. The essay concludes with what should prove a controversial, qualified approval of the new 'liberal realism' evident in American foreign policy in the early 1990s.

Where Do We Go from Here?

1948 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-141
Author(s):  
Bryce Wood
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Indirect Aggression ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The United Nations

These four publications appeared in the latter half of 1947 but all of them were written near the middle of the year. Three of them deal directly with the policy which the United States should adopt toward the Soviet Union. The concern of Mr. Armstrong at first seems to be limited to “the two main objectives of American foreign policy”: “to help Europe live and to strengthen the United Nations.” Subsequently, however, although Mr. Armstrong is nowhere explicit on this point, it appears that these are techniques, rather than objectives, for the first would avert the “planned social and economic disintegration” furthered by the Soviet Union, while the second would diminish the effectiveness of Moscow's policy of “indirect aggression.” It is, therefore, not unreasonable to include Mr. Armstrong among those offering answers to the question: Where do we go from here in seeking equilibrium and even an accord with the Kremlin?

No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 176-191
Author(s):  
Aaron Wildavsky
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Structural Basis ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Government

I wish to consider the possibility that a good part of the opposition to the main lines of American foreign policy is based on deep-seated objections to the political and economic systems of the United States. This is not to say that existing policy is necessarily wise or that there may not be good and sufficient reasons for wishing to change it. Indeed, at any time and place, the United States might well be overestimating the threat from the Soviet Union or using too much force. What I wish to suggest is that across-the-board criticism of American policy as inherently aggressive and repressive, regardless of circumstance – a litany of criticism so constant that it does not alert us to the need for explanation – has a structural basis in the rise of a political culture that is opposed to existing authority.To the extent that this criticism is structural, that is, inherent in domestic politics, the problem of fashioning foreign policies that can obtain widespread support is much more difficult than it is commonly perceived to be. For if the objection is to American ways of life and, therefore, “to the government for which it stands,” only a transformation of power relationships at home, together with a vast redistribution of economic resources, would satisfy these critics. If the objection is not only to what we do but, more fundamentally, to who we are, looking to changes in foreign policy to shore up domestic support is radically to confuse the causal connections and, therefore, the order of priorities.

The Making of a Cold Warrior: Karl Gruber and Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945–1953

1995 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 99-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Bischof
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Difficult Time ◽  
The Status ◽  
Small Powers

In the years 1945 to 1953, Karl Gruber exerted an influence over Austrian foreign policy at times resembling the dominant influence of a Kaunitz or a Metternich. But as a diplomatist Gruber did not come close to the finesse and shrewd sense of power that his two great predecessors possessed. Moreover, Gruber had to maneuver in less predictable domestic and international terrain. During his tenure in the Ballhausplatz, foreign policy wassubject to domestic partisan struggle as well as parliamentary control and public opinion. Furthermore, Austria no longer figured as a great power and was locked into the monumental Cold War struggle between East and West on the frontline of the superpower tensions. Gruber operated in an extremely hostile international environment. Instead of the traditional well-balanced nineteenth-century “concert of powers,” which had profited so much from Austrian professional statesmanship, the inexperienced Gruber faced the United States and the Soviet Union, which were in almost total control of international politics. The two superpowers were engaged in a gigantic ideological struggle, each striving for a preponderance of power. A small nation such as Austria was buffeted to and fro between the conflicts in Central Europe and could hardly escape the pull of the global “empires” fashioned at the time. The United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other in spiraling arms races (nuclear and conventional) and rigid alliance systems in an uneasy truce called the Cold War. In this context of a tight bilateral international system, even England and France—the former great powers reduced to the status of middling powers after the ignominious loss of their great colonial empires—had a difficult time holding on to their traditional influence in the international arena. Small powers like Austria were largely impotent, unless they fashioned for themselves some room to maneuver between the superpower blocs.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Problems for the United States in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, 1956–64

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
China’S Foreign Policy

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.

Crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Persian Gulf ◽  
The United States ◽  
Persian Gulf War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
Foreign Policy Strategies

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.

1. Theories of US foreign policy

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
International System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Offensive Realism ◽  
Defensive Realism ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines some of the competing theories that have been advanced to explain U.S. foreign policy. In trying to explain the foreign policy of the United States, a number of competing theories have been developed by International Relations scholars. Some theories focus on the role of the international system in shaping American foreign policy while others argue that various domestic factors are the driving force. The chapter first considers some of the obstacles to constructing a theory of foreign policy before discussing some of the competing theories of American foreign policy, including defensive realism, offensive realism, liberalism, Marxism, neoclassical realism, and constructivism. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the theoretical debate over the origins of the Cold War and the debate over the most appropriate grand strategy that the United States should follow in the post-Cold War era.

14. US foreign policy in Russia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Rutland
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Vladimir Putin

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised a number of questions that have profound implications for American foreign policy; for example, whether the Russian Federation, which inherited half the population and 70 per cent of the territory of the former Soviet Union, would become a friend and partner of the United States, a full and equal member of the community of democratic nations, or whether it would return to a hostile, expansionary communist or nationalist power. The chapter considers US–Russia relations at various times under Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, and Donald Trump. It also discusses a host of issues affecting the US–Russia relations, including the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the crisis in Kosovo and Ukraine, and the civil war in Syria.

India’s Proxy War in Sri Lanka

Proxy War ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 182-200
Author(s):  
Tyrone L. Groh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Proxy War ◽  
The Government ◽  
War Policy

This chapter presents a case study for how India initially supported the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) covertly to protect ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka and then later had to overtly intervene to stop LTTE’s operations during efforts to broker peace. For the duration of the conflict, India’s support remained covert and plausibly deniable. Inside Sri Lanka, the character of the conflict was almost exclusively ethnic and involved the government in Colombo trying to prevent the emergence of an independent Tamil state. Internationally, the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other global powers, for the most part, remained sidelined. Domestically, India’s government had to balance its foreign policy with concerns about its sympathetic Tamil population and the threat of several different secessionist movements inside its own borders. The India-LTTE case reflects history’s most costly proxy war policy.

Rational Superiority, Crises, and Arms Control, 1961–1963

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Rhetoric ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Test Ban

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.

Future Forces and Future Policies

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 35-39
Author(s):  
Richard L. Garwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Great Improvement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
National Capital ◽  
Missile Attack ◽  
Do So

Pertinent Highlights of the SALT Agreements: The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow May 26, 1972, were the result of more than three years of negotiation by the Nixon Administration. They provide the basis for a great improvement in national security. The ABM Treaty recognizes the technical reality that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can defend its population or industry against ballistic missile attack and that it is not simply wasteful but counterproductive to try to do so. The treaty limits each side to a negligible defense at two sites—the national capital and another at least 800 miles away. Furthermore, it limits the number of radar complexes around the national capital to six, at most, and the number of interceptors at each of the two sites to 100, with the clear implication that not only should these defenses against missiles be penetrable but also destroyable by those missiles.

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